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EFFORT: BEFORE AND UNDER THE 1954 CODE
PETER MILLER-"
THE Internal Revenue Code of 1954 points up the paradox that the
capital gains tax often applies to gains not from an investment of capital but
from personal effort.1 The new Code, however, is merely the latest in a
series of recent statutory amendments and court decisions which have made
a fine art of converting personal service income into capital gain. The tech-
niques of this art have become so numerous that it is now appropriate to
survey them both for their practical value to the taxpayer 2 and for their
implications for the rationale of favored treatment of capital gains. This
review will show that the opportunities for capital gains treatment are almost
non-existent where the taxpayer has only a contractual right to perform
tMember of the New York Bar. The author is indebted to Martin A. Roeder, Esq., for
his stimulating conversations as to Section V and to Eugene R. Anderson, Esq., for his
assistance in research on Sections II and III.
1. The dichotomy of income from personal effort ("earned income") and income from
capital investment ("unearned income") will be used throughout this article in preference
to some economists' conception of capital as the "congealed" labor of a prior period. See 1
XVORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF DAVID RicARwo 52 (Sraffa ed. 1951). The distinction
between earned income and unearned income is largely one of degree: at one end of
the spectrum is the stock market profit of the passive investor; at the other is the wage
claim of the unskilled laborer. But ordinarily neither element is found in such pure form:
the investor's profit is often due in part to his study of the market; the employee's com-
pensation may reflect a substantial "capital expenditure" for vocational or professional
training. See U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23 (a) -15 (f) (1953). But see Coughlin v. Com-
missioner, 203 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1953), reversing, 18 T.C. 528 (1952) ; Hilly . Commissioner,
181 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1950), reversing, 13 T.C. 291 (1949) ; LT. 4044, 1951-1 Curu. BuLL.
16.
2. The present inquiry is not concerned with cases involving only questions of fact,
e.g., whether compensation for personal services has been disguised as part of the purchase
price for a capital asset whose market value cannot easily be ascertained. See, e.g., Fred
MlacMurray, 21 T.C. 15 (1953) (Commissioner failed to prove any part of profit from sale
of screenplay was additional compensation for seller's performance in film based on the
screenplay) ; Irving R. Lewis, 19 T.C. 887 (1953) (part of sales price of stock held to be
salary owed by corporation to vendor) ; NV. P. Melton, 11 T.C.M. 133 (1952) (Tax Court
refused to find sale of stock in liquor stores a "subterfuge!' compensation for seller-incor-
porators' influence and services in obtaining inventory) ; Commissioner v. Beamsley, 205 F.2d
743 (7th Cir. 1953), reversing, 18 T.C. 988 (1952) (payments by corporation purportedly
for surrender of its stock held not taxable at ordinary rates to seller's husband as compen-
sation for his influence in obtaining business for the corporation).
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personal services as an employee or independent contractor; that they become
substantial where the taxpayer performs his services as a sole proprietor or
partner; and that they are maximized where the services are performed for a
corporation in which he holds stock.3 The sequence of the following discus-
sion reflects these increasing opportunities for tax saving: PAOF
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3. The normal activities of attorneys, brokers, investment bankers, and even politicians
often afford them information not generally available to the public concerning speculative
new ventures requiring only nominal investment and sometimes opportunities to buy stock
not offered for sale to the public. Although the resultant capital gains are partly attribu-
table to the individual's personal activities, they do not involve the conversion of potential
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LEGISLATIVE INTENT
The capital gains provisions of the Internal Revenue Code are of two main
types. The general language of Sections 1201, 1202, 1221, and 1222 of the
1954 Code-Section 117 of the 1939 Code-provides long-term capital gain
treatment of profit from the "'sale or exchange" of "property" held for more
than six months.4 The second type includes specific provisions dealing with
certain narrowly-defined transactions. These specific provisions furnish the
best available evidence of legislative intent, but they form no simple pattern:
even while enlarging the opportunities for capital gains treatment of personal
service income in some situations, Congress, in others, has stated that this is
an improper use of the capital gains tax and has limited such opportunities.
Personal Service Holding Companies
Probably the earliest significant legislative action was the 1937 attempt to
curb "incorporated talent" arrangements by amending the personal holding
company provisions. Prior to this amendment, an executive or entertainer
commanding high compensation frequently made his services available at a
modest figure to a family corporation, which then contracted to furnish his
services at their true value to third parties. The Ways and Aleans Committee
objected to this scheme on the ground that the difference between the com-
4. IxT. Rav. CODE: OF 1954, § 1221 and INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 117(a) (1) exclude,
among other things, stock in trade and real and depreciable property used in business from
the category of "property" qualifying as a "capital asset."
5. Not until after 1937 did the courts threaten to upset arrangements of this type ante-
dating the amendment Compare Commissioner v. Laughton, 113 F2d 103 (9th Cir. 1940),
remanding, 40 B.T.A. 101 (1939), discussed in text at note 370 in!ra, uith Fontaine Fox,
37 B.T.A. 271 (1938). See also Jones v. Page, 102 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1938) (Bobby Jones,
the golfer, taxed on compensation notwithstanding "sale" of his services for a nominal
amount to his father, who assigned the compensation to a trust for Jones' children.)
1954]
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pensation received by the corporation and that paid to the performer was taxed
at low corporate rates rather than graduated individual rates.0 It is obvious
that this device produced no tax avoidance if, in order to cash in on the
corporate accumulation, the taxpayer received dividends taxed at full indi-
vidual rates. Hence, congressional condemnation of this scheme as a "loop-
hole" seems due, at least in part, to the fact that it made possible a conversion
of personal service income into capital gain by the performer-taxpayer's sale
of stock or liquidation of the corporation.
7
To plug this "loophole," Congress added income received by a corporation
from "personal service contracts" to the category of "personal holding com-
pany income."' 8 In most cases,9 this provision would subject the corporation to
a confiscatory penalty surtax on undistributed earnings and would compel its
earnings to be distributed-and taxed at graduated rates-to the stockholder." °
Combined corporate and personal taxes make it cheaper for the stockholder
not to channel income from "personal service contracts" through a corporation.
Although its effect is drastic, the incorporated-talent amendment is so nar-
row in scope that it may not be an accurate barometer of legislative intent.
By its terms, it is applicable only when either the contract or someone outside
the corporation designates the individual who is to perform the services.1
Thus, if the customer will accept the services of any one of several men, the
compensation of each can be accumulated by their corporate employer for
later capital gains treatment.' 2 In view of its restricted operation, it is debat-
6. H.R. REP. No. 1546, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1937), 1939-1 Cum. BuLL., pt. 2, 707.
7. Other factors would include: (a) the splitting of the taxpayer's earnings with rela-
tives in lower brackets, (b) the postponement of the capital gains tax, giving the taxpayer
the use of funds with no interest paid to the Government, and (e) the elimination of the
capital gains tax if the sale or liquidation were delayed until after the taxpayer's death, at
which time the basis of the stock in the hands of his estate or legatee would become its fair
market value at the date of death or one year thereafter. INT. Rsv. CODE OF 1939, § 113 (a)
(5) ; INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1014.
8. "PERSONAL SERVICE CONTRACTS-(1) Amounts received under a con-
tract under which the corporation is to furnish personal services; if some person other than
the corporation has the right to designate (by name or by description) the individual who
is to perform the services, or if the individual who is to perform the services is designated
(by name or by description) in the contract; and (2) amounts received from the sale or
other disposition of such a contract." Revenue Act of 1937, § 353(e), 50 STAT. 814 (1937),
corresponding to I NT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 502 (e) and INT. Rav. CoDE OF 1954, § 543 (a) (5).
However, such amounts are personal holding company income only if at least 25 percent of
the corporate stock is held "directly or indirectly" by the performer.
9. To be a "personal holding company" subject to the surtax, more than fifty percent of
the outstanding stock must be held by not more than five individuals and eighty percent of
the corporation's gross income must consist of "personal holding company income." INT'.
Rav. CODE OF 1939, § 502(a) ; INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 542(a).
10. The surtax is 75 percent on the first $2000 of undistributed "personal holding com-
pany income" and 85 percent thereafter. INT. Ray. CODE OF 1939, §§ 500, 504, 505; INT. Rat.
CODE OF 1954, §§ 541, 545.
11. See note 8 supra.
12. Some of the difficulties encountered in accumulating income are discussed in text
at notes 364-482 infra.
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able whether the amendment reflects a broad congressional policy to subject
all personal service earnings to the graduated income tax. But, at the very
least, the amendment does imply that a combination of the regular corporate
income tax at the time of earning and capital gains tax later is not always
an acceptable substitute for the graduated personal tax.
Termination Distributions by Employce Trusts
If the 1937 personal holding company amendment does reflect a congressional
policy against capital gain treatment of earnings from personal services, this
policy underwent a sharp modification in the 1942 amendment to Section
165 (b).13 This amendment provided that if in a single year by reason of sever-
ance of employment, an employee or his beneficiary receives from a qualified
pension, profit-sharing, or stock-bonus trust, a final distribution in excess of
his contributions to the trust, the excess is to be taxed as long-term capital
gain. The Report of the Senate Finance Committee is not explicit as to its
purpose,' 4 but the measure was undoubtedly adopted to mitigate the possible
confiscatory effect of taxing the employee at ordinary rates in a single year on
employer contributions and trust income accumulated over many years. Pre-
sumably capital gains treatment was preferred to the pro-rating relief of
Section 107 15 because it was more easily understandable by low-salaried
employees with no ready access to tax advice. The limited scope of the 1942
amendment makes it again unlikely that much thought was given to broad
implications. 16
Assuming the propriety of capital gains treatment, it was anomalous for
the 1942 amendment to grant it to lump-sum distributions by trusteed plans
but not insured plans; or to beneficiaries of employees who die before retire-
ment but not to those who die after retirement; or to an individual employee
who leaves the company but not to all employees when the company ceases
business and the plan terminates. Although the 1954 Code allows capital gains
in all these cases, the Committee Reports are silent as to underlying policy.'1
Section 165(b) has raised itself by its own unrationalized bootstraps.
13. Revenue Act of 1942, § 162(a), 56 STAT. 862 (1942), corresponding to .Th. Rv.
CODE OF 1939, § 165 (b) and INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 402 (a) (2).
14. Sax. Rm. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 138 (1942), 1942-2 Cum Buu.. 607.
15. Irr. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 107; INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1301.
16. This portion of § 165(b) has been narrowly construed. Estate of Frank B. Fry, 19
T.C. 461 (1952), aff'd, 205 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1953) ; Edward Joseph Glinshe, 17 T.C. 562
(1951) ; P. S. 61, P-H 1947 FE. TAX Seam. 1 76,237. But cf. Mary Miller, 22 T.C. No. 41
(1954).
Section 165(b) has been tvice amended: in 1951 to permit the postponement of capital
gain tax on any part of the termination distribution representing appreciation in the value
of securities of the employer corporation, Revenue Act of 1951, § 335(a), 65 STAT. 507
(1951), and in 1952 to postpone the tax on appreciated employer securities purchased with
employee contributions, even when the distribution is not occasioned by termination of em-
ployment, 66 STAT. 766 (1952).
17. INT. REv. CODE: OF 1954, §§ 402(a) (2), 403(a) (2). Capital gains treatment of dis-
tributions occasioned by liquidation of an employer corporation is limited by § 402(e) to
1954]
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Restricted Stock Options
The "bootstrap" principle of statutory growth is also illustrated by the
development of Section 130A.18 This provision treats an employee who
exercises an option to purchase stock of his corporate employer the same as
an investor who happens to buy stock at a bargain price: no tax is imposed
until-and unless 19-- the stock is sold and then only at capital gains rates.-"
Section 130A contains a number of "limiting" requirements.2 ' The most im-
portant of these is that the option price must be at least 85 percent of fair
market value of the stock when the option is granted,2 2 a rule supposedly
intended to limit capital gains treatment to "incentive" as distinguished from
"compensatory" options. This rule presumes that the distinction between
stimulus and reward is significant for capital gains purposes 23 and that the
test of taxability should be the size of the bargain "spread" on the date of the
grant of the option rather than the date of its exercise. But even the incentive
theory compensates personal services-future services-of the employee. Thus
with Section 130A Congress broadened the capital gains tax to include at least
some of the fruits of personal effort.
The legislative history of Section 130A affords no clue as to how Congress
reconciled this extension of the capital gains provisions with previous state-
ments as to their purposes.2 4 The Senate Finance Committee merely argued
trust distributions made during the calendar year 1954. The original House version of this
provision was to have permanent effect and was much broader in scope-so broad that small
corporations probably could have been dissolved and reincorporated every few years to
withdraw the plan's funds as capital gain. See, e.g., H. R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 401
(b) (2) (B) (1954) (hereinafter cited as "H.R. 8300 (House Bill)").
18. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 130A, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 421.
19. If the employee dies before selling the stock, its appreciation in value to the date of
death escapes taxation by reason of INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 113 (a) (5) ; INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 1014, except to the limited extent provided in INT. REV. CoDE OF 1939, § 130A(b)
and INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 421(b). As to the effect of death prior to exercise of the
option, see INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 421 (d) (6), 691 (c) (2) (B).
20. If the option price is between 85 and 95 percent of the value of the stock when the
option is granted, part of the profit on resale may be taxed as ordinary income under INT.
REv. CODE OF 1939, § 130A(b) and INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 421(b). The entire profit is
capital gain if the option price is at least 95 percent. SEN. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d
Sess. 60 (1950).
21, For example, the Senate Report asserts that the requirement that the employee hold
the stock for six months insures that he "actually invests in the stock of the company for a
considerable period." Id. at 60. This requirement is largely illusory both because a six-
month investment is not likely to provide much "incentive" and because the employee could
not sell the stock for at least six months without forfeiting long-term capital gain treatment
anyway.
22. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 130A(d) (1) (A); INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 421(d)
(1) (A).
23. For a criticism of this viewpoint, see Miller, The Treasury's Proposal to Tax
Employees' Bargain Purchases, 56 YALE L.J. 706 (1947), and letter from Dean Erwin N.
Griswold to the author, dated May 22, 1947, reproduced in 93 CONG. REC. A4323 (1947).
24. There is no comprehensive official statement of the purposes of the capital gain tax,
but such scattered utterances as appear in the Committee Reports and Treasury publications
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that a graduated tax in the year of purchase might force the employee to sell
some of the "incentive" stock to pay the tax.2 i This may be a sound argument
for deferring the tax until disposition of the stock or death of the employee,
but it does not explain why the deferred tax should be a capital gains tax.
The rationale of "restricted" stock options becomes even more uncertain
with the extension of capital gains treatment to "variable price options" in the
1954 Code.26 This provision makes it possible to set the option price by formula
at 85 percent of fair market value of the stock on the date the option is ex-
ercised.27 The executive-optionholder thus can receive the maximum 15 per-
cent bargain spread if the value of the stock drops after the option is granted.P
It is not easy to harmonize this amendment with the original "incentive"
theory of Section 130A since it preserves the tax benefit to the executive, not
only where the stock declines despite his best efforts (as in a nationwide
recession), but also where the decline is caused by his own lack of diligence.P
Furthermore, since the valuation problem can apparently be eliminated by an
agreement that the option price shall be the "fair market value of the stoci:
on the exercise date as finally determined for federal income tax purposes," '
the amendment no longer squares with the 1950 statement of the Senate
Finance Committee that the 5 to 15 percent spread is intended to afford a
margin for error in valuation."'
are collected in FEDERAL INlomE TAx TR.EATM&NT oF CkPiTAL GAuis A.ND LossEs (1951).
See also Miller, The 'Capital Asset' Concept: .4 Critique of Capital Gains Taxation, 59
YALE L.J. 1057-86 (1950). The most important single statement appears in the 1921 Report
of the Ways and Means Committee advocating favored treatment for capital gains on the
ground that "[t]he sale of farms, mineral properties, and other capital assets is now serious-
ly retarded by the fact that gains and profits earned over a series of years are ... taxed as a
lump sum... in the year in which the profit is realized. Many such sales with their possible
profit taking, and consequent increase in the tax revenue, have been blocked by this feature
of the present law." I.RL REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1921).
25. SErx. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1950). U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.2"-
(a) -1(c) (1953), would tax as ordinary income the excess of market value at the time of
exercise over the option price. For the reception of this regulation in the courts, see text
at notes 324, 325 infra.
26. IxTr. REv. CODEOF 1954, § 421 (d) (1) (A) (ii).
27. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 46-7, A153-4 (1954) ; Smtr. REP. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 59, 61, 2934 (1954).
28. Presumably the executive receiving a "variable price option" may also be given a
conventional fixed-price "restricted stock option!' which would be more favorable if the stock
value rises after the option date.
29. Still this theory is repeated in H.R. REP'. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1954),
which recommends that favored treatment be denied to options exercisable over a period
longer than 10 years: "This action was taken because options granted over a longer period
of time are almost certain to benefit the employee even if there is no action on his part to
increase the success of his employer."
30. This drafting device is analogous to "marital deduction' will clauses which leave
to the surviving spouse "an amount equal to one-half of the adjusted gross estate as finally
determined for federal estate tax purposes."
31. "Ordinarily when an option is used as an incentive device, the option price approxi-
mates the fair market value of the stock at the time the option is granted. However, many
19541
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Literary, Musical, and Artistic Creations
A reconciliation of Section 130A with official statements as to the scope
of the capital gains provisions is further complicated by the fact that the
Revenue Act of 1950 which introduced Section 130A also amended the general
definition of "capital assets" in Section 117(a) (1)82 to exclude a literary,
musical, or artistic composition, a copyright, or "similar property"' held by a
taxpayer "whose personal efforts created such property."8 4 This amendment
was designed to overrule administrative 3r and judicial 80 decisions that an "out-
right sale" of a manuscript by an "amateur" author qualified as the sale of a
capital asset.37 The Committee Reports characterized this interpretation as a
"loophole" because "the taxpayer receives long-term capital gain treatment
on the product of his personal effort."' 8 At first blush this statement shows
congressional disfavor of capital gains on any products of personal effort-
stocks are not listed on exchanges and therefore the fair market value is difficult to deter-
mine. Hence, your committee's bill requires that to qualify as a 'restricted stock option' the
option price at the time of issuance must be 85 percent or more of the fair market value of
the stock." SEN. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1950).
32. Revenue Act of 1950, § 210(a), 64 STAT. 932 (1950), corresponding to INT. Rev.
CODE OF 1939, § 117(a) (1) (C) and IxT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1221(3).
33. An example of "similar property" is "a radio program which has been created by
the personal efforts of the taxpayer." H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1950).
The problems of Jack Benny and "Amos 'n' Andy" prior to this amendment are discussed
by Mintz, Entertainers and the Capital Gains Tax, 4 TAx L. REV. 275 (1949).
34. Section 117(a) (1) also denies capital gains treatment when such property is sold
by any other person required to use the creator's cost basis, e.g., a donee or controlled cor-
poration. Attempted avoidance of the statute by transferring the property to a corporation
and then selling its stock may run afoul of § 117(m), also added by the 1950 Act (now § 341
of the 1954 Code), which applies ordinary income tax rates to gain realized upon the sale of
stock of a "collapsible corporation."
35. The Bureau's ruling that the income-reputedly $1,000,000--from the sale of
"Crusade in Europe" was taxable at the 25 percent capital gain rate rather than graduated
rates up to 77 percent appears to have saved General Eisenhower roughly $500,000 in tax.
N.Y. Times, June 2, 1948, p. 31, col. 5.
36. Apparently all the cases permitting capital gains treatment of the proceeds of
literary, musical, and artistic property (as distinguished from patents and inventions) were
decided after the ruling for General Eisenhower discussed in note 35 siupra: Herwig v.
United States, 105 F. Supp. 384 (Ct. Cl. 1952) (sale of motion picture rights to "Forever
Amber" by Kathleen Winsor) ; Richard W. TeLinde, 18 T.C. 91 (1952) (sale of copyright
to medical treatise); St. George v. Reynolds, P-H 1953 FED. TAx SE.Rv. [ 72,370 (D.C.
Minn. 1952) (sale of book by non-professional writer). See generally Fulda, Copyright
Assignments and the Capital Gains Tax, 58 YALE L.J. 245 (1949).
37. The statutory basis of such rulings was that the assignment of exclusive rights in
the taxpayer's creation was a "sale" of "property" and that, because of the infrequency of
the taxpayer's dealings of this type, such "property" was not excluded from the "capital
asset" category as "property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of his trade or business." INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1939, § 117(a) (1) (A). See
Miller, The "Capital Asset" Concept: A Critique of Capital Gains Taxalion, 59 YAiE L.J.
837, 851-60 (1950).
38. H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1950); SEN. REP. No. 2375, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1950).
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at least in the absence of a special statutory exception like that for "restricted
stock options." Such an inference is refuted by the Committee Reports them-
selves in commenting on the statutory exclusion of "similar property":
"The interest of a sole proprietor in such a business enterprise as a
photographic studio is not 'similar property' even though the value
of the business may be largely attributable to the personal efforts
of the sole proprietor." 39
Possibly the "loophole" statement can be reconciled on the basis of the practical
difficulty of separating the personal-effort element from the other intangibles
sold as part of a going business.
40
Inventions, Patents, and Designs
Congress' loophole-closing policy is also contradicted by its decision to allow
capital gains treatment to sales of inventions and patents by the "occasional
inventor." The Finance Committee refused to follow the House in den)ing
such treatment explaining:
"The desirability of fostering the work of such inventors outweighs
the small amount of additional revenue which might be obtained
under the House bill, and therefore the words 'invention,' 'patent,'
and 'design' have been eliminated from this section of the bill.1
41
This is the only congressional pronouncement since the genesis of favored
treatment for capital gains in 1921 which affirmatively states that such treat-
ment should be given to the fruits of personal effort, not "under some special
provision such as that for "restricted stock options" but under the general
language concerning the "sale or exchange" of "capital assets."4' There had
been numerous court decisions, especially in the Tax Court, construing this
general language to permit capital gains on the sale of a patent by its inventor.4 3
But these opinions failed to distinguish between the profit made by an inventor,
which is primarily compensation for his personal efforts, and the profit made
on the sale of a patent acquired by an investment of capital. Furthermore,
these decisions can be criticized for applying the statutory word "property"
mechanically and ignoring the absence of any indication that Congress intended
the capital gains tax to apply to the sale of an invention by its inventor.44
By supplying evidence of legislative approval of capital gains for inventors,
Congress implied a major shift in the underlying philosophy of capital gains
taxation.45 Since 1942, when the minimum holding period was reduced from
39. H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong.,2d Sess. 92 (1950).
40. See text at note 181 infra.
41. SED. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1950).
42. b4r. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 117(a) ; INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1221.
43. See cases collected in Miller, supra note 37, at 851-60.
44. See note 24 supra.
45. See Miller, supra note 24, at 1057-86, for a discussion, of the theories adv.anced with-
in and without Congress.
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eighteen months to six months, 40 the statute has not harmonized with the
theory that the purpose of capital gains treatment is to mitigate the impact
of graduated rates on profits arising over several years. The six-month hold-
ing period was rationalized as sufficient to distinguish "speculative" from "in-
vestment" profits.47 Somehow capital gains treatment is thought to be appro-
priate for the profit on a sale of an "investment, ' 48 even though it arose in
less than a year.4 9 Although it is possible to "invest" in business intangibles
such as patents, an amateur inventor's investment is usually minor in com-
parison to the value of his personal efforts. Accordingly, congressional ap-
proval of capital gains for inventors expands the rationale of the capital gain
provisions beyond the encouraging of "investment." Unfortunately the new
rationale of capital gains is not spelled out by the Committee Reports. The
only clue lies in the Finance Committee's assertion of "the desirability of
fostering the work" of occasional inventors. This statement assumes that
capital gains treatment should be used to encourage "desirable" types of per-
sonal effort, and that personal effort is "desirable" if it results in an invention,
a patent, or a design but not if it results in a literary, musical, or artistic work,
a copyright, or "similar property."
Even if these assumptions are accepted, their objectives cannot effectively be
accomplished under the general language of the statute pertaining to the "sale
or exchange" of "capital assets." The basic difficulty is the negative statutory
definition of "capital assets" as everything within the broad sweep of the
.word "property" except what is explicitly excluded. For this reason the
policy of fostering pamateur invention was expressed, not by an affirmative
statement in the statute, but by silence-by failing to mention patents along
with copyrights as one of the exclusions from "property." Statutory drafts-
manship which describes the hole but not the doughnut does not lend itself to
a precise outline of the scope of an intended tax incentive.50 Furthermore,
46. Revenue Act of 1942, § 150(a) (1.), 56 STAT. 843 (1942).
47. "It is believed that a holding period of 6 months will be a sufficient deterrent to the
speculator as contrasted with the legitimate investor." SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. 50 (1941).
48. The phrase "held for profit or investment" modified "capital assets" in Revenue Act
of 1921, § 206(a) (6), 42 STAT. 233 (1921), but was deleted by Revenue Act of 1924, §208
(a) (8), 43 STAT. 263 (1924), for the express purpose of extending capital gain treatment
to profit on the sale of a personal residence and other "property held for the personal use or
consumption of the taxpayer or his family." SEN. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 22
(1-924).
49. See Miller, supra note 24, at 1058-9.
50. For example, it is not clear whether capital gain treatment is available for un-
patentable intangibles such as technical know-how and secret trade formulae. A secret pro-
cess has been held to be "property" susceptible of having a March 1, 1913 value for purposes
of INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 113(a) (14) (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1053). George S.
Mepham, 3 B.T.A. 549 (1925). Cf. Nelson v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 1, 6 (6th Cir. 1953):
"It is well established that secret processes may constitute property and be dealt with con-
tractually as such." But even if such intangibles constitute "property," payment for them
might not be the proceeds of a "sale or exchange" unless received in the sale of a busi-
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there was little reason to encourage the "sale or exchange" but not the licens-
ing of inventions. And even if a transaction qualified as a "sale or exchange," 1
the inventor's right to capital gains treatment depended on such fortuities as
whether his prior inventions had been sold or licensed,r  and whether his sales,
present and prior, were "to customers."' 3 Obviously these technicalities did
not provide rational criteria for determining who was the "occasional inventor"
deserving to be encouraged by tax benefits.51
These technicalities are largely, but not entirelyrm eliminated by the 1954
Code which seeks "to provide a larger incentive to all inventors to contribute
to the welfare of the nation."' 0 Section 1235 specifically authorizes long-term
capital gains treatment of the consideration received for a "transfer" of the
rights evidenced by a patent or patent application. The statute applies whether
or not (a) the taxpayer is an amateur,57 (b) the invention is held for six
months, or (c) the transaction would qualify as a "sale or exchange"--the
consideration may be payable periodically during the transferee's use of the
patent or may be "contingent on [its] productivity, use, or disposition."35
The amendment is significant in marking a retreat from the only congressional
attempt to use the general language of the capital gains provisions to en-
courage personal effort.
ness, in which event the intangibles would probably be treated as part of good will, as in the
Mepham case.
51. The authorities appear still to be in conflict on the distinction between a sale and a
license. Compare Gregg v. Commissioner, 203 F.Zd 954 (3d Cir. 1953) ; Eterpen Financiera
Sociedad De Responsabilidad v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 100 (Ct. CL 1952) ; Mim. 6490,
1950-1 Cum. But- 9; and Rev. RuL 54-409, 1954 Ix. Rv. Bur.. No. 39 at 10 (1954)
with Kavanagh v. Evans, 188 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1951) ; Allen v. Werner, 190 F.2d 840 (5th
Cir. 1951) ; Kronner v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 730 (Ct. CI. 1953) ; and Edward C.
Myers, 6 T.C. 258 (1946). See also Joseph A. Fields, 14 T.C. 1202 (1950), aff'd, 189 F2d
950 (2d Cir. 1951). See Note, 63 HAnv. L. REv. 853 (1950).
52. Compare Harvey v. Commissioner, 171 F2d 952 (9th Cir. 1949), and Harold T.
Avery, 47 B.T.A. 538 (1942), with Samuel Diescher, 36 B.T.A. 732, aff'd, 110 F2d 90 (3d
Cir. 1940) ; Edward C. Myers, supra note 51; and Leo P. Curtin, 6 T.C.ML 457 (1947).
53. William L. Kelly, 6 T.C.M. 646 (1947).
54. See Miller, The "Capital Asset" Concept: A Critique of Capital Gains Taxation,
59 YALE L.J. 837, 860 (1950).
55. Sn. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 441 (1954), states that § 1235 is not intended
to affect the operation of "existing law" in areas beyond its scope, e.g., the status of corporate
inventors. See note 50 supra. The House version of § 1235 was to have been "exclusive."
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., _d Sess. A280 (1954).
56. Ibid.
57. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1235(b) (1). The new provision also applies to non-
inventors who purchased an interest in a patent from the creator before the invention is re-
duced to practice. Id. § 1235 (b) (2). This is intended to extend capital gains treatment to
"individuals who contribute financially toward the development of the invention." San. REP.
No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 440 (1954).
58. INT. RFv. CODE OF 1954, § 1235(a) (2). According to Sm. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 439 (1954), the phrase is intended to cover "amounts which are measured by a fixed
percentage of the selling price of the patent article, or are based on units manufactured or
sold, or any other method measured by profits, production, sale or use. '
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Collapsible Corporations
Further evidence of congressional ambivalence toward the capital gains
status of income from personal efforts is found in the half-way treatment of
"collapsible corporations" in Section 117(m), also a product of the Revenue
Act of 1950.r, Single-venture or born-to-die corporations had long been used
in a variety of situations in which the element of personal effort was not pre-
dominant.60 Undoubtedly it was their use by motion picture producers, writers,
and actors to convert compensation into capital gain which first aroused public
attention and legislative action.61 The essence of the "collapsible corporation"
scheme was the creation of a separate corporation to produce each film. After
the film was produced but before the corporation received box-office income,
the stockholders would dissolve the corporation and realize a long-term
capital gain on the difference between their investment and the fair market
value of the corporate property distributed to them-the film itself or contracts
under which it was to be distributed.62 They would obtain a stepped-up basis
for this property equal to its fair market value. This basis could then be
amortized to offset box-office income and permit it to be received tax-free. 0
The stockholders would thus substitute a capital gains tax for both the cor-
porate income tax and the personal income tax on dividends.
4
Sections 117(m) limits this double tax avoidance to the avoidance of only
one tax. If the corporate tax is escaped by a sale of stock or distribution of
property (in liquidation or otherwise) before realization of income by the
corporation, Section 117(m) requires the stockholders to report their profit
as ordinary income rather than long-term capital gain. But if the corporation
has realized, and paid tax on,65 a "substantial" part of the income from its
productive activities, Section 117(m) is inapplicable and the stockholders may
still enjoy long-term capital gains. 6 In this respect Section 117(m) is more
lenient than the 1937 personal holding company amendment 67 which denies
59. Revenue Act of 1950, §212(a), 64 STAT. 906 (1950). INT. REV. CoDE oF 1939,
§ 117(m) ; INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 341.
60. H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1950), mentions their frequent use in
the construction industry.
61. See President Truman's message to Congress. N.Y. Herald Tribune, Jan. 24, 1950,
p. 14, col. 3.
62. The statutory mechanics are outlined in Miller, Capital Gains Taxation under the
Revenue Act of 1950, N.Y.U. 9TH INST. ON FE. TAX. 675, 683-5 (1951).
63. The fair market value used in computing the gain (and the stepped-up basis) would
be equal to the estimated income from the film. If the post-liquidation receipts by the stock-
holders exceeded this estimate, the excess was taxable as ordinary income. Lewin v. West-
over. 53-2 U.S. TAX CAs. 9619 (D.C. Cal. 1953). Cf. Osenbach v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d
235 (4th Cir. 1952) (ost-liquidation income fnder INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 112(b) (7),
now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 333).
64. Compare Herbert v. Riddell, 103 F. Supp. 369 (S.D. Cal. 1952), with Bittker &
Redlich, Corporate Liquidations and the Income Tax, 5 TAX L. REv. 437-48 (1950).
65. See discussion of § 337 of the 1954 Code in text at notes 453-5 infra.
66. But see text at notes 425-6 infra.
67. See text at notes 5-12 supra.
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capital gain treatment to income from personal efforts even though the regular
corporate income tax has already been levied on such income.
Inconsistencies within the single Revenue Act of 1950 evidence the piece-
meal congressional approach to capital gains on personal efforts and the lack
of a philosophy as to the purposes of capital gains taxation. Use of the cor-
porate form to obtain capital gain treatment of personal service compensation
was condemned in the case of "collapsible corporations" at the very same time
that it was facilitated in the case of "restricted stock options"; capital gains
treatment w-as denied to authors, musicians, and artists but approved for
inventors.
Cmmnutation of Contingent Dcferrcd Compensation
Section 117(p), 68 enacted in 1951, also bears the earmarks of random
tinkering. This section accorded long-term capital gains treatment to the
amount received for the assignment or release by a former employee of his
right to receive deferred compensation under a contract which measured such
compensation by the employer's profits or receipts for at least five years after
termination of employment. This special treatment was available only if the
entire payment had been received within one taxable year, if the employment
relationship had existed for at least twenty years, and if the rights to the
future payments had been part of the terms of employment for at least h,:elve
years.
69
Although this section applied to only a few taxpayers,70 and has been sub-
stantially repealed without explanation by the 1954 Code,"' its rationale de-
serves attention both because it allowed capital gains treatment of compensation
received directly from the taxpayer's employer and because it typifies the
legislative approach to capital gains during recent years. The Senate Finance
Committee thought it "unduly harsh" to apply graduated rates to the commuted
value of several years' income received in one year merely because "the em-
ployee may not wish to leave his retirement income dependent upon the operation
68. IxTr. REv. CODE or 1939, § 117(p), as added by Revenue Act of 1951, §329(a), 65
STAT. 452 (1951).
69. The Committee Reports are silent as to the purpose of the 12 and 20 year require-
ments; presumably they were intended to discourage the creation of new profit-sharing
rights expressly for the capital gain upon release of such rights.
70. Shannon, Bill Put Through for L. B. Mayer Saved Movie Mak'cr 3 1/4 Million,
New York Post, Jan. 15, 1952, pp. 2,14.
71. Section 117(p) of the 1939 Code was listed as corresponding to § 405 of the 1954
Code in Cross Reference Table I of H.R. 8300 (House Bill), but neither § 405 nor any
other reference to § 117(p) appeared in the text of the bill or the accompanying H.R. Rp.
No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954). SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1954),
states: "Your committee agrees with the House's objective of removing this provision
prospectively but took that action in such a way as not to affect individuals who prior to 1954
entered into employment contracts relying on the application of this provision." (Emphasis
supplied). As restored by the Senate in § 1240 of the 1954 Code, capital gains treatment
remains available for contracts created prior to the enactvent date of the Code, August 16,
1954.
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of the business subsequent to the severance of his connection with it. ''72 But,
presumably, the employee would never have entered into this unusual contract
had he not been willing to take the risks involved in having his deferred
compensation depend upon post-employment profits or receipts. He has en-
joyed lower graduated rates during his active years, and at retirement has
the opportunity to spread his remaining compensation over several years.73
Congress does not explain why he is entitled to further tax relief when his own
act causes him to receive the entire balance in a single year.74
Assuming that some form of tax relief is appropriate for lump-sum settlements
of deferred compensation,75 it seems more consistent to provide such relief
through Section 107 76 than by granting capital gains treatment. Section 107
apparently received no consideration from the Senate Finance Committee, 77
while two arguments for capital gain treatment were presented to the Com-
mittee by the United States Chamber of Commerce.78 The first was that this
type of lump-sum payment is analogous to a termination distribution made
under Section 165 (b) by a "qualified" pension, profit-sharing, or stock bonus
trust upon severance of employment. The analogy is not apt, for Section
165 (b) is part of an elaborate system of tax benefits supplementing Social Se-
curity by encouraging private employee trusts which meet carefully prescribed
standards for the prevention of discrimination in favor of high-salaried em-
ployees.79 The second argument for capital gains taxation under Section
117(p) began with the assumption that deferred compensation measured by
post-employment profits or receipts is characteristic of cases involving "the
72. SEN. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1951). The "Old Folks at Home" con-
notations of the word "retirement" were not supported by the text of § 117(p) which merely
required that the employment terminate.
73. The few decisions in this area leave little reason to doubt this result. See com-
mentaries collected by Barrett, Current Develonnents in the Deferred Compensation Mys-
tery, N.Y.U. 11TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 133 n.1 (1953). This income-spreading was express-
ly permitted by § 401(c) of H.R. 8300 (House Bill). See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 43 (1954). Section 401(c) was eliminated by the Senate without explanation.
74. See Eisenstein, A Case of Deferred Compensation, 4 TAX L. REv. 391 (1949).
75. To obtain a release of the employee's right to share in future profits or receipts, the
employer might agree to pay the lump-sum in installments over several years, thus convert-
ing the arrangement into the garden variety of deferred compensation. Rearrangements of
this type have been permitted by the courts under certain circumstances. See, e.g., Com-
missioner v. Oates, 207 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1953), affirming, 18 T.C. 570 (1952) ; Howard
Veit, 8 T.C. 809 (1947), 8 T.C.M. 919 (1949).
76. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 107; INT. RBV. CODE or 1954, § 1301.
77. See SEN. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1951).
78. Statement of Ellsworth C. Alvord, Chairman, Committee on Federal Finance,
Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Hearings before Senate Commnittec on Finance
on. H.R. 4473, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1464, 1478 (1951).
79. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, §§ 165(a) (3), (4), (5); INT. Rsv. CoDa OF 1954, §§ 401
(a) (3), (4), (5). Many of the administrative interpretations of these sections are sum-
marized in Rev. Rul. 33, 1953-1 Cum. BuLL. 267, 275-87. Although the anti-discrimination
requirements were relaxed by § 501 (e) (3) of H.R. 8300 (House Bill), the Senate restored
the provisions of prior law. See SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 53-4 (1954).
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exploitation of some particular devices, productions, ideas, or other property,
for which the employee was largely responsible."8 0 This argument then asserts
that "no uncertainty would exist [concerning the employee's right to capital
gains] if, for example, the employee's efforts gave him a property right in a
particular patent which, upon termination of his employment, he sold to his
employer."8' The principal fallacy is that Section 117(p) is not limited to
cases in which the employee has left with his employer an "invention,"
"patent," or "design" created by him.8 2 Furthermore, even "occasional in-
ventors" often failed to obtain capital gains.8 3
Whatever their merits, the arguments in favor of Section 117(p) illustrate
the tendency of capital gains provisions to spawn other capital gains provi-
sions.8 4 This tendency is a natural consequence of the need to reason by an-
alogy to unrationalized existing capital gains sections. Like Topsy, the statute
has "just grow'd."
Accounts and Notes Receivable for Services Rendered
While special provisions of the 1954 Code broaden capital gains treat-
ment of inventions, stock options, and termination distributions under "quali-
fied" employee plans, the new Code excludes from the capital asset category
"accounts or notes receivable acquired in the ordinary course of trade or busi-
ness for services rendered or from the sale of" most non-capital assets.8 5 This
exclusion is primarily intended to allow an ordinary loss where a taxpayer
accrues the receivable as ordinary income and then sells it at a loss instead
of holding it until payment by the obligor.80 But, of course, the amendment
also precludes capital gains treatment of a profit on the sale of an account or
note previously taken into income at a discounted value. In other respects,
it seems merely to codify precedent which by analogy would deny capital gains
on the sale of claims for compensation.8 7  Nevertheless, the enactment
may signalize a new congressional policy to prevent income originating in
personal services from qualifying as the "sale or exchange" of a "capital asset"
under the general capital gains provisions. Other traces of this congressional
80. See statement cited note 78 supra.
81. See statement citednote 78supra.
82. If the "particular devices, productions, ideas or other property" created by the
taxpayer constituted "similar property" under IxT. Rzv. CoDE OF 1939, § 117(a) (1) (C),
the consideration for them would be taxable as ordinary income. See text at note 33 stipra.
83. See text at notes 51-4 supra.
84. Thus § 117(k) (2) of the 1939 Code, affording capital gain treatment to the "dis-
posal" of timber, was extended to coal by § 325 of the Revenue Act of 1951, 65 STAT. 452
(1951).
85. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1221(4).
86. H.R. RESP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 82, A273-4 (1954). Cf. Graham Mill &
Elevator Co. v. Thomas, 152 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1945) ; Rockford Varnish Co., 9 T.C. 171
(1947) ; and similar cases criticized in Miller, The "Capital Asset" Concept: A Critique of
Capital Gains Taxation, 59 YA=F, L.J. 837,871-7 (1950).
87. See text at notes 94-101 infra.
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attitude are found in the provisions of the 1954 Code which restrict capital
gains treatment of personal service receivables held by "collapsible partner-
ships ,,88 and collapsible corporations."8 9
CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS
Capital gains have been uniformly denied where the taxpayer sells a con-
tractual right to compensation for personal services, whether the services
have already been performed or are still to be performed. In the latter case,
however, an exception has been made for exclusive agency contracts. The de-
cisions lost by the taxpayer are important in marking the shoals which await
one who veers from the well-charted capital gains channels described in later
sections of this discussion. Most of these decisions turn on the general language
of Section 117(a) concerning the "sale or exchange" of "capital assets," since
Congress was silent as to the capital gains status of the fruits of personal effort




By excluding "accounts or notes receivable ... for services rendered" from
the "capital asset" category, 91 the 1954 Code destroys any statutory basis for an
argument that capital gains treatment is available, for example, to the cash-
basis doctor who receives value for an assignment of his claim for fees due
from patients. But because the new section is limited to receivables "acquired
in the ordinary course of trade or business," it is still necessary to look to the
court decisions to determine the status of rights to potential income arising
in non-recurrent transactions. Moreover, "accounts receivable" may be con-
strued not to include contingent claims.
The dearth of decisions on the capital asset status of personal service
claims under the pre-1954 Section 117 is easy to explain.92 During the
'twenties and 'thirties the possibility of obtaining capital gains was unlikely to
occur to taxpayers because of the limited purposes stated for the original 1921
enactment. 93 Furthermore, before the holding period was reduced to six
months in 1942, the assignment of a compensation claim could not have quali-
88. See text at notes 244-72 infra.
89. See text at notes 446-51 and 456-61 infra.
90. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, §§ 165(b), 502(e).
91. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1221 (4).
92. The cases most nearly in point are those stemming from Helvering v. Smith, 90 F.2d
590 (2d Cir. 1937), discussed in text at notes 216-20 infra. See also Bessie Lasky, 22 T.C.
No. 3 (1954), where capital gains were denied to Jesse Lasky, on a lump-sum payment re-
ceived from United Artists for the assignment of Lasky's claim against Warner Bros. for it
percentage of the receipts from a motion picture conceived by Lasky and based on a story
owned by him: "There was, in fact, only payment of the total accruals to Lasky through nit
intermediary." Id. at 16.
93. See note 24 supra.
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fled for favored treatment unless two years (later eighteen months) had
elapsed between the time the claim arose and the assignment, a likely situation
only in cases of deferred compensation.04 Still another explanation is found
in the discharge-of-obligation doctrine developed in Old Colony Trust Co. and
other early cases.95 These decisions treat a debtor as having received income
assigned to his creditor in discharge of his debt. Presumably, then, an assignor
could be taxed on compensation paid to his assignee when the assignment
was made in consideration of new value given expressly for the assigned
compensation. Finally, the assignment would probably run afoul of the
Supreme Court's Eubank rule.97 Eubank, a life insurance agent, was taxed
on "earned" but unpaid renewal commissions which he had assigned to a
trust. Although the Horst-Evbank opinion98 holds that assigned income is
taxable to the earner whether he assigns it before he earns it 09 or afterwards,
the case may also be significant for capital gains purposes because of the
distinction drawn between an assignment of rights in income-producing prop-
erty and an assignment of rights to income itself.100 This distinction may be
94. The two-year holding period of the Revenue Act of 1921, § 206(a) (6), 42 ST,%?.
232 (1921), was in effect until shortened to 18 months by Revenue Act of 1933, § 117(a)
(2), (4), 52 STAT. 500-01 (1938).
95. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929) (employee held taxa-ble
for compensation paid directly to Government as income tax on his behalf) ; Douglas v.
Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1 (1935) (husband held taxable on trust income paid directly to divorced
wife in discharge of his obligation of support) ; cf. Raybestos-,fanhattan, Inc. v. United
States, 296 U.S. 60 (1935) ; United States v. Joliet & Chicago Ry. Co., 315 U.S. 44 (1942).
96. The assignor would probably be permitted to offset the taxable assigned income by
a deduction to the extent of any discount given the assignee. See O.D. 1009, 5 Cim. Bu..
81 (1921) where a bank officer was required to report compensation for his services as re-
ceiver and trustee of the bank's insolvent debtor, but was allowed a business expense de-
duction for compensation turned over to the bank under a prior agreement. See also I.T.
1685, 11-1 Cum. BuL 72 (1923). But cf. Mayes v. United States, 207 F.2d 326 (10th Cir.
1953), affirming, 106 F. Supp. 961 (E.D. Okla. 1952), and cases cited therein. See also
W.B. Mayes, Jr., 21.T.C. 286 (1953).
97. Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940).
9. The opinion in Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940), vas intended to apply to
Eubank, a companion case.
99. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930), held a husband taxable upon the entire amount
earned by him notwithstanding a prior agreement with his wife that half of all his sub-
sequent earnings should belong to her. The Court reasoned:
"There is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who earned
them and provide that the tax could not be escaped by anticipatory arrange-
ments and contracts however skilfully devised to prevent the salary when
paid from vesting even for a second in the man who earned it. That seems to
us the import of the statute before us and we think that no distinction can be
taken according to the motives leading to the arrangement by which the fruits
are attributed to a different tree from that on which they grew."
Id. at 114-5.
100. The distinction is exemplified by Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937) (trust
income not taxable to life tenant after assignment of his entire interest in trust).
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used to exclude rights to personal service income from the word "property"
in the definition of "capital assets." But few cases are explicit on the point.101
Services Not Yet Performed
Not all payments for the assignments of rights under personal service con-
tracts are for claims based on services performed. A may pay B for the right
to perform B's contract with C. The question of capital gains for B is not
affected by the amended definition of "capital assets" in the 1954 Code because
B's contractual rights neither have been "acquired in the ordinary course of
trade or business" nor have they arisen from "services rendered." 2 This
amendment thus differs from analogous 1954 amendments relating to "col-
lapsible partnerships" and "collapsible corporations," both of which employ
language broad enough to preclude capital gains on contractual rights to com-
pensation for services "to be rendered.' 0 3
Standing alone, the 1954 Code might suggest that B's rights qualify as
"capital assets," but there is no indication that Congress intended to overrule
the leading case of Thurlow E. McFall.10 4  McFall contracted to serve for
five years as superintendent of the Sparta Foundry Co. for $100 per week
plus % of Sparta's annual profits. Two years later A. W. Clutter & Co., an
underwriting firm, purchased this contract for $175,000 cash because the
profit-sharing feature interfered with plans to raise additional capital for
Sparta. Still later, Clutter released Sparta from the contract in return for a
101. This type of reasoning is employed in Rhodes v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 50 (6th
Cir. 1942), affirming, 43 B.T.A. 780 (1.941), which invoked Horst-Eubank and similar de-
cisions to deny capital gains to the proceeds from an assignment of a declared dividend tin-
accompanied by a sale of the stock. And it seems implicit in several cases involving the
assignment for value of rights to income arising from personal effort. See General Artists
Corporation, 17 T.C. 1517 (1952), af'd, 205 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
866 (1953), discussed in text at notes 136-42 infra. Cf. Estate of Thomas F. Remington, 9
T.C. 99 (1947).
Without disputing the desirability of this result, one may wonder whether it logically
follows from the Earl-Blair-Eubank line of cases. In those cases the issue was the identity
of the taxpayer; under § 117 the issue is the character of the income-whether it is a type
that should be taxed at lower rates. Another distinction is that the makers of the gratuitous
assignments claimed that they never "realized" the assigned income, while the assignor for
value would claim that he has accelerated the "realization" of income. The latter distinction
is noted in G.C.M. 24849, 1946-1 Cum. BULL 66, involving the assignment of a short-lived
in-oil payment right carved out of a depletable interest in oil and gas in place. This ruling
is confusing insofar as it intimates that the Earl and Horst-Eubank cases have no bearing
upon an assignment for value, citing as authority for this view the Rhodes case, mipra.
102. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1221(4).
103. Id. §§ 741, 751 (a) deny capital gains treatment to that part of a payment for a
partnership interest which is allocable to "unrealized receivables," defined by Id. § 751 (c)
to include "to the extent not previously includible in income under the method of accounting
used by the partnership, any rights (contractual or otherwise) to payment for ... services
rendered, or to be rendered." A similar definition of "unrealized receivables" is found in
Id. § 341(b) (4) relating to "collapsible corporations." See text at notes 448-9 infra.
104. 34 B.T.A. 108 (1936).
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large block of Sparta's stock.'10  The Board of Tax Appeals held that the
$175,000 was not capital gain to MfcFall for four overlapping reasons: (1)
Before he had any contractual rights which he could sell, McFall was "obli-
gated to perform services for the company." 100 (2) Even if these rights were
"property," they were not "capital.'107  (3) Although the contract had been
in existence for more than two years (the holding period then in effect),
McFall's rights under it were "not the sort of property which is susceptible
of ownership for a length of time as is a share of stock, a bond, or a thing."'0 8
(4) "The purpose of the statute, whether it be liberal or strict, is not served
by including within it the contractual expectation of receiving pay for services
not yet performed."'' 09 Subsequent decisions apparently accept all four of
these reasons, but stress the first, that the contract itself was not transferable
property: "[the taxpayer's] qualifications and skill formed the material in-
gredient in the contract and such a contract cannot be sold.""10
"Sale or Exchange" Requirement
Even if it is a "capital asset," a right to income under a personal service
contract may not give rise to capital gains because the taxpayer has failed
to make a "sale or exchange." The term "sale" usually means a transfer
of property for cash or the transferee's promise to pay cash."' An "exchange"
is essentially a barter, differing from a "sale" in that the consideration received
105. Although McFall had no claim against Sparta for back pay, the amount received
from Clutter can be viewed as the delayed product of 1MfcFal1's personal efforts-not his
work under the profit-sharing contract, but his previous work which induced Sparta to share
its profits with him.
106. Thurlow E. McFall, 34 B.T.A. 10, 110 (1936). Certainly it was not intended that
McFall continue to work under the contract with his compensation paid to Clutter. It is
equally clear that Clutter was not to perform McFall's services during the unexpired term
of the contract. Had this been the plan, the Commissioner still could have argued that be-
cause a substitution would require the consent of Sparta, the transaction was not a "sale"
but a novation whereby McFall's contract was cancelled and a new one made vith Clutter.
107. Id. at 110. By this the Board may have meant that, when used in the definition of
"capital assets," the word "property" connotes a substantial investment of capital by the
taxpayer-a factor absent in McFall's case. It is arguable that the fact of little or no capital
investment should affect the amount of the gain but not its character as "capital gain."
108. Thurlow E. McFall, 34 B.T.A. 108, 110 (1936). Cf. Richard S. Doyle, 37 B.T.A.
323,330 (1938).
109. Thurlow E. McFall, 34 B.T.A. 108, 110-11 (1936). The opinion does not cite
congressional authority as to the purpose of the statute, but it presumably refers to the 1921
statement of the Ways and Means Committee, quoted in note 24 supra.
The Board also indicated its agreement with the Commissioner's alternate contention that
what McFall and his associate received was "the price to them of ending their contract, and
not of selling it." Thurlow E. McFall, 34 B.T.A. 103, 111 (1936).
110. George K. Gann, 41 B.T.A. 388, 397 (1940) (capital gains treatment denied to
payment received directly from taxpayer's employer for cancellation of unexpired term of
employment contract).
111, See, e.g., Hale v. Helvering, 35 F.2d 819, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1936).
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by the transferor consists, at least in part, of property other than cash.' 2 Thus
both "sale" and "exchange" ordinarily require a transfer by the taxpayer. 118
Because an individual who performs services is likely to receive reasonable
value for his rights to compensation only from his employer, 114 he rarely
can obtain capital gain on these rights. An attempted "sale" of such rights to
the employer runs into the general rule that where a right to receive payment
is surrendered to the prospective payor, there is a satisfaction, modification or
cancellation of the payee's right rather than the true assignment or transfer of
the right necessary to a "sale or exchange." ' For example, in W. Morgan
Shuster,"0' this rule precluded capital gains treatment of an employer's pay-
ment to an employee for the cancellation of the unexpired term of his employ-
ment contract. Similarly, where the services have already been performed,
cash payments by the taxpayer's employer have been treated as a satisfaction
of the taxpayer's contractual claim for compensation in other forms than a
112. See, e.g., Trenton Cotton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 33, 36, rehearing
denied, 148 F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1945) :
"'Exchange' is a word of precise import, meaning the giving of one thing
for another, requiring the transfers to be in kind, and excluding transactions
into which money enters either as the consideration or as a basis of measure."
Cf. Helvering v. Flaccus Oak Leather Co., 313 U.S. 247, 249 (1941). See also Gruver v.
Commissioner, 142 F.2d 363, 365-6 (4th Cir. 1944) :
"The criterion in determining whether a transaction is a sale or an ex-
change is whether there is a determination of the value of the things exchanged.
If no price is set for either property, it is said to be an exchange; but if each
is valued and the difference is paid in money, it is a sale."
113. But see Kessler v. United States, 124 F.2d 152, 154 (3d Cir. 1941):
".... the verb 'exchange' is not restricted in meaning to the idea of an inter-
change but includes as well the thought of merely giving up something in con-
sideration of the receipt of something else. Thus the plaintiff might have given
up his partnership interest in exchange for the stock even though that interest
as such did not pass to the corporation."
114. If the services have already been performed, a third party will rarely be willing
to purchase the taxpayer's claim for compensation, although he may accept an assignment
as security for a loan, retaining a right of recourse against the taxpayer. If the services
have not yet been performed, the taxpayer's rights have little value even as security.
115. Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941) (payment received by lessor from lessee
for cancellation of lease) ; Helvering v. William Flaccus Oak Leather Co., 313 U.S. 247
(1941) (gain from proceeds of fire insurance) ; Fairbanks v. United States, 306 U.S. 436
(1939) (gain realized by bondholder upon redemption of bond before maturity) ; United
Cigar-Whelan Stores Corp. v. District of Columbia, 176 F.2d 952 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (pay-
ment by lessor to lessee in cancellation of unexpired term of lease) ; Bingham v. Commis-
sioner, 105 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1939) (loss on reconveyance of realty previously sold by tax-
payer) ; Hale v. Helvering, 85 F.2d 819 (2d Cir. 1936) (settlement of a promissory note for
less than face value) ; Charles E. McCartney, 12 T.C. 320 (1949) (payment for contract
modification causing loss of profits to corporation partly owned by taxpayer) ; William G.
H. Finch, 1 T.C.M. 191 (1942) (payment for cancellation of contract to furnish inventor
with laboratory) ; Stewart E. Earle, 9 T.C.M. 1181 (1950) (mutual release of claims in
controversy).
116. 42 B.T.A. 255 (1940), aff'd, 121 F.2d 643 (2d Cir. 1941).
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sum-certain of cash, rather than the proceeds of a "sale or exchange" of his
claim.llT
The "sale or exchange" requirement may also prevent the assignee of a
claim from enjoying capital gains. In Martin Charles Ansorgc,"28 a lawyer
accepted as his fee an assignment of part of his client's claim in an expropriation
suit. Ordinary rates were applied to his share of the recovery he obtained on
the ground that he had made no "sale or exchange" of the claim but had merely
collected it. And this reasoning was extended to deny capital gains treatment
to the profit made by an attorney who paid cash for another attorney's share
of a joint fee."19
Yet a broader interpretation of "sale or exchange" has evolved during re-
cent years, apparently as a judicial reaction to the sweeping language of the
Supreme Court in Hort v. Conmmissioner. -° In Hort capital gains were denied
to a lessor who received a payment from his lessee for cancellation of the
lease. But instead of stating simply that this was the extinguishment of a
right rather than its "sale or exchange,"'' the Court reasoned:
"Where, as in this case, the disputed amount was essentially a sub-
stitute for rental payments which § 22(a) expressly characterizes
as gross income, it must be regarded as ordinary income, and it is
immaterial that for some purposes the contract creating the right to
such payments may be treated as 'property' or 'capital'. " 1
This may mean that capital gains treatment requires not only that there be
a "sale or exchange" of a "capital asset" but also that the proceeds of the
transaction do not take the place of ordinary income.2a
Since even the purest capital gain-the profit on the sale of stock-usually
involves a commutation of anticipated dividend income, the lower courts
117. Matilda S. Puelicher, 6 T.C. 300 (1946) (compromise of promissory notes given
as compensation) ; Joseph W. Frazer, 4 T.C. 1152 (1945), aff'd, 157 F2d 282 (6th Cir.
1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 807 (1947) (payment to employee for surrender of interest in
trusts for benefit of managerial employees) ; A.L. Parker, 5 T.C. 1355 (1945) (payment in
compromise of contract for percentage of profits of hotels brought into hotel chain by tax-
payer); Albert C. Becken, Jr., 5 T.C. 498 (1945) (cash payment in lieu of stock or.ed for
services).
118. 1 T.C. 1160 (1943), aff'd, 147 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1945). See also Sloane v. Com-
missioner, 188 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1951), affinming, Merton E. Farr, 11 T.C. 552 (1948);
Escher v. Commissioner, 78 F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1935) ; Frank Hodous, 14 T.C. 1301 (1950).
119. Pat N. Fahey, 16 T.C. 105 (1951). See also Joseph A. Guthrie, 42 B.T.A. 696
(1940) (profit on interest in decedent's residuary estate purchased by taxpayer) ; Galvin
Hudson, 20 T.C. 734 (1953) (profit on judgment claim purchased by taxpayer) ; Green v.
United States, 113 F. Supp. 295 (D. Neb. 1953).
120. Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941), followed in Rev. Rul. 129, 1953 INT.
REv. BulLT No. 16, at2 (1953).
121. This was the ground of the decision against the taxpayer by the Board of Tax
Appeals. Walter M. Hort, 39 B.T.A. 922,926 (1939).
122. Hortv. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941).
123. So interpreted in dissenting opinion of Judge Frank in the McAllister case, infra
note 125, and in Note, 56 YA.E L.J. 570 (1947). See also Levin & Mitosky, Tax Sating
Practices of Artists and Entertainers, 31 TAxEs 21,25 (1953).
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have understandably attempted to limit the Court's language to the facts
of the Hart case. They rarely invoke the Hart dictum where "sale or
exchange" would ordinarily have been found under pre-Hort decisions, i.c.,
where the taxpayer assigns his rights to a third party, as distinguished from
a transaction between the original parties. 1 24 Other decisions construe Hart
to turn on the fact that the right to future rentals did not survive as property
in the hands of the lessee. They find a "sale or exchange" if what the payee
gives up is property in the payor's hands, even where payor and payee are
the original contracting parties. 25 Still other cases imply that Hart is applic-
able only where the payment is a "substitute" for nothing more than ordinary
income: it does not preclude a "sale or exchange" between the original parties
to the contract, so long as the taxpayer parts with something more than a
naked right to income. And this "something" need not survive as property
in the hands of the payor.126
The conflict over whether there can be a "sale or exchange" of rights be-
tween original contracting parties is resolved by the 1954 Code in favor of
124. Hort was employed in cases involving transactions between the original parties
in: F. W. Jessop, 16 T.C. 491 (1951) (capital gains denied to employee receiving lump-sum
from his employer in consideration of cancellation of unexpired term of employment contract
and employee's covenant not to compete) ; Elmer John LaPointe, 2 T.C.M. 252 (1943)
(cash settlement of claim for wrongful discharge held ordinary income). However, in one
case the Hort dictum has been invoked to deny capital gains treatment of a payment from a
third party. Joseph Roscoe, P-H 1953 TC MEm. DEC. § 53,181 (1953), aff'd, 54-2 U.S. TAX
CAs. IT 9576 (5th Cir. 1954) (alternate holding that payment from purchaser of stock for can-
cellation of seller's exclusive brokerage contract with the corporation was a substitute for
future commissions).
125. Commissioner v. Golonsky, 200 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1953), affirminq, 16 T.C. 1450
(1951) (payment by lessor to lessee for surrender of possession and cancellation of unex-
pired term of lease) ; Commissioner v. McCue Bros. & Drummond, Inc., 210 F.2d 752 (2d
Cir. 1954), affirming, 19 T.C. 667 (1953) (payment by lessor to lessee for surrender of
possession under New York rent control laws).
See also McAllister v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1946) and Bell's Estate v.
Commissioner, 137 F.2d 454 (8th Cir. 1943). In denying that payments made by trust re-
mainderman for assignment of interest of income beneficiary were ordinary income because
a substitute for future trust income, both majority opinions distinguished Hort on the
ground that an income beneficiary's interest was "property" under the Blair case, supra
note 100. The alternate theory of the Tax Court, that Hort applied because Mrs. McAllister
"surrendered" rather than "sold" her interest, Beulah Eaton McAllister, 5 T.C. 714, 723
(1945), was also rejected by the Second Circuit, presumably because her interest was not
founded upon a contract with the remainderman (which could be cancelled) but upon the
will of the settlor. See Note, 53 CoL L. Rav. 976 (1953).
126. Jones v. Corbyn, 186 F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1950) (payment by insurance company
to insurance agent in cancellation of exclusive agency contract) ; Commissioner v. Ray, 210
F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1954), affirming, 18 T.C. 438 (1952) (payment by lessor for lessee's con-
sent to elimination of covenant prohibiting rental to lessee's competitors) ; Starr Brothers,
Inc., 18 T.C. 149 (1952), rev'd, 204 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1953) (payment by manufacturer to
retailer for cancellation of retailer's exclusive sales agency) ; Commissioner v. Goff, 212
F.2d 875 (3d Cir. 1954), affirming, 20 T.C. 561 (1953) (payment received from owner of
machines for cancellation of payee's exclusive right to products of machines).
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capital gains on two types of contracts. Section 1241 provides that a "can-
cellation" of a lease or distributorship agreement is to be treated as an "ex-
change" by the lessee or distributor. However, the Senate Finance Com-
mittee Report is explicit that the amendment is not intended to affect personal
service contracts, even by implication;- 7 accordingly, uncertainty may be
expected to continue in that area.L2
Exclusive Agency Contracts
Jones v. Corbyn l is not only the principal personal service decision to
depart from the traditional strict interpretation of "sale or exchange," but it
also implies that the term "capital assets" includes a right to earn future per-
sonal service income in an exclusive capacity. The Corbyns were granted
capital gains treatment on a $45,000 payment received from a life insurance
company in cancellation of their rights as the company's exclusive agent in
Oklahoma. Since the settlement took into account the fact that the agents had
previously earned $30,000 a year under the agency contract, it represented,
at least in part, the fruits of their prior services. The decision is based on the
theory that there was a "sale and transfer of a going business." But all that
the Corbyns gave up (apart from office space and records) was an exclusive
right to earn commissions by writing policies in the future. They expressly
reserved rights to renewal commissions already earned but payable in future
years and apparently retained the right to use the firm's name and its subagencies
to solicit insurance for other insurance companies.'3 0 Accordingly, the Corbyn
127. "The section is limited in scope and it does not constitute a reex-amination of pres-
ent law relating to contracts to which the section does not specifically apply." SE:.. REP. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1954). "Since the section only applies to distributor's agree-
ments in which the distributor has made a substantial capital investment in the distributor-
ship, this section will not apply to cancellation of agreements requiring no substantial capital
investment (as in Jones v. Corbyn, 186 F.2d 450) or to agreements that are not 'distributor's
agreements' relating to goods as distinguished from intangible property." Id. at 444. The
requirement of a substantial capital investment by the distributor but not by the lessee may
indicate a desire not to facilitate the conversion of personal service income into capital gain.
128. Because of Jones v. Corbyn, 186 F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1950), discussed in text at
notes 129-34 infra, and the Second Circuit cases which declare its interpretation of "sale or
exchange" unsound: Commissioner v. Starr Bros., Inc., 204 F2d 673 (2d Cir. 1953), re-
versing, 18 T.C. 149 (1952); General Artists Corp. v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 360
(2d Cir. 1953), affirming, 17 T.C. 1717 (1952), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 866 (1953). But see
Commissioner v. McCue Bros. & Drummond, Inc., 210 F.2d 752, 753 (2d Cir. 1954), distin-
guishing Starr and General Artists on the ground that "the right of possession under a lease
or otherwise, is a more substantial property right which does not lose its existence when it is
transferred." A better distinction probably would be that the taxpayer's right to possession
was derived from the New York rent control laws, so that no surrender of contractual rights
was involved.
129. 186 F2d 450 (10th Cir. 1950).
130. See dissenting opinion of Phillips, C.J.:
"Occidental did not acquire the right to use the name of the partnership,
or to otherwise receive benefit from the good will built up by the partner-
ship.... Occidental did not by virtue of the compromise agreement take over
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decision seems to mean that, although under the McFall rule 181 the "mere"
right to earn future compensation is not a "capital asset," it becomes a "capital
asset" if it is an exclusive right. But if McFall had nothing to sell because his
services were unique and he could not substitute someone to do his job,Z-
the Corbyns had little more since their agency contract could not be assigned
without the principal's approval.133 Thus the court seems to have erred in
stating that the contract "could be bought and sold.'
13 4
Although Corbyn was accepted by the Tax Court in Starr Brothers, Inc.,lm1
it was later rejected by both Tax Court and Second Circuit in General Artists
Corporation.136 GAC, a booking agency, had made contracts with Frank
Sinatra to act as his exclusive agent. GAC was to receive ten percent of
Sinatra's earnings from bookings it arranged, including earnings which might
be received by Sinatra from such employment after expiration of the contracts.
After performing booking services for Sinatra for part of the term of the con-
tracts, GAC "sold" them to MCA Artists, Ltd. MCA agreed, with Sinatra's
consent, to perform all of GAC's obligations, and the GAC contracts were
cancelled and replaced by new contracts between MCA and Sinatra running
well beyond the unexpired term of the GAC contracts. The "purchase price"
of the GAC contracts was half the commissions to be received from Sinatra
by MCA under both old and new contracts.
In rejecting GAC's contention that $39,000 received from MCA in the first
year was capital gain, the Tax Court and the Second Circuit agreed that
$15,500 of this amount, resulting from bookings arranged by GAC before
the "sale," was ordinary income to GAC under Eubank and other "assignment
of income" cases.1 37 The balance, for which GAC performed no services, was
said to represent the proceeds, not of a sale, but of the cancellation of the con-
a going business. It had to build or acquire a new agency and subagency per-
sonnel."
Jones v. Corbyn, 186 F.2d 450, 454-5 (10th Cir. 1950).
131. See text at notes 104-110 supra.
132. See George K. Gann, 41 B.T.A. 388 (1940), quoted in text at note 110 supra.
133. The agency contract was not "transferable without the consent of Occidental."
See Jones v. Corbyn, 186 F.2d 450, 455 (10th Cir. 1950) (dissenting opinion).
The indistinguishability of Corbyn and McFall is stressed in Phillips' dissent.
134. Id. at 452. See 2 WLLISTON, CoNtRAcrs § 421 (rev. ed. 1936) : "No right to per-
sonal service under a bilateral contract can be assigned by either party to it."
135. 18 T.C. 149 (1952). Capital gains treatment was granted to a payment by United
Drug Co. for cancellation of a retail drug itore's exclusive right to market United's products
in a city. In holding the exclusive contract a "capital asset," the Tax Court stressed the fact
that the store received a dealer's mark-up rather than commissions, adding that "the agency
contract did not require it to render personal services, though to be sure the petitioner ex-
pected to perform selling services in order to assure itself of income." Starr Brothers, Inc.,
18 T.C. 149, 153 (1952). The Second Circuit reversed solely on the ground that the can-
cellation was not a "sale or exchange," assuming "arguendo" that the taxpayer's exclusive
right was a capital asset. Commissioner v. Starr Bros., Inc., 204 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1953).
136. 17 T.C. 1517 (1952), aff'd, 205 F.2d 360 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S, 866
(1953).
137. See text at notes 97-101 supra.
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tracts. 135 A majority of the Tax Court concurred in giving as additional
reasons: The GAC contracts were not "salable property" under the McFall
rule because they called for GAC's personal services;129 "[i]f one person,
originally employed to do work, has another do the work, with the consent
of the employer, for a part of the charge, the entire amount received is still
ordinary income."'140 Only five members of the Tax Court were of the view
"that the interest of an agent in [an exclusive agency] contract is a property
right or 'capital assets' subject to sale just as was the insurance agency in
Jones v. Corbyn."' 41 Thus, there is now clear conflict of authority over whether
an exclusive contractual right to earn income by performing services in the
future is a "capital asset."'1
GOOD WML
Unlike the taxpayer who "sells" only a contractual right to earn income
through personal services, the taxpayer whose efforts have produced good
will 143 and other intangibles, such as trade names and trade-marks, often ob-
138. The Second Circuit cited its own decision in Starr Bros. expressly disapprov-
ing the holding in Jones v. Corbya that the cancellation of a contract could be a "sale or ex-
change." General Artists Corp. v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 360, 361 (2d Cir. 1953). Neither
the Tax Court nor the Second Circuit mentioned the fact that Gcneral lrtdsts differed from
the usual cancellation case in that GAC dealt, not with the other party to the original con-
tract (Sinatra), but with a third party (MCA). It can be argued that because an exclusive
agency contract can be "sold" to a third party only with the consent of the principal, the
transaction is not a "sale' but a novation whereby the old contract is extinguished and a
new one created between the principal and the third party. See notes 106, 124, 134 supra.
139. Ordinarily a corporation is free to choose any fit person to perform its contracts
for "personal services," but the findings of fact indicate that at least one of GACs contracts
with Sinatra "provided that two persons named, and those only, should personally supervise
Sinatra's business during the term of the contract but unnamed subagents employed by the
agent might handle agency matters for Sinatra or assist the named persons." General
Artists Corporation, 17 T.C. 1517, 1519 (1952).
140. Id. at 1523. The opinion cites Edwin J. McEnaney, 3 T.C. 552 (1944), in which a
contractor was taxed on net commissions after deducting compensation paid for subcontrac-
tor's services. This proposition was thought inapplicable to GAC's case by the five dissent-
ing Tax Court judges on the ground that GAC completely terminated its services for Sinatra
and did not merely employ AICA to perform them as a subcontractor.
141. General Artists Corporation, 17 T.C. 1517,1525 (1952).
142. See also Sammons v. Dunlap, P-H 1952 Frz. TAx SERv. ff72,578 (D.C. Tex.
1952) (held, without citation of authorities, general agency contract with a health and
accident insurance association is a "capital asset") ; Charles J. Williams, 5 T.C. 639 (1945)
(Tax Court refused to decide whether a general insurance agency %was a "capital asset" but
denied capital gains on other grounds). Cf. Camloc Fastener Corporation, 10 T.C. 1024
(1.948) (damages paid for cancellation of exclusive agency contract held to be deductible
business expense rather than capital investment).
143. Good will has been defined as the amount by which the capitalized earnings of a
going business exceed the value of its tangible assets. George J. Staab, 20 T.C. 834 (1953) ;
A.PM. 34, 2 Cums. BuLT. 31 (1920). Other definitions include only intangibles which exist
solely as part of the business (e.g., clientele) and cannot be sold separately. Pines, Fcdcral
Income Taxation of Intmagible Assets, 8 TAx L. Rnv. 231, 235 (1953). Although only the
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tains a capital gain on their sale. 144 The capital asset status of trade intang-
ibles is particularly important where they form part of an unincorporated one-
man enterprise. A proprietary interest in a partnership or corporation can
be sold as a single "capital asset." But, under the rule of Williams v. Mc-
Gowan,1"5 a sole proprietorship is merely the aggregate of its component
assets: machinery, inventory, fixtures, good will, and the like. Thus, when a
one-man business is sold, the proceeds are allocated among its various assets,
each of which must qualify separately for capital gains treatment. Where good
will stems from the proprietor's efforts to build up a commercial reputation,
the sales price allocated to good will is the fruition of these efforts.
Good Will in General
After giving scant attention to the matter until the late 1940's, 140 the courts
have unanimously held that good will is a capital asset, regardless of the extent
to which it reflects the activities of the owner of the business.' 47 The courts
have not, however, indicated how the sale of good will is to be distinguished
from the sale of a personal service contract. 48 The inconsistency is illustrated
by Elliot B. Snoak.149 Smoak contracted with the American Paper Bottle Co.
to act as its exclusive representative in the East, his compensation to consist of
part of the "royalties" from dairy companies using American's machines for
packaging milk. He spent $26,000 for an office, an advertising campaign, and
an organization for marketing, installing, and repairing the machines.50
American subsequently combined its business with Ex-Cell-O Aircraft & Tool
Corporation, which had its own established agencies to market and service
machines. Ex-Cell-O then induced Smoak to "sell" to it his rights under the
latter factors are mentioned in the classic definition of good will, SroRv, PARTIN.RSIIIPSS § 99
(1881.), adopted in Metropolitan Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., 149 U.S. 436, 446 (1893),
most tax decisions include all intangibles in good will. See, e.g., Union Metal Manufactur-
ing Co., 1 B.T.A. 395, 397 (1925). See, generally, Note, 53 COL. L. REv. 660 (1953).
144. Though economically akin to good will and trade names, patents and copyrights
receive special tax treatment. See text at notes 32-58 supra.
145. 152 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1945), approved in Watson v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 544,
552 (1953).
146. As late as 1947, a tax service could state: "No administrative or judicial inter-
pretation of the status of good will as a capital asset is available .... ." 2 CCH 1947 Fa),
TAx REP. f1865.097 (1,947).
147. See cases cited notes 176, 177, 188 infra. Cf. Rainier Brewing Co., 7 T.C. 162
(1946), aff'd, 165 F.2d 217, rehearing denied, 166 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1948) (trade name) ;
Seattle Brewing & Malting Co., 6 T.C. 856 (1946), aff'd per curiam, 165 F.2d 216, rehearing
denied, 166 F.2d 326 (9th Cir. 1948) (same). For congressional support of this rule see
quotation in text at note 39 supra.
148. Non-personal service contracts qualify as capital assets and thus need not be dif-
ferentiated from good will, at least so far as the seller of the business is concerned. See
Cowan, Tax Aspects of the Sale or Exchange of Contracts, 25 TAxEs 31 (1947).
149. 43 B.T.A. 907 (1941).
150. The opinion does not indicate how much of the $26,000 may have been deducted as
current business expense.
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contract with American, including his right to royalties from future licensees
within his territory, his right to future royalties from existing licensees, his
office files and records, and the good will he had built up. The Board of Tax
Appeals distinguished the McFall and Gann cases,' not on the ground that
Smoak's right to earn future income was an exclusive right, but on the ground
that Smoak gave up "much more" than this right-he sold a "going agency
business."'152 The Board held that such a business was a single "capital asset"
and that Smoak's entire profit was capital gain.
15 3
If the Snwak case had been decided after Willianms v. McGowan,254 Smoak's
profit would be allocated among the separate assets surrendered by him.
Theoretically, capital gain treatment would be accorded to the portion attribut-
able to good will, and ordinary rates would apply to the amount representing
future royalties, not only for services already performed 15 but also for services
not yet performed. 5 6 In practice, however, such allocation would be highly
artificial because "good will" and "future royalties" are only different names
for the discounted value of the same future income.
157
Trade Nanes and Slogans
In Ellen J. Franklin,58 the capital gains treatment of good will vms ex-
tended to cover compensation for the use of a trade name deriving its value
from the taxpayer's personal efforts. Mrs. Franklin was widely known as a
maker of womens' wearing apparel. To obtain capital, her wholly-owned
corporation transferred several retail shops to a new corporation which issued
part of its stock to the old corporation and part to other persons for cash. As
payment for the use of her name, the new corporation, "Mrs. Franklin Shops
of Philadelphia, Inc.," issued to Mrs. Franklin personally 200 shares of its stock
and promised to pay her $75 per week. In a prior decision the Tax Court
had held these weekly payments nondeductible by the corporation on the theory
that they represented the purchase price of good will, a capital asset.'5 0 De-
151. See text at notes 104-110 supra.
152. Elliot B. Smoak, 43 B.T.A. 907, 910 (1941). This characterization is debatable
because, although technically an "independent contractor," Smoak apparently received all
his commissions from American and did no "business" with anyone else.
153. Id. at 911. The Commissioner also argued that, even if Smoak's contractual rights
constituted a capital asset, they had not been sold but cancelled. The Board refused to con-
sider this argument-apparently because it construed the statutory notice of deficiency to
raise only the capital asset issue. Id. at 909.
154. See text at note 145 supra.
155. See text atnotes 92-101 supra.
156. See text at notes 104-110 supra.
157. This allocation can perhaps be defended on the ground that Smoak gave up future
income which would have been economically attributable partly to his contract vith Ameri-
can ("future royalties") and partly to his contacts with the dairies ("good will").
158. 6 T.C.M. 1099 (1947).
159. Mrs. Franklin Shops of Philadelphia, Inc., P-H 1947 T.C. MEza. DEc. 44,135
(1947).
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claring itself bound by this interpretation, the Tax Court held that the weekly
payments were capital gains to Mrs. Franklin. 1 0
The other cases which grant capital gains treatment to trade names and
trade-marks as "property"'"' in the nature of good will 102 each involve a
sale of the whole or part of a business. 10 3 This reflects the rule of substantive
law that trade names and trade-marks cannot be assigned or sold "in gross"
but only as part of the business using the name or mark.'"4 Accordingly, had
it not been for the transfer of the retail shops by her wholly-owned corporation,
Mrs. Franklin might have been taxed at ordinary rates on the ground that she
had merely licensed the trade name and not assigned it.160
In view of the important substantive differences between trade-marks and
copyrights, 166 it is doubtful that trade names and trade-marks are affected by
the exclusions from the "capital asset" category of a "copyright," a "literary
composition" or "similar property" created by the taxpayer's personal ef-
forts.1 67 However, if part of the good will of a sole proprietorship consisted
of a copyrighted trade-mark or trade name created by the proprietor, the Com-
160. Ellen J. Franklin, 6 T.C.M. 1099, 1100 (1947). No issue was raised as to the tax
treatment of the 200 shares of stock, presumably because they were received prior to the
year in controversy.
161, See Holmes, J. in Beech-Nut Co. v. P. Lorillard Co., 273 U.S. 629, 632 (1927):
"[I) n a qualified sense the mark is property, protected and alienable, although as with other
property its outline is shown only by the law of torts, of which the right is a prophetic sum-
mary." See also 52 Am. JUR. 513 (1944).
162. See J.S. Tyree, Chemist v. Thymo Borine Laboratory, 151 F.2d 621, 623 (7th Cir.
1945) : "The function of a trademark is to designate the goods as the product of a par-
ticular trader and to protect his good will against the sale of another's product as his." Cf.
Standard Brands v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1945) ; E. F. Prichard Co. v. Consumers
Brewing Co., 136 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1943).
163. Seattle Brewing & Malting Co., note 147 supra; Rainier Brewing Co., note 147
supra. The element of personal effort may have been present in Semon Amzalak, 12
T.C.M. 19,970 (1953) (family corporation realized capital gain from sale of store name).
164. Section 10 of the Lanham Act, 60 STAT. 431 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1953).
American Broadcasting Co. v. Wahl, 121 F.2d 412, 413 (2d Cir. 1941) : "A trade-mark is
intended to identify the goods of the owner and to safeguard his good will. The designation
if employed by a person other than the one whose business it serves to identify would be mis-
leading. Consequently 'a right to the use of a trade-mark or trade name cannot be trans-
ferred in gross.' Restatement Torts § 755." Cf. Kidd v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 617, 620 (1879).
It is only in unusual cases that a trade-mark may be transferred without the transfer of
physical assets. See Continental Distilling Corp. v. Old Charter Distillery Co., 188 F.2d
614 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
165. See Thomas D. Armour, 22 T.C. No. 24 (1954). There a professional golfer was
denied capital gains treatment on the ground that he had only licensed use of his name and
photograph by sporting goods manufacturers.
166. Compare 60 STAT. 427 (1946), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 et seq. (1953), with 61 STAT. 652
(1947), 17 U.S.C. §§ L et seq. (1953). See also United States v. Steffens, 100 U.S. 82 (1879),
holding statute for the registration of trade-marks unconstitutional under the "Authors and
Inventors Clause," U.S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, but suggesting that such legislation would
be permissible under the "Commerce Clause," Id., cl. 3.
167. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 117(a) (1) (C) ; INT. REv. CoDF OF 1954, § 1221(3).
There have been no judicial interpretations of these sections.
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missioner might seek to deny capital gains to a corresponding fraction of
the sales price of the business. 0 s There is probably a greater risk that the
"literary composition" and "similar property" exclusions will preclude capital
gains on a sole proprietor's advertising ideas and slogans.', 9 And even if such
intangibles should qualify as "property,"'170 the taxpayer's activities might
cause them to be excluded as "property held by the taxpayer primarily for
sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business."'1' Finally,
their disposition would have to be effected through a "sale or exchange"
rather than a licensing arrangement. 172 Because of these obstacles, capital
gains on advertising intangibles are likely to be available, if at all, only where
the intangibles can be treated as an integral part of good will upon the sale of
a going business.
173
Covenants Not to Compctc
Because a sale of good will is often accompanied by the seller's covenant
not to compete with the purchaser, and because a covenant not to solicit old
customers will be implied in most states on any sale of a business," 4 the
recent arrival of good will as a capital asset has forced the courts to distinguish
earlier decisions holding that payment received for a covenant not to compete
is ordinary incomeY.5 This problem and its judicial "solution" are illustrated
168. If good will is not to be excluded from the capital asset category as "similar
property" (see text at note 39 supra), it seems artificial to exclude good will merely because
copyrighted.
169. These intangibles may be more closely analogous to a radio program (see note 33
supra), than to the good will of a photographic studio (see text at note 39 supra).
170. Compare Belt v. Hamilton National Bank, 108 F. Supp. 6S9 (D.C. Col. 1952),
with Golding v. R.K.O. Pictures, 35 Cal.2d 690, 221 P.2d 95 (1950) ; Meyer v. Liggett &
Myers Tobacco Co., 101 Ind. App. 420, 194 N.E. 206 (1935) ; Larx Co. v. Nicol, 224 Minn.
1, 28 NAV.2d 705 (1946) ; and Ryan v. Century Brewing Assn., 185 Wash. 600, 55 P.2d
1053 (1936). Advertising ideas are sometimes protected without deciding whether they
constitute "property." Matarese v. Aloore-McCormack, 158 F2d 631 (2d Cir. 1946);
American Mint Corp. v. Ex-Lax, Inc., 263 App. Div. 89, 31 N.Y.S2d 703 (1st Dep't 1941).
171. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 117(a) (1) (A) ; INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1221(1). Cf.
Goldsmith v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1944), affirming, 1 T.C. 711 (1943), cerl.
denied, 323 U.S. 774 (1944) ; Fields v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 950 (2d Cir. 1951), affirm-
ing, 14 T.C. 1202 (1950).
172. See authorities cited note 51 supra.
173. I.e., where the parties do not themselves allocate part of the sales price to the in-
tangible as something distinct from good will
174. "[T]he sale of good will of a business carries with it, even in the absence of a
restrictive covenant, the implied obligation that the seller will not solicit his old customers
or do any act that would interfere with the vendee's use and enjoyment of that which he had
purchased." Cooper & Co. v. Anchor Securities Co., 9 Wash.2d 45, 55, 113 P2d 845, 850
(1941), quoted with approval in D. K. MacDonald, 3 T.C. 720, 728 (1944). See also Von
Bremen v. MacMonnies, 200 N.Y. 41, 93 N.E. 186 (1910).
175. See, e.g., Beals' Estate v. Commissioner, 8 F.2d 268, 270 (2d Cir. 1936): ("A
promise not to work for others or for oneself is no more a conveyance of property than is a
promise to enter the promisee's employ. Payment for either promise is income, not proceeds
received on disposal of a capital asset.") ; Cox v. Helvering, 71 F.2d 937 (D.C. Cir. 1934).
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by Aaron Michaels.17 There the entire profit upon the sale of a one-man
laundry business (except for profit from its inventory of linens) was held to
be capital gain, even though the taxpayer purported to sell his customer lists,
good will, and a covenant not to compete. The Tax Court reasoned:
"Where [the covenant] accompanies the transfer of good will in
the sale of a going business and it is apparent that [it] has the func-
tion primarily of assuring to the purchaser the beneficial enjoyment
of the good will which he has acquired, the covenant is regarded as
nonseverable and as being in effect a contributing element to the
assets transferred. 1 77
A distinction between "ancillary"'17 and independent covenants has little eco-
nomic substance, 17 but the appellate courts may hesitate to deny capital gains
status to "ancillary" covenants because of the practical difficulty of allocating
sales proceeds between such a covenant and the other intangibles of an unin-
corporated 180 business when capital or location have contributed just as much
as the owner's personal activities toward the value of the intangibles.18 '
Professional Practices
Since the good will of a professional practice ordinarily is due almost
exclusively to personal effort and the allocation problem is diminished, the
courts have been less inclined to find capital gains on the sale of a practice.
Cf. Estate of Mildred K. Hyde, 42 B.T.A. 738 (1940). See also Clarence C. Hamlin Trust,
19 T.C. 718 (1953), aff'd, 209 F.2d 761 (10th Cir. 1954).
176. 12T.C. 17 (1949).
177. Aaron Michaels, 12 T.C. 17, 19 (1949). Similar decisions: Ethel M. Cox, 17 T.C.
1287 (1952) ; Cox v. United States, 99 F. Supp. 518 (D.C. Ariz. 1951); Toledo Newspaper
Co., 2 T.C. 794 (1943). Cf. Toledo Blade Co., 11 T.C. 1079 (1948), aff'd per curilm, 180
F.2d 357 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 811 (1950).
178. "[T]he agreement to refrain from competition should be treated as a capital asset
ancillary to the transfer of good will and customers." Aaron Michaels, 12 T.C. 17, 20
(1949).
179. "When a man buys a business, he bargains for future extra profits. The seller gets
part of the expected future profits in the present because he built up the intangible assets that
will bring them. Agreeing not to compete, the seller promises not to seek the return of his
early labors for himself. The net effect is a reallocation of future incomes between buyer
and seller, whether there is a 'separable' covenant, an inseparable one, or no covenant at all.
Hence, there is no justification for taxing the sale of 'good will' as a capital gain while the
sale of a promise not to compete may result in ordinary income." Pines, Federal Income
Taxation of Intangible Assets, 8 TAx L. Rav. 231, 237 (1953).
180. Under present case law it is hard to predict when a covenant by the stockholders
of a closely-held corporation would be "ancillary" to the sale of the good will of the cor-
poration or "independent" and taxable as ordinary income under Beals Estate, s$ pra note
175. Compare George H. Payne, 22 T.C. No. 66 (1954) (capital gain computed on full sales
proceeds despite allocation of part to stockholders' covenant not to compete), with Hamlin's
Trust v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 761 (10th Cir. 1954) (portion of price allocated to stock-
holder's covenant taxed as ordinary income).
181. For a possible legislative solution of this problem, see Pines, supra note 179, at 238.
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In E. C. O'Rear,8 2 three attorneys formed a partnership with all fees to be
shared equally. O'Rear received $25,000 from each of the others in recognition
of the "conceded excess value of good vill and unearned [sic] fees of said O'Rear
put into the firm."18s3 On the theory that he had sold good will built up in his
individual law practice, O'Rear contended that no part of the $50,000 was
taxable income because it did not exceed the value of his practice on March
1, 1913,18- and, in the alternative, that any gain was capital gain. The Board
of Tax Appeals rejected these contentions because: a professional man cannot
transfer his reputation; O'Rear failed to prove the March 1, 1913 value of his
practice; the formation of the partnership did not purport to be a sale ;185 and
the same result could have been accomplished by giving O'Rear a larger share
of partnership income. 8 6 The $50,000 was held to be an advance payment
of partnership profits taxable as ordinary income.
Although O'Rear and several other cases suggest that a professional practice
can never possess vendible good will as a matter of law,' s 7 two recent Tax
Court decisions treat the rule as merely a presumption of fact which can be
overcome by evidence that the parties genuinely believed good will existed and
bargained for its sale. 88 In Richard S. WVylcr,18 9 a Kansas City accountant
became a local partner of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., a nationwide account-
ing firm, under an agreement by which he was to receive $10,000 per year
plus one percent of Peat, Manvick's net profits. In addition, Peat, Marwick
182. 28 B.T.A. 698 (1933).
183. E. C. O'Rear, 28 B.T.A. 698,699 (1933).
184. Revenue Act of 1921, § 202(b), 42 STAT. 229 (1921), corresponding to Irm. Rnv.
CODE OF 1939, § 113 (a) (14) ; INT. R-v. CoDE or 1954, § 1053.
185. The agreement referred to the payments as "a differential in division of fees and
income of the firm business" E. C. O'Rear, 28 B.T.A. 698, 699 (1933).
186. "Compensation for personal services is income regardless of whether it is paid
directly by clients or whether it is received through an arrangement with partners whereby
they advance certain amounts for the privilege of taking a larger share of the partnership
profits than their personal contribution would otherwise justify." Id. at 701.
187. D.K. fMacDonald. 3 T.C. 720, 727 (1944) (insurance agency: "good will does not
adhere to a business or profession, dependent solely on the :personal ability, skill, integrity
or other personal characteristics of the owner.") ; Charles F. Coates, 7 T.C. 125, 134 (1946)
(accounting firm: "Ordinarily no value, or nominal value, will be given to good va at-
taching to a personal service partnership such as one composed of physicians, attorneys or
accountants.') ; Estate of Thomas F. Remington, 9 T.C. 99 (1947) (insurance agency:
Coates followed). See also John Q. Shunk, 10 T.C. 293 (1948), rev'd on other grounds, 173
F.2d 747 (6th Cir. 1949). The tax cases reflect the substantive rule of Bailly v. Betti, 241
N.Y. 22, 26, 148 N.E. 776, 777 (1925) (name of the Flonzaley Quartet held not a salable
asset: "It has, however, never been held that a business dependent solely on... personal
skill and professional qualifications of the persons carrying it on possessed a good will or
co-partnership name, which could be sold ... . The contrary proposition is abundantly
established [citing cases].").
188. Rodney B. Horton, 13 T.C. 143 (1949) ; Richard S. Wyler, 14 T.C 1251 (1950),
discussed by the taxpayer in Wyler, Tax Court Says Gooduill Atloches to Accounting
Practice and May Be Sold, 90 J. or AccoUNTANcY 242 (1950).
189. 14 T.C. 1251 (1950).
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paid him $50,000 in cash for his practice-principally workpapers and good
will-and for an "ancillary" covenant not to solicit the clients of Peat, Mar-
wick, including his former clients, for three years after he should cease to be
a partner. 90 The Tax Court held that the entire $50,000 was capital gain
to Wyler, rejecting the Commissioner's contentions that a professional man
cannot sell good will and that the $50,000 was an advance payment of compen-
sation, either for Wyler's services while a partner or for his covenant not to
compete thereafter. 191 Instead the court found from the testimony, particu-
larly that of Wyler's partners, that his accounting practice, or its good will, 19 "2
was considered a salable asset by the parties, 9 3 that the entire $50,000 was
intended only as its purchase price, 94 and that the covenant merely ensured
the purchaser's enjoyment of the good will. This testimony was doubtless given
great weight because, by characterizing the transaction as a purchase of good
will, Wyler's partners forswore all tax benefit to themselves from the $50,000
payment, as a distribution of partnership profits, 19 5 through amortization,9 0
or perhaps even as a loss if the firm should terminate its existence. 19 7
The result of the Wyler decision is that $50,000 of potential income was taxed
not once, as ordinary income to Wyler, but twice, first as capital gain to Wyler
and later as ordinary income to his partners when realized by the firm. Although
190. Richard S. Wyler, 14 T.C. 1251, 1256 (1950). Wyler received separate considera-
tion for the sale of his office equipment, library, and supplies. Id. at 1255.
191. The agreement in E. C. 0'Rear, 28 B.T.A. 698 (1933), was distinguished because
it did not purport to be a "sale." Id. at 1261.
192. The court agreed with both taxpayer and Commissioner that the terms "account-
ing practice" and "good will" were here synonymous and noted "the probability that the
customers of the old establishment will continue their patronage." Id. at 1259.
193. Evidence was introduced at the trial that accounting practices are often bought and
sold. See Wyler, supra note 188, at 245.
194. In Rodney B. Horton, supra -note 188, the Tax Court arbitrarily halved the pro-
ceeds of the sale of an accounting practice, taxing half representing good will at capital gain
rates and the other half representing the seller's covenant not to compete as ordinary income.
No such allocation was made in Wyler, apparently because the narrower scope of Wyler's
covenant made it "ancillary" to the sale of his practice. See text at note 190 su1pra.
195. Compare Carol F. Hall, 19 T.C. 445 (1952), with N. Paul Kenworthy, 11 T.C.M.
60 (1952).
196. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23(1) -3 (1953): "No deduction for depreciation, in-
cluding obsolescence, is allowable in respect of good will." Rotan v. Commissioner, 56 F.2d
153 (5th Cir. 1932). Cf. R. Bryson Jones, 17 B.T.A. 1213 (1929); Bills Bros. Memorial
Corp., 7 B.T.A. 1182 (1927).
Because of this rule the purchaser of a going business has not been permitted to amortize
any part of the cost attributable to the seller's "ancillary" covenant not to compete. Toledo
Blade Co., 1.1 T.C. 1079 (1948) ; Harold J. Burke, 18 T.C. 77 (1952). Cf. Gazette Telegraph
Co., 19 T.C. 692 (1953) (covenant held "independent" and therefore subject to amortiza-
tion by the purchaser).
197. Harry C. Weeks, 1 T.C.M. 151 (1942). There a lawyer was denied a loss deduc-
tion for the amount paid to his partner for good will on the termination of the partnership.
The court reasoned that the taxpayer had failed to prove that he was not still "enjoying the
benefits of the original good will" purchased by him, even though he had moved his law
practice to another city. Id. at 154.
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this type of "double tax" is not unique,0 8 and presumably was reflected in the
terms of the bargain, 0 9 the resultant tax-shifting is illogical. Since Wyler would
have had no salable asset without the covenant to refrain from soliciting former
clients, the "capital asset" nature of his business depended upon the covenant,
which, had it not been "ancillary" to the asset, would have given rise to ordinary
income. Thus, apart from the question whether capital gains taxation is appro-
priate, the Wyler decision can be criticized for its circular reasoning. "
PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS
During the past decade the courts 201 and the Commissioner 20 2 have adopted
the view that a partnership interest is a single "capital asset" even though
composed of fractional interests in partnership assets, some of which could not
qualify separately as "capital assets. '20 3 This rule has made it possible for a
partner to sell his interest in the firm and enjoy capital gains on those personal
efforts which have produced good will, appreciated inventory, and possibly
198. Ever since United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156 (1921), one who purchases cor-
porate stock "dividend on" is fully taxable on the dividend even though it consists of profits
earned before the purchase and can be said to represent a return of capital to the purchaser.
See U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22(a)-i (d) (1953).
199. Wyler and his partners were aware of the tax consequences of their actions. This
is not always the case. See, e.g,, Clarence C. Hamlin Trust, 19 T.C. 718, 725 (1953) (dis-
senting opinion).
200. Such circular reasoning has a distinguished pedigree. See Holmes, J. in Cincin-
nati Packet Co. -v Bay, 200 U.S. 179, 184-5 (1906) : "It is said that there is no sale of good
will. But the covenant makes the sale. Presumably all that there was to sell, beside certain
instruments of competition, was the competition itself, and the purchasers did not want the
vendors' names."
201. Except for City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. United States, 47 F. Supp. 98 (Ct. Cl.
1942), the court decisions appear unanimous: United States v. Shapiro, 17S F.2d 459 (8th
Cir. 1949) ; Bass v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1949) ; Long v. Commissioner, 173
F.2d 471 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 818 (1949); Commissioner v. H. 1. Smith, 173
F2d 470 (5th Cir. 1949), affirming, 10 T.C. 398 (1948), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 818 (1949) ;
Commissioner v. Lehman, 165 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 819 (194) ;
United States v. Landreth, 164 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1947) ; Commissioner v. Shapiro, 125
F.2d 532 (6th Cir. 1942) ; Joseph Pursglove, 20 T.C. 68 (1953) ; Aaron Lowenstein Estate,
12 T.C. 694 (1949), aff'd sub nor. First Nat. Bank of Mobile v. Commissioner, 183 F2d
172 (5th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 911L (1951); Daniel Gartling Estate, 6 T.C.M.
879 (1947), aff'd, 170 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1948) ; George H. Thornley, 2 T.C. 220 (1943);
Dudley T. Humphrey, 32 B.T.A. 280 (1935).
202. G.C.M. 26379,1950-1 Cum BuLL 58, 59. This ruling limits capital gains treatment
"to those cases in which the transaction in substance and effect, as distinguished from form
and appearance, is essentially the sale of a partnership interest"
203. The "single capital asset" rule is contrary to the rule of Williams ,. 31cGocn,
discussed in text at note 145 supra (sale of a sole proprietorship is a sale of each component
asset). Its corollaries are: (1) A retiring partner's basis is his investment in the firm rather
than a fraction of the firm's basis for each asset; but see Ix"r. RrM. CoDE oF 1954, § 705(b),
referred to in note 205 infra. (2) His holding period runs from the acquisition of his part-
nership interest rather than from the firm's acquisition of the underlying assets.
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also uncollected fees. The 1954 Code codifies the "single capital asset" rule
but sharply curtails its tax advantages to the withdrawing partner.
In general, the interest of a withdrawing partner consists of his share of one
or more of the following:
(1) Capital account (ordinarily the partner's financial investment
in the firm's tangible assets).
(2) Good will.
(3) Undistributed income realized and taxed in prior years.
(4) Income realized in the current tax year up to the date of with-
drawal and not yet taxed.
(5) Potential income of the current or a prior year, unrealized
under the firm's regular method of accounting before the date of
withdrawal, and consisting of
(a) Appreciation in the value of firm assets (including
stock-in-trade, real and depreciable property used in
the business, and capital assets).
(b) Fees for services partly or completely performed by
the firm.
Payments other than for Unrealized Income
The 1954 Code makes statutory the Tax Court rule that, even though the
purchase price of a partnership interest reflects the withdrawing partner's
undistributed share of current earnings (item 4), he is taxed on this share at
ordinary rates.20 4 This amount is then added to his basis for his partnership
interest which consists of his capital investment (item 1) plus previously taxed
undistributed income of prior years (item 3) .2 05 Any profit on the sale
204. INT. RFv. CODE OF 1954, § 706(c) (2). See H.R. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
60-1 (1954). George F. Johnson, 21. T.C. 773 (1954) ; Standard Paving Co., 13 T.C. 425
(1949), aff'd, 190 F.2d 330 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 860 (1951) ; Louis Karseh, 8
T.C. 1327 (1947); Charles Goodman, 9 T.C.M. 789 (1950); Robert S. LeSage, 6 T.C.M.
1263 (1947), aff'd, 173 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1949). Contra: Meyer v. United States, 213
F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1954). (Capital gains treatment granted to selling partner's share
of undistributed earnings accruing after close of partnership's last fiscal year and before
date of sale.)
Since the partnership books are usually -not "closed" until the end of the firm's regular
year, the retiring partner's share is computed by taking a fraction of the full year's profit.
Abe Globman, P-H 1947 TC Mzm. DEC. 47,261 (1941). Where the books were "closed"
on or about the date of retirement, his share has been computed on the profit from operations
during the pre-retirement period, irrespective of events during the remainder of the year.
Louis Karsch, supra.
205. Under the 1954 Code, the unadjusted basis of a partner's interest is his contribution
of money and property (§ 722), the price paid by him to purchase the interest of a retiring
partner, or the estate tax value of an interest inherited by him (Q 742). The unadjusted
basis is then adjusted, primarily by being increased by his share of partnership income and
decreased by his share of partnership losses and distributions (§ 705). These principles are
substantially a codification of pre-1954 practice as summarized in U.S. Treas. Reg. 118,
§ 39.113(a) (13)-2(a) (1953). See SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong.,'2d Sess. 384 (1954).
The 1954 Code introduces an "alternative rule" whereby the adjusted basis of a partner's
interest may be determined "by reference to his proportionate share of the adjusted basis of
partnership property upon a termination of the partnership." (§ 705 (b)).
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is necessarily attributable to his interest in good will (item 2) or unrealized
income (item 5). 206
The 1954 codification of the rule that a partnership interest is a single
capital asset 207 facilities capital gains on the good will of a partnership.- 8 It
brings no new tax advantage to the withdrawing partner of a manufacturing
or merchandising firm because his share of good will would be treated as a
capital asset even if he were regarded as selling a fractional interest in each
of the firm's assets.209 But the withdrawing member of a professional or
other personal service partnership is freed of the uncertainty over whether the
good will of his enterprise can separately qualify for capital gains treatment.210°
Paynmnts for Unrealized Income prior to the 1954 Code
Tax Treatment of Selling Partner
The treatment of a partnership interest as a single capital asset under pre-
1954 law enabled a withdrawing partner to obtain capital gains on any payment
attributable to his share of the potential income in the form of appreciated stock
in trade. In the case of the typical small manufacturing or merchandising
partnership, the appreciation of stock in trade is often the product of the part-
ners' business ability and activities as well as their capital.
Pre-1954 law was much less certain that the sale of an interest in a profes-
sional or other personal service partnership would convert into capital gain
the withdrawing partner's share of potential income represented by work in
process and uncollected fees.2 1 1 If a member of a personal service partnership
has neither a capital investment in the firm2- nor an interest in partnership
good will, 21 3 he has nothing more to sell than his share of profits earned but
206. If the withdrawing partner previously purchased his interest in good will or un-
realized income, his basis for his partnership interest was increased, reducing his ultimate
gain.
207. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 741.
208. If a partner receives payments from his firm in "liquidation of a partner's interest"
instead of selling his interest, IxTr. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 736(b) (2) makes ordinary income
of the amount attributable to "good will of the partnership, except to the e.\tent that the
partnership agreement provides for a payment with respect to good will" Sr.;. REP. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 395 (1954) states that "[w]here the partnership agreement pro-
vides for payments with respect to good will, such payments may not exceed the reasonable
value of the partner's share of partnership good will" Cf. § 736(b) (2) (B) of MR. 8300
(House Bill).
209. See authorities cited in note 147 supra.
210. See discussion of O'Rear, Wyler, and similar cases in te.\t at notes 182-200 stspra.
211 In the case of accrual-basis partnerships such fees are those not accruable before
the partner's withdrawal.
212. A partner has no capital investment when the firm operates without capital, e.g.,
by using office furniture and equipment belonging to the partners individually, or when he is
a "junior" partner sharing in profits and losses with all of the firm's assets belonging to its
"senior" partners. -
213. A withdrawing partner may have no interest in partnership good will either be-
cause the partnership agreement provides that good will, e.g., the firm name, shall belong
to the remaining partners, or because good will may belong to the individual partners rather
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unrealized before his withdrawal. The leading case of Bull v. United Statcs 2 14
held that a partner's naked right to such income could not be sold and that pay-
ment received for the right was taxable as an advance distribution of profits.
210
The Bull decision involved a payment made to the estate of a deceased partner,
but its reasoning was extended in Helvering v. Smith 210 to a payment to a
withdrawing partner for his share of fees earned and uncollected at the time
of his withdrawal. Under the partnership agreement all other assets of the
firm, e.g., its library and office equipment, were to belong to the remaining
* partners. In holding that the withdrawing partner received ordinary income,
Judge Learned Hand reasoned:
"The transaction was not a sale because he got nothing which was
not his, and gave up nothing which was. Except for the 'purchase'
and release, all his collections would have been income; the remaining
partners would merely have turned over to him his existing interest
in earnings already made .... The 'purchase' of that future income
did not turn it into capital, any more than the discount of a note
received in consideration of personal services . . . .Nobody would
suggest that the sale of a declared dividend payable in the future turns
the cash received into capital."
2 1 7
The Smith decision had been approved by the lower courts,2 1 8 the Commis-
sioner,21 9 and possibly the Supreme Court,220 when the Seventh Circuit re-
jected it in Swiren v. Commissioner.221 A lump-sum payment of $40,000 had
been made to a withdrawing partner for his interest in the uncollected fees of a
cash-basis law partnership. Unlike Smith, Swiren had spent over $18,000 to
than the firm under state law. See, e.g., In re Martin's Estate, 178 Misc. 43, 33 N.Y.S.2d 81
(Surr. Ct. 1941) ; Master v. Brooks, 132 App. Div. 874, 117 N.Y. Supp. 585 (1st Dep't 1909);
Magee v. Pope, 234 Mo. App. 191,112 S.W.2d 891 (1938).
214. 295 U.S. 247 (1935).
215. "Where the effect of the contract is that the deceased partner's estate shall leave
his interest in the business and the surviving partners shall acquire it by payments to the
estate, the transaction is a sale .... Here, however, the survivors have purchased nothing
belonging to the decedent, who had made no investment in the business and owned iio
tangible property connected with it. The portion of the profits paid his estate was, therefore,
income.. . ." Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 254 (1935).
216. 90 F.2d 590 (2d Cir. 1937).
217. Helvering v. Smith, 90 F.2d 590, 592 (2d Cir. 1937).
218. See, e.g., Richard S. Doyle, 37 B.T.A. 323 (1938), aff'd, 102 F.2d 86 (4th Cir.
1939); James Wesley McAfee, 9 T.C. 720 (1947). Cf. Paul W. Trousdale, 16 T.C. 1056
(1951).
219. "Payments made to a retiring partner which represent his distributive share of
earnings for past services should be treated as ordinary income rather than the proceeds
derived from the sale of his interest [citing the Smith, Doyle, and McAfee cases]." G.C.M.
26379, 1950-1 Cums. BULL. 58.
220. The Supreme Court did not cite the Smith case in Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S.
28 (1941), discussed in text at notes 120-2 supra, but its "substitute for ordinary income"
theory is virtually identical with the quote from Judge Hand's opinion in text at note 217
si pra.
221. 183 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1950), reversing, 8 T.C.M. 924 (1949).
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purchase the interest of other partners in the firm's name and tangible assets.
Reversing the Tax Court holding that the $22,000 gain iwas compensation for
past services, the Seventh Circuit treated the entire W40,000 as the proceeds
of the sale of his partnership interest and held the profit to be capital gain. -
Other circuits have not yet chosen between Swircn and the BuIl-Smith line
of cases, but the weight of argument disfavors capital gains on a payment for
uncollected fees even when the withdrawing partner has a substantial capital
investment in the firm. Swiren conflicts with authorities which deny capital
gains on the proceeds of an assignment of rights to income from past services."2-
Furthermore, it invites sale of partnership interests for tax avoidance pur-
poses 2  And finally, it puts the purchaser of the partnership interest in an
unfair and illogical position.
Tax Treatment of Buying Partner
The consequence of the withdrawing partner's capital gains on stock in trade
and uncollected fees under pre-1954 law was a severe tax burden on the
purchaser of his interest. The payment to the withdrawing partner did not
affect the computation of firm income225 or the distributive shares of the
partners, including the buyer, but represented a capital investment in the
firm by the buyer-from which he often obtained little or no tax benefit.2 0
When the firm realized the income "sold" by the retiring partner, the buyer
was taxed on his distributive share even though it represented no economic
gain to him but was merely the return of his investment. Thus, what was eco-
nomically the seller's income was taxed to the buyer at ordinary rates while
the seller received the same amount as capital gain.
This hardship to the buyer could have been mitigated by treating part of the
sales proceeds as an advance payment of partnership profits.2 2 7 This was done
with respect to the seller by the Tax Court in the Swiren case 2 even in the
222. The opinion assumes that a partner cannot realize ordinary income in excess of his
share of currently distributable partnership income, which in the case of Swiren's cash-basis
partnership did not include the uncollected fees. Swiren v. Commissioner, 183 F2d 656, 660
(7th Cir. 1950).
223. See text at notes 95-101 mpra.
224. See Doyle v. Commissioner, 102 F.2d 86, 88 (4th Cir. 1939). See also Little,
FERAL INcomE TA~xATIoN OF PARTN RsHipS 257-9 (1952).
225. Under INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 113(a) (13) the partner's basis for his partner-
ship interest was not allocable to firm assets until they were distributed to the partners in
their individual capacity.
226. The buyer would derive no tax benefit from his high basis for his partnership in-
terest unless he later sells or liquidates. If he retains his interest until his death, his execu-
tor or legatee obtains a new basis equal to the then fair market value of the partnership
interest. INT. Rnv. CODE OF 1939, § 113(a) (5) ; INT. REv. COD OF 1954, § 1014 (a).
227. This solution is suggested by Rabkin & Johnson, The Partnersilp under the
Federal Tax Laws, 55 HARv. L. REv. 909, 94S (1942). See also U.S. Treas. Reg. 118,
§ 39.126(c), Example (1953) (allocation of payment to estate of dcceased partner ).
228. Max Swiren, 8 T.C.M. 924 (1949), rev'd, 183 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1950).
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absence of a contractual allocation by buyer and seller.22 9 Earlier, in Raymond
S. Wilkins,230 where a professional partnership had purchased a former part-
ner's share of earned but uncollected fees from his estate, the Tax Court had
refused to allow the remaining partners to reduce their income by the amount
paid to the estate, but bad stated by way of dictum:
"[I] n future periods as the fees are collected they will not be income
in toto to the partnership, but only to the extent that they exceed
the pro rata part of the capital outlay allocable thereto; and, if they
do not exceed, but are less, a loss will result."
'23 1
Implicit in this dictum is the assumption that the commutation payment was
taxed as ordinary income to the estate under the Bull-Smith line of cases. But
where a withdrawing partner pays only a capital gains tax, the courts logically
could not exclude the collections from the income of the buyers, for then the
fees would be ordinary income to no one. Thus the remaining partners would
probably be denied the benefit of the Wilkins dictum under the Seventh Circuit
decision in Swiren, although they might have been permitted to write off the
amount taxed to Swiren as ordinary income under the Tax Court decision
2 32
"Collapsible Partnerships"
The general adverse tax consequences to a purchaser of unrealized partner-
ship income prior to the 1954 Code were not, however, a deterrent to the
"collapsible partnership." 23 3 Modeled after the "collapsible corporation,12 4
this device involved the formation of a partnership to produce or purchase
property the income from which would not qualify as capital gain, followed by
a sale of the partnership interest before realization of the income by the part-
nership.235 The purchaser then liquidated the partnership and obtained the
229. Allocations by the parties were involved in: Courtland N. Smith, 9 T.C.M. 1084
(1950) ; Sidney Hess, 12 T.C. 773 (1949) ; Charles F. Coates, 7 T.C. 125 (1.946) ; Richard
P. Hallowell, 39 B.T.A. 50 (1939).
230. 7T.C. 519 (1946), aff'd, 161 F.2d 830 (lst Cir. 1947).
231. Raymond S. Wilkins, 7 T.C. 519, 524 (1946). No such offset was permitted in
the Wilkins case because of failure of proof of the amounts of the purchased fees collected
during the year in controversy. Although the Wilkins dictum involved a payment occasioned
by the death of a partner, it seems equally applicable to a payment to a withdrawing partner.
See Lawrence W. Zonsius, P-H 1941 BTA Min. DEC. 141,313 (1941).
232. Max Swiren, 8 T.C.M. 924 (1949), reVd, 183 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1950). See Little,
Payments by a Partnership to Former Partners or Their Estates, 31 TAXES 439, 475
(1953).
233. For a discussion of the use of collapsible partnerships to produce motion pictures,
see Walker, Investing in Motion Picture Enterprises, 1954 U. So. CALIv. TAX IsT. 399.
234. See text at notes 59-66 supra and 421-74 infra.
235. Unlike "collapsing" a corporation, liquidating a partnership by distributing the
assets to the original partners would not achieve the desired result because it was not a tax-
able event; instead, each individual partner would be required to allocate the basis of his
partnership interest among the various assets in proportion to their market values at the
time of the distribution. INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1939, § 113(a) (13) ; U.S. Treas. Reg. 118,
§ 39.113 (a) (13)-2 (1953); G.C.M. 20251, 1938-2 Cum. BULL 169. Any cash distributed
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property at a basis equal to the price paid for his partnership interestmo
Amortization of this high basis would offset subsequent income from the
property.
The seller's prospect of capital gains was subject to several risks. Im-
mediate liquidation of the partnership might have resulted in ordinary income
to the seller under Paid WV. Trousdale.27 That case denied capital gains on
the sale of an interest in a partnership in liquidation on the ground that there
had been no sale of a "capital asset" but only an assignment of the taxpayer's
distributive share of partnership income and other assets. And the risk would
be increased if none of the original partners remained in the firm because
of the tenuous distinction between a simultaneous sale of the "capital asset"
partnership interest of each partner and a sale by the partnership of all of its
assets, capital and non-capital. Capital gains treatment has been granted on
the basis of this distinction to sales of long-established partnerships,= even
where the business was purchased by an individual 2  or a corporation,
2 40
but these precedents are distinguishable from the preconceived sale of an inter-
est in a temporary partnership.241 Finally, capital gains might have been denied
on the grounds that an interest in a collapsible partnership was "property held
... primarily for sale to customers"' -' or that part of the sales proceeds repre-
sented payment for inadequately compensated services previously rendered
to the partnership.
243
Payments for Unrealized Income under the 1954 Code
The 1954 Code sharply restricts the rule that a partnership interest is a
single capital asset.24  If the partnership interest includes a share of "un-
realized receivables of the partnership" or "inventory items of the partnership
which have appreciated substantially in value,12 45 part of the payment received
reduced the basis of the partnership interest to be allocated among the non-cash assets. IT.
2010, 111-1 Cum. BuLw 46 (1924). Where only cash was distributed, ordinary gain or loss
was recognized to the extent that the cash exceeded the basis of the partnership interest
because the distribution was not a sale or exchange.
236. INT. REv. CODE Or 1939, § 113(a) (13). See Jackson, et al., A Proposed Revision
of the Federal Income Tax Treatment of Partnerships and Partners-American Law In-
stitute Draft, 9 TAx L. Rxv. 109, 145 (1954): "[T]he 'collapsible partnership' device of ob-
taining the step-up in basis by dissolving the partnership after the sale is fast replacing the
'collapsible corporation' ... as a means for converting ordinary income into capital gain."
237. 16 T.C. 1056 (1951).
238. Mignonette E. Luhrs, 9 T.C.M. 537 (1950).
239. Hatch's Estate v. Commissioner, 193 F2d 26 (9th Cir. 1952).
240. Ed Krist, 12 T.C.M. 801 (1953) ; Kaiser v. Glenn, 54-2 U.S. TAx GAs. f 9521 (6th
Cir. 1954), reversing 114 F. Supp. 356 (D.C. Ky. 1953).
241. See note 202 supra.
242. Cf. Altman, Collapsible Corporations, 28 TAXES 1013, 1014 (1950). The fact that
the taxpayer had made no prior sales of partnership interests would not necessarily prevent
this result. See, e.g., Goldsmith v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1944).
243. See note 219 supra.
244. INT. REv. CODE: o 1954, § 741.
245. Id. § 751(a).
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and part of the basis of the selling partner's interest 240 are attributed to the
receivables or inventory items, and the gain computed from these amounts is
ordinary income, while the rest of the profit is capital gain. The term "un-
realized receivables" is defined to "include" any rights, contractual or other-
wise, to ordinary income from "services rendered, or to be rendered,"2' 17 and
"goods delivered, or to be delivered '248 to the extent that such rights were
not previously includible in income under the method of accounting used
by the partnership. In contrast to this nonexclusive definition, the term "in-
ventory items" is defined to "mean" most, but not all, types of non-capital
assets,249 including property held by the partnership which would not qualify
for capital gains treatment if it had been held by the selling partner. "Inven-
tory items" are deemed to have "appreciated substantially in value" if their
fair market value exceeds both 120 percent of their basis to the partnership
and ten percent of the fair market value of all partnership property other
than money.
250
The 1954 Code also prevents "unrealized receivables" and "inventory
items" from receiving capital gains treatment through the medium of partner-
ship distributions, whether the partnership is "collapsible" or long-established.
The distribution rules have considerable importance because a partner's inter-
est in the firm or some of its assets is often discharged by giving him firm
assets rather than the personal funds of the other partners, new or old. A
partner's interest in partnership receivables or inventory can be satisfied by
(a) a distribution in kind of his pro rata share of the assets themselves, (b) a
distribution in cash equal to the value of his share, (c) a distribution of other
non-cash assets equal in value, or (d) a combination of the foregoing.
If the firm makes a distribution in kind of a partner's share of "unrealized
receivables" or "inventory items,' 251 no tax is incurred by either the firm or
the partner at the time of the distribution. 252 However, ordinary rates are
246. According to SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 401 (1954), the partner's
basis is to be allocated in proportion to his pro rata share of the firm's basis for the receiv-
ables or inventory.
247. IxT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 751 (c) (2).
248. Id. § 751(c) (1). It is doubtful whether the phrase "goods delivered" is broad
enough to include future rentals, royalties, and similar types of potential income of a "col-
lapsible partnership" which constructs a building or produces a motion picture and has no
inventory of "goods" in the narrow sense.
249. Id. § 751(d) (2). Real and depreciable property used in the trade or business of
the partnership is excluded from the category of "inventory items."
250. Id. § 751 (d) (1). The Senate "liberalized" the House Bill by basing the 10 percent
test on fair market value rather than the adjusted basis of all partnership property other than
money. SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 403 (1954). H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. A114 (1954) (discussing the "collapsible corporation" provisions of H.R.
8300) provides some light on how fair market value of inventory items is to be determined.
251, With certain exceptions, the basis of the receivables or inventory in the distribu-
tee's hands is their basis to the partnership immediately prior to the distribution, whether
or not the distribution is in liquidation of the partner's interest. Id. §§ 732(a), (b), (e).
252. Id. § 731 (a) (1) provides that in the case of a distribution by a partnership to a
partner, "gain shall not be recognized to such a partner, except to the extent that any money
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imposed upon the distributee when he makes a "disposition" of the receiv-
ables 2 ' or, within five years after the distribution, sells the "inventory
items."
254
If the partner gives up all his interest in "unrealized receivables" or "in-
ventory items" in consideration of a distribution consisting of other partner-
ship assets or cash, there is deemed to have been a "sale or exchange" between
the distributee and the partnership as it exists after the distribution.3
Under this rule the distributee realizes ordinary income as though he had sold
his share of receivables or inventory to a third party, and the partnership
realizes (usually capital) gain to the extent that it parts with property other
than money in exchange for the distributee's interest in the receivables and
inventory.
256
If a partner receives a distribution in kind consisting of more than his share
of receivables or inventory because he surrenders his interest in other types
of partnership property, including money, the transaction is divided into two
parts for the purpose of applying the distribution rules.2-57 Receivables or in-
ventory up to his pro rata share are treated as a tax-free distribution in kind;
receivables or inventory in excess of his share are deemed to pass in a "sale
or exchange" between the distributee and the partnership as it exists after
the distribution. 25 s Here the firm realizes ordinary income from the disposition
of the receivables or inventory in excess of the distributee's share and the
distributee realizes (usually capital) gain or loss at the time of the distribu-
tion to the extent that he parts with his share of partnership assets other than
money,259 later realizing ordinary income or loss from the disposition of the
receivables or inventory. -2 GO The rules for disproportionate distributions may
distributed exceeds the adjusted basis of such partner's interest in the partnership im-
mediately before the distribution."
253. Id. § 735(a) (1). The mere collection of the receivables might not be a "disposi-
tion," but it could not give rise to capital gains because of the absence of a "sale or exchange."
Cf., e.g., Helvering v. William Flaccus Oak Leather Co., 313 U.S. 247 (1941); Fairbanks
v. United States, 306 U.S. 436 (1939) ; Hale v. Helvering, 85 F.2d 819 (2d Cir. 1936).
254. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 735(a) (2). Whether capital gain would be realized
upon a "disposition" after the five-year period would depend on whether the property was
then a capital asset in the hands of the taxpayer and whether the disposition would qualify
as a "sale or exchange." H.R. RE'. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A229 (1954).
255. INT. Rv. CODE OF 1954, § 751(b) (1) (B).
256. See SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 401-02 (1954) ; H.I. REP. No. 2543,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 64-5 (1954).
257. This is made clear by the Conference Report, H.R. Ri. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. 65 (1954). Fragmentation would also be required where the partner receives less than
his full share of receivables or inventory in kind and the balance in other property or cash.
258. INT. REv. CODE-OF 1954, § 751(b) (1) (A).
259. The distributee's gain or loss is the difference between the value of the assets re-
ceived by him and his share of the partnership's basis for the assets which he relinquishes.
See H.R. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1954).
260. See notes 253,254supra. However, to the extent that the receivables and inventory
are in excess of his share, his basis for them will be the value of the share of the partnership
assets, including money, relinquished by him.
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also apply to payments by the firm in "liquidation of a partner's interest"21
when these payments are attributable to the withdrawing partner's interest in
"inventory items. ' 2 2 The rules do not apply to payments to a retiring partner
for his interest in "unrealized receivables," the latter being fully taxable as
ordinary income whether or not the payments are disproportionate.20 8
Having thus attempted to prevent a partner from extracting his interest
in receivables and inventory as capital gain rather than ordinary income, the
1954 Code also seeks to prevent the purchasing or remaining partners from
paying a second tax on the amounts already taxed to the selling or distributee
partner.264 No problem is involved as to receivables or inventory which the
distributee receives in kind, because the partnership will never realize the
income on these items. And the partnership will use as its basis for receivables
and inventory acquired in a distribution treated as a "sale or exchange" the
amount of cash or the value of the property distributed in exchange, so that
its later income from the receivables or inventory will be only the excess over
this basis.
2 5
If a partner's interest in receivables or inventory is acquired by purchase
rather than by a partnership distribution and if the partnership so elects, 20 the
purchaser may compute his share of subsequent partnership profits, deprecia-
tion, and the like by using his own set of basis figures for the partnership
assets.237 Thus where the purchaser has paid the withdrawing partner more
than his share of the partnership's adjusted basis for the assets, such basis will
be increased by the amount of this excess for the purpose of computing the
purchaser's share of partnership income.2 68 The excess basis is to be allocated
261. This phrase is defined in INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 761(d) as "the termination of a
partner's entire interest in a partnership by a distribution, or a series of distributions, to the
partner by the partnership."
262. See SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 402 (1954). The amount taxable to
the distributee may be different than in the case of a disproportionate nonliquidating distri-
bution because "the basis to the distributee of the distributed properties will be determined by
reference to the basis of the distributee for his interest in the partnership under section
732(b), rather than under the provisions of section 732(a), relating to nonliquidating dis-
tributions." H.R. RaP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1954).
263. See SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 402 (1954).
264. See text at notes 225-32 supra.
265. The principal exception to this rule is that to the extent that a distribution other
than in receivables "in liquidation of a partner's interest," see note 261 supra, is attributable
to his interest in receivables, the income of the remaining partners is reduced when the dis-
tribution is made, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 736(a), rather than later when the partnership
realizes the income represented by the receivables.
266. The manner of election is described in id. § 754 which provides, inter alia, that the
election shall apply to all future transfers and distributions until its revocation subject to
limitations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury.
267. Similar treatment is available in the case of a transferee of a deceased partner's in-
terest, id. § 743 (a), and in the case of a partnership making certain types of distributions
to a partner, id. § 734(b).
268. Id. § 743(b) (1). The computation is illustrated in the Conference Report, H.R.
RaP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 61-4 (1954). If the election has been made, a downward
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among the various classes of assets, e.g., inventory, depreciable assets, capital
assets, to which it is attributable under a statutory sequence which reduces
differences between their fair market values and adjusted bases.26 0 If the
partnership does not make this election, the purchasing partner will derive no
immediate benefit from the high basis for his partnership interest unless he
receives a distribution of property, other than money, within two years after
the purchase. If such a distribution occurs, the distributee is permitted to make
an individual election to increase his basis for the distributed property to reflect
his high basis for his partnership interest.
270
The rules as to receivables and inventory were intended by the Ways and
Means Committee "to prevent the conversion of potential ordinary income into
capital gain by virtue of transfers of partnership interests. 2 ' And implicit
in this statement is the fact that the partnership form is used primarily by small
enterprises depending largely upon the activities of the individual partners.
Thus the new statute seems directed primarily against capital gains treatment
of the fruits of personal effort, not only in "collapsible partnership"'' 2 - schemes
but also upon the severance of long-established partnership relationships.
COPPORATE STOCK
Unquestionably the most common and effective means of reaping the fruits
of personal effort as capital gain is a sale or redemption 2 7 3 of corporate stock.
The sale of a sole proprietorship can produce capital gains on good will attri-
butable to the proprietor's individual activities.2 74 The sale of a partnership
interest results in capital gains on good will and, prior to the 1954 Code, on at
least some types of unrealized income.2 7 5 The sale or redemption of corporate
stock affords both of these advantages and makes possible a third, much more
important--capital gains on income already realized. This benefit stems from
the fact that, unlike a sole proprietor or a partner, a stockholder is not taxed
adjustment must also be made where the transferee's basis for his interest is less than his
portion of the partnership's basis for its assets.
269. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 755. The method of allocation is illustrated in SEs,. REP.
No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 397-401 (1954).
270. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 732 (d). The adjustment may be required by regulation
if at the time of the transfer the fair market value of all partnership property, other than
money, exceeded 110 percent of its adjusted basis to the partnership, regardless of whether
the distribution is made within two years after the transfer. See H.R. Rr. No. 2543, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1954).
271. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1954). See also Id. at 71.
272. Although the phrase "collapsible partnerships" is used in a caption in SE.. REP.
No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 98 (1954), it is neither defined nor illustrated.
273. Ixr. RE:v. CODE OF 1939, § 115(c) provided that amounts distributed by a corpora-
tion in either complete or "partial" liquidation were to be treated as received by the stock-
holders in "exchange" for the stock surrendered by them. Under the 1954 Code a corporate
distribution is treated as payment in exchange for stock if made in complete or partial
liquidation Q§8 331, 346) or in certain "redemptions treated as exchanges" § 302).
274. See text at notes 143-200 supra.
275. See text at notes 201-243 supra.
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on earnings until he withdraws them from the business; he thus can accumulate





There are 'many other ways in which the corporate form is superior for
converting personal service income into capital gain. A sale of part or all of
a sole proprietor's or partner's interest invariably involves a pro tanto sever-
ance of his interest in the future of the enterprise; in several ways the owner
of a corporation can obtain capital gains without a comparable loss of interest. 277
A sole proprietor or partner must first find a purchaser willing to pay a fair
price for his interest; a controlling stockholder may receive capital gains
directly from his corporation by causing it to redeem his stock. And stock
redemptions are free of the price-depressing tax hardships often suffered by
the purchaser of good will of a sole proprietorship,278 a partnership interest,270
or even corporate stock. 280 Moreover, unlike a sole proprietorship or partner-
ship, the corporation affords a feasible method of conferring capital gains not
only upon the proprietors but also upon employees and outsiders such as
276. For other less important advantages see note 7 supra. The typical personal ser-
vice enterprise operated as a sole proprietorship or a partnership will be unable to take
advantage of the election offered in the 1954 Code to be treated as a corporation for tax
purposes. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1361 (a) permits an unincorporated enterprise to elect to
be considered a corporation "with respect to operation, distributions, sale of an interest, and
any other purpose; and each owner of an interest in such enterprise shall be considered a
shareholder thereof in proportion to his interest." But the enterprise must be "one in which
capital is a material income producing factor, or 50 percent or more of the gross income [is]
income derived from trading. .. ." Id. § 1361(b) (4). See SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 119 (1954) : "This provision would rule out firms engaged in professional services
such as the law, accounting, medicine, engineering and others." This report also states that
capital is a material income-producing factor if the business requires a substantial inventory
or a substantial investment in plant, machinery, or equipment. Id. at 456.
277. See text at notes 490-525 infra.
278. See text at notes 195-7 .nqpra.
279. See text at notes 225-32 mtpra.
280. See note 198 supra. Liquidation of the corporation by noncorporate purchasers of
common stock would avoid their being taxed on accumulated earnings, but under the 1939
Code even an immediate liquidation may not have been satisfactory in the case of a corpora-
tion purchasing at least 80 percent of the stock. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 112(b) (6) and
U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.115 (a) -3 (1953) seem to require the transferee corporation to
take over the transferor's "earnings and profits." See also INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 113 (a)
(15) which may have required the corporate purchaser to use the liquidated corporation's
basis for the assets even though less than the price paid for the stock. But see Kimbell-
Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.), cert. dcnicd, 342 U.S. 827
(1951) (denying purchaser the use of the old asset basis where in excess of the purchase
price).
INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954, § 334(b) (2) provides that if a corporation purchases at least
80 percent of the stock of another corporation within a twelve-month period and causes its
complete liquidation within two years thereafter, the purchasing corporation shall use its ad-
justed basis for the stock as the basis of the assets distributed in the liquidation. Where
§ 334(b) (2) applies, § 381 (a) (1) prevents a carry-over of "earnings and profits" under
§ 381 (c) (2).
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attorneys and brokers.28 ' Finally, corporate stock simplifies the problems en-
countered in other attempts to comply with the "capital asset"2 '-2 and "sale or
exchange" 283 requirements.
The capital gains advantages of doing business as a corporation are limited
in important respects by both corporate and tax law. State laws prohibit
corporations from practicing the learned professions and engaging in other
licensed activities. 284 Even if the enterprise can be operated as a corporation,
its capital gains potentialities may be offset by any of at least four serious
disadvantages: (1) The acquisition of stock may be taxed as compensation for
personal services. (2) Under certain circumstances the current earnings of
the enterprise may be taxed as belonging directly to the stockholder-employee
in his individual capacity rather than to his corporation. (3) Taxes on cor-
porate income may outweigh the tax savings of capital gains treatment of the
stockholder. (4) Capital gains may not be worth a sacrifice of all or part of
the taxpayer's equity in his business, if the stock is sold, or the inconvenience of
operating it in unincorporated form, if the corporation is dissolved.
Acquiring tle Stock
A cash purchase of stock is an "open transaction": even though the stock
may be worth more than its cost, the profit is not taxed until the stock is sold,
and then usually at capital gain rates. -2 8 5 This rule is applicable to a stock pur-
chase, not only by a passive investor, but also by a person who performs services
for the corporation. The latter will be taxed when he receives the stock only
if the Commissioner can establish, as a fact,-80 that the stock is in payment for
the services.2 8 7 Here ordinary income is realized to the extent that the stock
281. It seems improbable that employees and outsiders have been made partners with a
view to capital gains on a subsequent sale of their partnership interests to the substantial
owners of the business. The owners' inability to deduct the purchase price would have out-
weighed the limited tax benefit to the employee or outsider. And aside from taxes, owners
would probably be unwilling to confer upon employees the broad authority of a general
partner under the law of agency. Furthermore, state laws such as N.Y. P_,xA LAw § 440
may involve cumbersome filing requirements and unwanted publicity.
282. Corporate stock is ordinarily a capital asset unless held as stock in trade by a
securities dealer. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 117(n) ; Irr. Rsv. CODE or 1954, § 1236. See
Miller, The 'Capital Asset' Concept: A Critique of Capital Gains Taxation, 59 YALE LJ.
837,848-51 (1950).
283. See text at notes 111-128 supra.
284. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAw § 280 (practice of law by a corporation constitutes
criminal offense). See also 6 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAw or PRIvATE Co.uoLiToiS
§ 2523 et seq. (1950), stating that corporations are generally not considered "persons" who
may be licensed to practice a profession involving personal qualifications.
285. Palmer v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 63 (1937).
286. To date the courts have refused to accept the conclusive presumption of U.S. Treas.
Reg. 118, § 3922(a)-1 (c) (1953) that the excess of stock value over the price paid by the
employee is always in the nature of compensation as a matter of law, irrespective of the
"facts" as to intent of the parties. See text at notes 321-31 infra.
287. Id. § 39.22(a)-3.
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value exceeds the cash and the current value of any non-cash assets given by
him. The 1954 Code makes it clear that any such excess received for personal
services is taxable compensation even though received in an otherwise tax-
free exchange or distribution, e.g., where appreciated assets are exchanged for
stock by controlling stockholders. 28  Of course, a tax at ordinary rates reduces
the benefits of capital gains on the eventual sale or redemption of the stock.
Purchase of Stock for Full Value
By its very nature, the rule taxing stock received for personal services usually
cannot be applied when an owner-employee receives stock before he performs
services for his corporation, e.g., at the time of its organization. The owner-
employee builds up his eventual capital gain by contributing more to the cor-
poration by his efforts than he withdraws as salary or dividends. The resultant
appreciation in the value of his stock is his only payment for these otherwise
uncompensated efforts. Nevertheless, this appreciation in value is not taxed
to the owner-employee at the time he receives the stock 289 because it does not
then exist.
290
Similarly, no tax is imposed where stock in a new venture is sold at net
asset value to employees, attorneys, and other persons connected with the busi-
288. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 351 (a) provides that "stock or securities issued for ser-
vices shall not be considered as issued in return for property" for the purpose of the general
rule permitting the tax-free exchange of property for stock or securities of a controlled cor-
poration. This means that "stock or securities received by a person who has rendered or
will render service to the transferee corporation would be fully taxable as compensation
upon receipt." H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A117 (1954). See also INT. Ra,.
CODE OF 1954, §§ 305(c) (3) (stock dividends) and 356(f) (2) (corporate reorganizations
and divisions). These new provisions appear to be merely declaratory of pre-1954 law. See,
e.g., Fifth Avenue Bank of New York, 31 B.T.A. 945 (1934) (stock representing compen-
sation for personal services taxed at ordinary rates even though received in an otherwise
tax-free exchange). Cf. Philip W. McAbee, 5 T.C. 1130 (1945).
289. As a practical matter, if the owner-employee does not mention the stock in his
tax return for the year in which he receives it, the statute of limitations, LiT. REv. CODE OF
1939, §§ 275 (a), (c) (3 or 5 years) ; INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6501(a), (e) (1) (A) (3 or 6
years), is likely to have run against the Commissioner by the time he learns of the trans-
action. In the typical case where the stock is not obviously compensation, the Commissioner
probably could not sustain his burden of proving that the failure to report the stock was
"with the intent to evade tax," so as to permit a later assessment for a fraudulent return.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1.939, § 276(a) ; INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954, § 6501 (c) (1).
290. If an executive or entertainer contracts to work for his own corporation for sub-
stantially less than his services have commanded from strangers, the stock may have taxable
value at the time of receipt by reason of the contract. Bittker & Redlich, Corporate
Liquidations and the Income Tax, 5 TAX L. Rxv. 437, 440-2 (1950). Cf. Altman, Tax
Effects of the Sale of a Radio Show, 27 TAXES 19, 20-21 (1949). The dearth of decisions
on this point suggests that the Commissioner prefers other methods of challenging such
arrangements: taxing the corporation as a personal holding company (see text at notes 5-12
supra) ; taxing the stockholder on all income received by the corporation (see text at notes
364-81 infra) ; taxing as ordinary income the stockholder's gain upon sale of the stock or
liquidation of the corporation (see text at notes 485-6 infra).
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ness but not controlling it. These "non-proprietors"2 0 1 have much the same tax
advantages as the substantial owners-their gain will depend upon enhance-
ment of the stock value attributable, more or less, to their individual efforts.202
And the benefits to non-proprietors can be multiplied if the employer helps to
bring about the appreciation, especially if the employer purchases the appreci-
ated stock. Thus the "non-proprietors" might form a new "growth" corpora-
tion which will derive much of its income from business with the employer,
e.g., by serving as its sales agent.20 3 Except as a consequence of a possible
attack by the employer's minority shareholders, 94 such arrangements are not
likely to be treated as compensation, at least in the absence of an understanding
that the employer will later purchase the new corporation's stock.
Full value purchases of stock are not taxable as compensation, but they pre-
sent the obvious difficulty that the non-proprietor may lack sufficient funds to
purchase the stock. One solution to this problem is to sell non-proprietors part
of a special class of high-leverage stock whose present value is low because of
subordinate voting, dividend, and liquidation rights.20 5 As corporate earnings
increase beyond the amount needed to satisfy dividend preferences, the value
of this stock would increase at a rapid rate, and a sale would produce a large
capital gain in relation to the small investment of the employee. A possible
danger of this arrangement is that unless the two classes of stock are issued
before substantial earnings have accumulated, the proprietors may be taxed as
having received a dividend when they sell the new stock to the non-proprietors.3 °
The purchase of stock at full value by non-proprietors may also be facilitated
291. For want of a better term, "non-proprietors" will be used to denote stockholders
such as employees, attorneys, brokers, and investment bankers who perform services for the
corporation but whose stock interest is relatively small compared with that of the substan-
tial owners of the corporation.
292. E.g., Bing Crosby is reported to have paid 10 cents a share for 20,000 shares of
Vacuum Foods Corp., whose product, "Minute Maid" frozen orange juice concentrate, he
was to advertise over the radio at an undisclosed salary. "Mfinute Maid's ofa!', Time,
Oct. 18, 1948, p. 91. Time fails to indicate whether the 10 cent price was less than the fair
market value of the stock.
293. The Rouge and the Black, Time, May 18, 1953, p. 102, 105 (Ford Motor Company
executives).
294. If the employer's minority shareholders charge a "diversion of corporate oppor-
tunity" and the management seeks to justify the arrangement as providing additional con-
pensation, the non-proprietors may lose capital gains treatment. See note 320 infra.
295. One-class stock can be given high leverage by the issuance of bonds, debentures,
or notes to the proprietors.
296. Compare Heady v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1947), ziih Marjorie N.
Dean, 10 T.C. 19 (1948) and Elmer W. Hartzell, 40 B.T.A. 492 (1939), acq., 1939-2 Cum.
Bu-. 16. Also see Commissioner v. Snite, 177 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1949). IzzT. RE,. CoDs
oF 1954, § 306, discussed in text at notes 523-5 infra, would not be applicable if the pro-
prietors retain the newly issued preferred stock and sell part of their old common stock. If
the non-proprietors already own common stock, the proprietors will now be permitted to
exchange part of their old common for new preferred in a tax-free recapitalization. Rev.
Rul. 54-13,1954 INT. Rv. Butm.. No. 2, at 14 (1954).
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by deferred payment plans. 297 A major shortcoming of such plans is that the
purchaser's obligation becomes burdensome if the value of the stock drops.208
Should the corporation then release him, the release might be taxable either
as compensation or under the "foregiveness of indebtedness" theory.2 9 Even
when the stock value increases, the non-proprietor may have difficulty meeting
the deferred payments. He can sell some of his shares as each installment falls
due and make the payment out of the proceeds (diminished by a capital gains
tax), but this would reduce his ultimate profit if the stock continued to rise.
Similarly, generous dividends on the stock would be of little help to purchasers
in the higher brackets, and would retard the accumulation of earnings for event-
ual capital gain.
Under a more elaborate deferred payment scheme the stock is purchased
by an intermediate corporation owned by the non-proprietors300 This arrange-
297. Treasury stock would ordinarily have to be used in deferred payment plans if the
stock is acquired directly from the corporation because of state statutes prohibiting the issu-
ance of stock on credit. See, e.g., N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAw § 69; 13 Am. JUR., Corp. §§ 213-
216 (1938).
Until quite recently, the Tax Court consistently held-and was consistently reversed-
that the sale of treasury shares to employees did not result in the realization of gain (or
loss) by the employer corporation. Batten, Barton, Durstine, & Osborne, Inc., 9 T.C. 448
(1947), rev'd, 171 F.2d 474 (2d Cir. 1948) ; Rollins Burdick Hunter Co., 9 T.C. 169 (1947),
reld, 174 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1949) ; H. W. Porter & Co., 14 T.C. 307 (1950), rev'd, 187 F.2d
939 (3d Cir. 1951) ; Landers Corp., 11 T.C.M. 577 (1952), revld, 210 F.2d 188 (6th Cir.
1954). See also Timken-Detroit Axle Company, 21 T.C. 769 (1954), in which the Tax
Court again refused to follow the appellate decisions.
On July 13, 1954 the Tax Court view was adopted by the Court of Claims in Anderson,
Clayton & Co. v. United States, 54-2 U.S. TAX CAs. 9495 (Ct. Cl. 1954). The next day the
Tax Court overruled its prior decisions and accepted the appellate court view. Burrus Mills,
Inc., 22 T.C. No. 107 (1954). This problem is eliminated by INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1032:
"No gain or loss shall be recognized to a corporation on the receipt of money or other prop-
erty in exchange for stock (including treasury stock) of such corporation."
298. Although this risk can be avoided by making the taxpayer's obligation conditional,
this "solution" raises additional problems. See discussion in text at notes 332-9 infra.
299. A reduction or cancellation of purchase-money indebtedness has been viewed by the
courts as a mere reduction of the purchase price. Commissioner v. Sherman, 135 F.2d 68
(6th Cir. 1943) ; Helvering v. A. L. Killian Co., 128 F.2d 433 (8th Cir. 1942) ; Allen v.
Courts, 127 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1942) ; Hirsch v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 656 (7th Cir.
1940) ; Hextell v. Huston, 28 F. Supp. 521 (S.D. Iowa 1939) ; Charles L. Nutter, 7 T.C 480
(1946), acq., 1946-2 Cum. BUL 4; Ralph W. Gwinn, 3 T.C.M. 548 (1944) ; Gehring Pub-
lishing Co., 1 T.C. 345 (1942), acq., 1943 Cum. BuLL. 9. But these decisions have been
criticized as unjustified exceptions to the general principle that taxable income is realized
upon a cancellation of indebtedness. Fifth Avenue-Fourteenth Street Corporation v. Com-
missioner, 147 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Frank v. United States, 44 F. Supp. 729 (E.D. Pa.
1942), aff'd, 131 F.2d 864 (3d Cir. 1942). Cf. Commissioner v. Coastwise Transportation
Corp., 71 F.2d 104 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 595 (1934). The Senate overruled the
attempt to codify the "reduction of purchase price" theory in the 1954 House Bill, SEN. Rsi'.
No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 13,14 (1954).
300. Where the net dividend income of the intermediate corporation would be more than
$25,000 per year, the splitting of this income among two or more such corporations would
eliminate the corporate surtax. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 15(b) ; INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 11(c).
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ment takes advantage of the 85 percent intercompany dividend deduction -0 ' to
reduce the tax rate on dividends on the newly acquired stock, enabling them to
be used to pay off the deferred purchase price rapidly. 2 The non-proprietors
would obtain capital gains on the appreciated stock by the sale or redemption
of their stock in the intermediate corporation. And incidentally, the intervening
corporate entity would shield them from personal liability for the unpaid price
of the stock 30 3 and from any taxable income on a release of the obligation by the
employer. However, the intermediate corporation could fall prey to the per-
sonal holding company surtax, and if not, to the tax on unreasonably accumu-
lated surplus.305
To a degree, employee stock ownership can be facilitated by a "qualified"
pension, profit-sharing, or stock bonus trust which invests in stock of the em-
ployer corporation. 30 This would permit employees to take advantage of the
statutory provisions granting capital gains on one-year severance distributions0 T
and postponing even the capital gains tax on that part of a distribution con-
sisting of employer securities which have appreciated in value. 08 However, the
use of such trusts to promote stock ownership by key employees is limited
both by uncertainty as to how much of the trust fund can be invested in the
employer's stock 3 09 and by rules against discrimination in favor of higher paid
employees3
1
Purchase of Stock for Less than Full Value
The risk that the acquisition of stock by employees will be taxed as compensa-
tion is increased when the issuer is a going concern with good will rather than a
301. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, §26(b) (1) ; INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §243(a).
302. See description of the "Paramount Plan" in Rudick, Income Taxes and Deferred
Compensation Agreeenwts, 1949 U. So. CALF. TAX INsT. 163 (1949).
303. Presumably the intermediate corporation would be liable to the employer corpora-
tion for the unpaid purchase price, and the stock would be retained by the latter as collateral.
304. The personal holding company surtax could be avoided if the stock of the inter-
mediate corporation was held by at least 10 unrelated individuals in such a vay that "more
than 50 per centum in value of its outstanding stock" would not be "owned, directly or in-
directly, by or for not more than five individuals." INT. REV. CODE or 1939, § 501 (a) (2);
IN-T. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 542(a) (2).
305. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 102(b) ; INT. Rv. CODE OF 1954, § 533(b) : "The fact
that any corporation is a mere holding or investment company shall be prima fade evidence
of a purpose to avoid surtax upon shareholders."
306. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 165 (a) ; IIx. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 401(a). The benefit
of qualified trusts is restricted to employees as distinct from independent contractors.
307. See text at notes 13-17 supra.
308. See note 16 supra.
309. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.165-1 (a) (6) (1953); P.S. 49, P-H P.'s. & PoriT
SHAR SEnv. 9547 (1945). Query as to the applicability of these authorities to stock bonus
plans under which "benefits are distributable in stock of the employer company." U.S. Treas.
Reg. 118, § 39.165-1 (a) (2) (1953).
Section 505 (a) (4) of H.R. 8300 (House Bill) might have permitted the investment of an
unlimited percentage of the trust fund in "securities of the employer."
310. See note 79 supra,
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new venture. Because of the many variables involved in computing good will,811
the purchasing employee finds himself in a dilemma if the Commissioner seeks
to tax him on a compensatory "bargain purchase." In seeking to demonstrate
that he paid fair market value for the stock, the employee may argue that
capitalized past earnings should be discounted to reflect the possibility that
his own death, disability, or departure might cause the loss of his services as one
of the corporation's "key men" ;312 this might strengthen the Commissioner's
contention that the stock was transferred to him in consideration of his otherwise
uncompensated services.
"Restricted Stock Options." The special treatment of "restricted stock op-
tions"313 is the clearest exception to the rule taxing the value of stock received
for services. But the exception is narrow. It covers only employees and not
attorneys or other non-proprietors. And, more important, it is rarely available
to employees of small corporations, both because of the ten percent stock owner-
ship rule 314 and the difficulty of ascertaining the value of the stock on the option
date.315 The exclusion of small corporations from the statute conflicts with its
original "incentive" rationale ;310 "incentive" would be stronger to the employee
of a small corporation, where appreciation in the value of the stock more directly
reflects his efforts, than to the optionee of a large corporation, where the price
rise may largely reflect stock market trends. This anomaly is partially resolved by
the 1954 Code, which makes holders of more than ten percent of outstanding
stock eligible for a "restricted" option if the price is at least 110 percent of the
stock value on the date it is granted and if it is not exercisable after five years
from that date or is exercised within one year after the enactment date of the
1954 Code.3 17 This exception to the ten percent rule is intended for "stock-
holder-employees of closely held corporations who use stock options to retain
control of their company when procuring outside equity financing."'318 But the
new provision is not confined to options having this purpose, and apparently
can be used to advantage whenever a sharp rise in the price of the stock is likely
within a five-year period.
Other Stock Options. The law is unsettled as to what extent ordinary income
is produced by a stock option which does not satisfy the "restricted stock
option" provisions. The courts have frequently rejected the Commissioner's
contention that the exercise of an option granted before the effective date of the
311. See Note, 53 Colr L. Rav. 660, 700-7 (1.953).
312. See cases collected in II PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIrT TAXATION § 18.36
(1942).
313. INr. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 130A; INT. REV. CODE or 1954, § 421. See discussion of
§ 130A options and the 1954 Code's "variable price options" in text at notes 18-31 supra.
314. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 130A(d) (1) (C); INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 421(d) (1)
(C).
315. See Bergen, Restricted Stock Options for Executives of Closely Held Corpora-
tions, N.Y.U. 11TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 145 (1953). But see text at note 30 m.pra.
316. See note 31 supra.
317. INT. REv. CODEOF 1954, § 421(d) (1) (C).
318. H.R. RaP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1954).
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first "restricted stock option" statute gives rise to ordinary income in the amount
that the value of the stock received exceeds the option price.310 These decisions
are based on a finding that the parties regarded the transaction, not as "compen-
sation," but as a means of enabling the employee to acquire a "proprietary" in-
terest in the business, affording him a type of incentive different from his regular
compensation.3 20 The distinction between "compensatory" and "proprietary"
options was rejected in a 1946 Treasury regulation.32 1 Relying on the sweeping
language of the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Smith,32- the Commissioner
took the position that the bargain spread at the time of exercise should hence-
forth 3 be taxed as compensation, no matter how the parties regarded the
transaction. The courts countered with a narrower view of the Smith case, first
in cases involving options granted before the effective date of the regulation,324
and recently in several cases concerning options granted after that date.32 Smith
is said to express no new rule of law but merely a finding of fact that the spread
at the time of purchase was intended as compensation. In two of these recent
cases this interpretation was used, not to exempt the transaction as "propri-
etary," but to limit the taxable compensation to the value of the option when
received, on the ground that this was the only compensation intended by the
319. See, e.g., Rossheim v. Commissioner, 92 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1937) ; Norman G.
Nicolson, 13 T.C. 690 (1949) ; Delbert B. Geeseman, 3S B.T.A. 258 (1933), acq., 1939-1
Cum. BuLr. 14.
320. The risk of minority stockholder attack on "proprietary" options is reduced by re-
cent corporate law amendments making the judgment of directors conclusive in the absence
of fraud as to the adequacy of the "consideration, value or benefit, tangible or intangible,
received or to be received by the corporation for the issuance of options." N.Y. Sa'ocu Co..P.
LAW § 69, as amended by Ch. 799, Laws of 1954. See also 49 LAWS oF D_..A,,,An 652
(1953). In other states the management may attempt to justify the options as providing
additional compensation, thus jeopardizing capital gains treatment of the optionee. But see
Tarleau, The Problem of Compensating Executives, 1953 U. So. CAL. TAx IusT. 149, 175-9
(1953).
321. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22(a)-1(c) (1953).
322. 324 U.S. 177, 181 (1945) : "Section 22(a) of the Revenue Act is broad enough to
include in taxable income any economic or financial benefit conferred on the employee as
compensation, whatever the form or mode by which it is effected."
323. The amended regulation was intended to apply only to options granted after Febru-
ary 26, 1945, the date of the Supreme Court's decision in the Smith case. See also I.T.
3795,1946-1 Cum. BuuT.. 15.
324. "Proprietary" transactions were found in Norman G. Nicolson, 13 T.C. 690
(1949); Malcolm S. Clark, 9 T.C.M. 719 (1950); Donald R. Bradner, 11 T.C.M. 566
(1952), af'd, 209 F2d 956 (6th Cir. 1953) ; Martin L. Strauss, II, 11 T.C.M. 786 (1952),
aff'd, 208 F.2d 325 (7th Cir. 1953) ; Abraham Rosenberg, et al., 20 T.C No. 5 (1953);
James C. Hazelton, 12 T.C.M. 398 (1953) ; Edward Eagan, 12 T.C.M. 876 (1953).
"Compensatory" transactions were found in Van Dusen v. Commissioner, 166 F2d 647
(9th Cir. 1948), affirming, 8 T.C. 388 (1947) ; John C. Wahl, 19 T.C. 651 (1953) ; Ray A.
Noland, P-H 1953 TC lan. Dc. 53,288 (1953); Charles E. Sorensen, 22 T.C. No. 44
(1954).
325. Estate of Lauson Stone, 210 F2d 33 (3d Cir. 1954), allrnizg, 19 T.C. 872 (1953) ;
McNamara v. Commissioner, 210 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1954), re-'ersing, 19 T.C. 1001 (1953) ;
Philip J. LoBue, 22 T.C. No. 58 (1954); Robert A. Bowen, 13 T.C.M. 120,471 (1954).
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parties.326 These holdings are likely to be limited to assignable options,82 but
their rejection of the automatic rule of the 1946 regulation in favor of an intention
test supports the Tax Court's recent findings of "proprietary" options granted
after the effective date of the regulation.3 28
In rejecting the 1946 regulation solely on the ground that it goes beyond the
Smith case, the courts have ignored several possible theoretical and practical
reasons for its promulgation. Intent of the parties seems irrelevant if there has
been a realized economic gain,329 and it has proved a prolific source of fruitless
litigation. 330 This litigation is likely to be increased now that there are not one
but three questions to be resolved : (1) Was compensation intended ? (2) If so,
did it arise on the option date or the exercise date? (3) If on the option date,
how should the option be valued? Possibly the courts will eliminate these
uncertainties by applying the rule of the 1946 regulation to options granted after
the effective date of Section 130A on the theory that the rule is necessary to make
meaningful the detailed requirements for "restricted stock options." ' ,,
Options to Resell. Midway between a typical stock option and an ordinary
non-bargain purchase is an immediate purchase of stock at its fair market value
with an option to resell to the corporation at an agreed price, usually the pur-
chase price.3 3 2 Such "put" options resemble the typical "call" options in that
the taxpayer enjoys the benefit of any subsequent increase in value while avoid-
ing the risk of a decline. However, "put" options are like outright purchases in
326. See the circuit court opinions in the Stone and McNamara cases, supra note 325.
This result was largely based on a dictum in the Smith opinion: "It of course does not follow
that in other circumstances not here present the option itself, rather than the proceeds of
its exercise, could not be found to be the only intended compensation." Commissioner v.
Smith, 324 U.S. 177, 182 (1945).
327. In the Stone case, supra note 325, the taxpayer received negotiable warrants to
purchase his employer's stock at less than its stock exchange quotation on the date of the
issuance of the warrants. Having reported this spread as compensation, the taxpayer was
held entitled to capital gains treatment upon the subsequent sale of the warrants. In the
McNamara case, supra note 325, the taxpayer reported as compensation the spread on the
date of receipt. The option could be assigned, was not conditioned upon the performance
of subsequent services, and was characterized in corporate resolutions and reports as com-
pensation for the year in which granted. The Stone-McNatnara rule may not apply to all
assignable options. See Charles E. Sorensen, 22 T.C. No. 44 (1954).
328. See the LoBue and Bowen cases, supra note 325.
329. See materials cited note 23 supra.
330. See commentaries collected by Alexander, Employee Stock Options and the 1950
Revenue Act, 6 TAx L. REv. 165, 167 n.10 (1951).
331. Id. at 202-3. Further support for this view may be found in H.R. REP. No. 1337,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. A155 (1954), stating that § 421 (e) (2) of the 1954 Code was designed
to facilitate the modification of options granted after February 26, 1945 to qualify them as
"restricted stock options."
332. As to the possible unenforceability of such contracts by reason of state laws pro-
hibiting corporate repurchase of stock except out of surplus, see Topken v. Schwartz, 249
N.Y. 206, 163 N.E. 735 (1928), as limited by Cross v. Beguelin, 252 N.Y. 262, 169 N.E.
378 (1929), and Greater New York Carpet House, Inc. v. Herschmann, 258 App. Div. 649,
17 N.Y.S.2d 483 (lst Dep't 1940).
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requiring an immediate investment of the individual's own funds, a
disadvantage which may not be offset by the advantage of immediate
dividend and other rights of full ownership. If the "put"-optionee
has raised the purchase price from any source independent of the cor-
poration, 33 it seems unlikely that an otherwise nontaxable purchase of stock
at current value would become taxable solely by reason of the option to resell
at the same price. Theoretically, the optionee has given nothing but his services
for the "put" feature and has therefore received compensation to the extent of
the discounted value of the "put." However, the difficulty of ascertaining the
"put" value may prevent this theory from being practiced.3 4
The "put"-optionee may be taxed at graduated rates when he disposes of the
stock. If the value of the stock goes down and he "puts" the stock back to his
employer, the Commissioner could contend that the receipt of $10 for stock
purchased at $10 but now worth $7 was, in substance, a sale for $7 coupled
with compensation of $3.A35 A "put" was a short-term transaction under the
"short sale" rules of Section 117(1) of the 1939 Code, which tolled the running
of the holding period while the taxpayer held a "put" option. But "short-
term" treatment of the exercise of the "put" would have hurt the taxpayer only
in the unusual case where the "put" price was higher than the price originally
paid by him and he realized a gain by exercising the "put." In the typical case
if the value of the stock goes up, the employee will not "put" the stock back at
its cost but will sell the stock for its appreciated value. Although Section 117(1)
(1) of the 1939 Code provided that failure to exercise a "put" was equivalent
to the closing of a "short sale," the gain would apparently have been long-term
if the taxpayer waited six months after his "put" lapsed before selling the stock.
This question is rendered moot by the 1954 Code which provides that the
"short sale" rules shall be inapplicable where the "put" is acquired on the same
333. If the corporation itself grants the credit and holds the stock as collateral, the
purchase could be viewed as a "call"-type option, and the later release of the corporation's
lien as the exercise of this option. Accordingly, the excess of market value of the stock on
this later date over the purchase price might be taxed as compensation, unless the trans-
action could be analogized to a "proprietary" option.
The option to resell the newly-acquired stock at the original price would increase its
value as security for a loan from a third party.
334. Even if the taxpayer reported the purchase in his tax return (see note 289 mspra),
the fair market value of the "put" could not be established without expert testimony, and
perhaps not even with it if the right to resell was subject to a contingency, such as death
or termination of the employment. These practical difficulties are similar to those behind the
Commissioner's policy not to assert a tax when an employee acquires a "call" option but to
wait until the option is exercised. See, e.g., the Commissioner's position in Van Dusen v.
Commissioner, 166 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1948), affirmnng, 8 T.C. 388 (1947) ; Harley v. Mc-
Namara, 19 T.C. 1001. (1953), re-od, 210 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1954) ; John C. Wahl, 19 T.C.
651 (1953). Query whether the Commissioner will now invoke the Seventh Circuit rationale
in McNamara to tax whatever value he can establish for assignable "put" options when
received.
335. The taxpayer would have $3 of ordinary income, only partially offset by a $3 long-
term capital loss.
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day as the stock. 3 6 The Committee Report refers repeatedly to "purchased
puts, 3 3 7 but the phraseology of the new Section 1233(c) conveniently sub-
stitutes "acquired" for "purchased" and thus seems applicable to "puts" re-
ceived for services as well as for cash.338 The 1954 amendment does not affect
the Commissioner's possible argument that a "spread" taxable as compensation
should be measured as of the date of the expiration of the "put" option (or
earlier sale of the stock to a third party) because no "risk of loss" has passed to
the taxpayer before this time. This theory seems unlikely to win acceptance by
the courts in view of the fact that the optionee receives the stock with dividend,
voting, and all other rights of ownership when he acquires the "put."' 0
Restricted Stock. It is also unclear whether taxation of stock received for
services is prevented by restrictions on the alienability of the stock which reduce
or eliminate its fair market value. These restrictions are ordinarily of two
types: (1) an outright prohibition of gale or other transfer for a limited period
of time, and (2) a requirement that the stock be resold to the corporation at a
given price, commonly the original purchase price or book value at time of
resale, on a given contingency, such as resignation by the employee-purchaser.
Restricted stock purchased at a depressed market value carries a built-in gain
which is not dependent upon appreciation in the value of the corporation. The
restrictions reduce or eliminate the fair market value on which a tax would be
based,340 but they may not seriously affect the inherent value of the stock to its
recipient, assuming that he is able to hold the stock until after the restrictions
have expired. The excess of this inherent value over the reduced or zero fair
market value at time of acquisition thus escapes taxation as compensation, at
least temporarily.
Restrictions were disregarded in the earliest tax decisions,3 41 but it is now
reasonably settled that a right in the corporation to repurchase at will limits the
taxable fair market value of the stock to the repurchase price 812 and that a pro-
336. T. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1233 (C).
337. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1954).
338. The amendment is applicable only to "puts" acquired after the date of its enact-
ment. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1233 (c).
339. Query as to an analogy between the expiration of a "put" and the expiration of
restrictions on alienation, which was held not to be a taxable event in Robert Lehman, 17
T.C. 652 (1951), acq., 1952-1 Cum. BULL. 3. See text at notes 352-60 infra.
340. But see Reginald Turner, 13 T.C.M. 120,335 (1954) (steamship tickets won in
radio quiz program held to be worth only $1,400 to the taxpayer although their market value
was $2,200).
341. G & K Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 76 F.2d 454 (4th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds,
296 U.S. 389 (1935) ; Rodriques v. Edwards, 40 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1930) ; Newman v. Com-
missioner, 40 F.2d 225, aff'd on rehearing, 41 F.2d 743 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S.
858 (1930) ; T. W. Henritze, 28 B.T.A. 1173 (1933). But see Wallis Tractor Co., 3 B.T.A.
981 (1926).
342. Helvering v. Salvage, 297 U.S. 106 (1935). Cf. Helen S. Delone, 6 T.C. 1188, 1193
(1946) (estate tax) ; Rev. Rul. 54-76, 1954 INT. REv. BuuL. No. 9, at 23 (1954) (estate
tax). But see Commissioner v. McCann, 146 F.2d 385 (2d Cir. 1944) (gift tax), suggesting
that value may exceed repurchase price it circumstances indicate that the repurchase option
will not be exercised.
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hibition against sale for a specified time deprives stock of all taxable value at
the time of its receipt if the corporation is "highly speculative."3 43 However,
uncertainty surrounds stock which is not "highly speculative" and which is sub-
ject to a prohibition against sale for a specified time or a contingent right to re-
purchase: Is the stock to be taxed at the time of receipt, the only effect of the
restriction being to reduce its taxable fair market value? Or does taxable com-
pensation arise when the restriction lapses, and if so, in what amount? Or does
taxable compensation arise when the stock is sold, and if so, in what amount?
(1) Taxable Compensation when Stock is Received. Although several cases
have refused to impose any tax upon the receipt of restricted stock of a corpora-
tion with an "untried business future,"3'' the Third Circuit, in Heiner v Gwin-
ner 345 pronounced the rule that restrictions reduce but do not eliminate fair
market value of stock unless the corporation is "highly speculative."-' Recently
the Tax Court, in Harold H. Kuchman,347 ignored the Gwinner iewT oint,
holding that restricted shares had no ascertainable fair market value to be in-
cluded in income even though the issuer was not "highly speculative" but was
merely a consolidation of five textile companies.3 48 Kuchman and Gwinner can
perhaps be reconciled because Kuchman, unlike Gwinner, would have forfeited
his stock by leaving his employment during the period of the restrictions. Or,
since Kuchnan involved no factual contest on the valuation issue-expert wit-
nesses for both parties agreed that a purchaser could not be found 34 09the cases
343. Helvering v. Tex-Penn Oil Co., 300 U.S. 481 (1937) ; Propper v. Commissioner,
89 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1937) ; Morris D. Kopple, 35 B.T.A. 1056 (1937). All three cases in-
volved enterprises which soon became insolvent.
344. Schuh Trading Co. v. Commissioner, 95 F.2d 404 (7th Cir. 1938), rcrrsfn9g, P-H
1936 BTA Mamn. DEC. ff 36,245 (1936) ; State Street Trust Co. v. United States, 37 F. Supp.
846 (D. Mass. 1941) ; Mac Sim Bar Paper Co., P-H 1941 BTA Mmi. DEc. 1 41,402 (1941) ;
Estate of Morgan J. Hammers, P-H 1943 TC Mx .s. DEc. 1 43,459 (1943). Thomas Watson,
P-H 1945 TC Mmn. DEC. 45,334 (1945).
345. 114 F.2d 723 (3d Cir. 1940), reversing, 25 F. Supp. 659 (W.D. Pa. 1938), cert.
denied, 311 U.S. 714 (1940). Cf. Fostoria Glass Co. v. Yoke, 45 F. Supp. 962 (N.D. W. Va.
1942) ; Henry S. Parker, 11 B.T.A. 1336 (1928).
346. "The restriction upon the sale or exchange of stock of course postpones the right
of the owner of the stock to transfer title until the expiration of the period ... and as a
practical matter results in limiting the number of prospective purchasers to those who do not
desire immediate delivery .... [But] there is no reason to believe that they would have
been unwilling to pay some fair price for the stock... ." Heiner v. Gwinner, 114 F.2d 723,
725 (3d Cir. 1940).
347. 18 T.C. 154 (1952), acq., 1952-2 Cum. Buu.m 2, discussed in Note, 62 YALE LJ.
832 (1953).
348. Kuchman was permitted to purchase at $5 per share stock of his corporate em-
ployer which was sold publicly by the undenvriters at $25 per share. He was not permitted
to sell the stock for one year without the underwriters' consent, but he could pledge it as
security for a loan. If he voluntarily terminated his employment within the year, he was
required to offer his stock to the underwriters at $5 per share. The Tax Court rejected the
Commissioner's contention that the $20 spread was taxable income in the year of the pur-
chase. Harold H. Kuchman, 18 T.C. 154,158-9, 163 (1952).
349. The Tax Court apparently reasoned that no buyer would pay more than $5 per
share because of the restrictions, and that no seller would sell for $5 because of the potential
value of the stock and the temporary nature of the restrictions.
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may both support the rule that restrictions do not eliminate fair market value as a
matter of law 850 but expert testimony may prove that they reduce it to zero as
a matter of fact.35 1 Even if restrictions do not reduce stock value to zero, they
may reduce it sufficiently to eliminate a taxable "spread" in the case of pur-
chases at substantially less than the value of unrestricted shares.
(2) Taxable Compensation when Restrictions Lapse. If reduced value
caused by restrictions precludes taxation when the stock is received, it is arguable
that taxable income is realized with the increased value when the restrictions ex-
pire. 352 In the only case on the issue, Robert Lehman,353 the Tax Court re-
jected the Commissioner's contention that the expiration of restrictions pro-
duced taxable compensation to the extent of the difference between the purchase
price and market value of the stock on the expiration date.85 4  However, the
Lehman rationale does not foreclose the possibility of taxable compensation
arising at the expiration date measured by the bargain spread on the purchase
350. For a contrary view, see John C. Wahl, 19 T.C. 651 (1953) and cases cited note
344 supra. See also Molloy, Restraints on Alienation and the Internal Revenue Code, 7
TAx L. REv. 439 (1952).
351. In Society Brand Clothes, Inc., 18 T.C. 304, 317 (1952) it was found as a fact
that stock of a listed corporation had no fair market value because subject to a 10-year option
to repurchase at specified prices: "In thus making the foregoing finding of fact we do not
mean to hold that as a matter of law the restriction of the sale of stock by an option nieces-
sarily destroys its fair market value." See also Spitzer v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 967 (8th
Cir. 1946) ; Worcester County Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 134 F.2d 578 (1st Cir. 1943) ;
Kline v. Commissioner, 130 F2d 742 (3d Cir. 1942) ; Edwin Singer, 3 T.C.M. 66 (1944)
(estate tax cases). From the taxpayer's standpoint, the chief disadvantage of the question
of fact rule is that it invites controversy as to the amount of the reduction in "fair market
value" caused by a particular restriction. See note 355 infra.
352. Because the expiration of the restrictions is contemplated by the parties, the situa-
tion is distinguishable from Thomas W. Blake, Jr., 20 T.C. 721 (1953) (attorney held not
to realize taxable income upon the removal of a cloud on title to real property 'eceived
seven years earlier as a fee).
353. 17 T.C. 652 (1951), acq., 1952-1 Cum. BuLL. 3; Note, 62 YALE L.J. 832 (1953).
Lehman was a member of a partnership which purchased stock of two corporations pur-
suant to an option received for underwriting services. The partners were not permitted to
dispose of the stock for eleven months without the consent of the vendors. Furthermore, if
the vendors sold their remaining stock in the two corporations during the eleven month
period, the partners were required to join in the sale for a pro rata share of the sales price,
which was not to be less than the option price. Notwithstanding the bargain price, the
Commissioner stipulated that taxable income did not arise in the year of the purchase be-
cause the restrictions prevented the stock from having any then ascertainable fair market
value, although neither of the corporations, Kresge Dept. Stores, Inc. and The Fair, Inc.,
appears to have been "highly speculative."
354. "Termination of the restrictions was not a taxable event such as the receipt of
compensation for services or the disposition of property. Values fluctuate from time to time
and the value on a later date might be out of all proportion to the compensation involved in
the original acquisition of the shares." Robert Lehman, 17 T.C. 652, 654 (1952).
The opinion states that the entire gain upon a subsequent sale of the stock was properly
reported as long-term capital gain, but it does not indicate whether there was evidence of
the fair market value of unrestricted shares on the purchase date, without which no alloca-
tion of the sales proceeds between capital gain and ordinary income could have been made.
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date.355 The Commissioner may argue that, even if restrictions justify deferment
of the tax, they do not justify its elimination or its conversion into a capital gains
tax, especially since an employee can be said to have "earned" the termination
of restrictions by his personal services. Deferred taxation of ordinary income
previously realized is supported by the analogous treatment of blocked foreign
currency,3 56 defeasible bonuses,357 and below 95 percent "restricted stock op-
tions."3 58
If Lehinan is construed to prohibit any taxation at the time restrictions lapse,
it substantially avoids the general rule taxing stock received for personal services.
In contrast with "restricted stock options," Lelhnan would then permit a bargain
purchase by non-employees and over-ten percent stockholders at a price below
85 percent of fair market value of stock in a closely-held corporation whose stock
cannot easily be valued. Moreover, because Lehman does not require that the
transaction be non-compensatory 359 but only that the fair market value of the
stock be unascertainable, the rule could apparently be extended from purchases
to bonuses of restricted stock (completely eliminating the need for financial
investment by the taxpayer) 360 and possibly to purchases or bonuses of other
kinds of property with restrictions on alienation.
(3) Taxable Compensation when Stock is Sold. Lehman also leaves open
the possibility that the initial spread can be taxed as compensation when the stock
is sold.3 6' This would represent a departure from the cases holding that the
sale of stock acquired as compensation gives rise to capital gain.ca But these
355. Thus if $10 per share were paid for stock worth '25 when purchased (if unre-
stricted), $40 when the restrictions expire, and $0 when sold, only $15 of taxable compen-
sation would arise on the expiration date, as compared with $30 under the Commissioner's
contention in the Lehman case. The $15 would be added to the cost basis of the stock under
U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22(a)-1 c) (1953) so that only $25 would be long-term capital
gain upon the subsequent sale.
Under the Gzwinner rule, see text at notes 345-51 supra, the restrictions would not pre-
vent the imposition of tax at the time of purchase but would reduce the taxable spread. Thus
if testimony showed that the restrictions reduced the fair market value on the purchase
date to $15 per share, only $5 would be taxed as compensation.
356. Mim. 6475, 1950-1 Cum. Buu.. 50.
357. Fred C. Hall, 15 T.C. 195 (1950) ; Phillip V. Haberman, 31 B.T.A. 75 (1934),
aff'd, 79 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1935) ; Roscoe H. Aldrich, 3 B.T.A. 911 (1926).
358. IxT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 130A(b) ; IxT. REv. CoDE or 1954, § 421(b). Another
possible precedent is Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6, 8-9 (1952) (stockholders of
dissolved corporation realized only capital loss from payment by them of judgment against
corporation several years after last liquidating distribution reported as capital gain) : "But
this principle [that each taxable year is a separate unit] is niot breached by considering all
the 1937-1944 liquidation transaction events in order properly to classify the nature of the
1944 loss for tax purposes!'
359. As the Kuchzman case indicates, the restricted stock theory can be coupled with
the "proprietary" theory in opposing the taxation of the bargain spread.
360. But see cases cited note 357 supra.
361. But see note 354 supra.
362. Commissioner v. Timmer, 78 F.2d 599 (6th Cir. 1935). Cf. Carl McFarlin, 1
T.C.M. 703 (1943). For the tax consequences of a sale of stock received as compensation
but not reported in the year of receipt, see Mintz & Plumb, Taxing Income in Ycars Not
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decisions apparently presume that the stock was taxable on receipt and thus
may turn on the theory that the retention and sale of the stock constitute an
investment transaction separate and distinct from the compensatory transaction
by which the stock was acquired. Hence it is arguable that their rule should not
be extended to restricted stock cases where the compensation element would
escape ordinary tax rates. A tax on compensation at the time the stock is sold
would still leave restricted stock purchases with the advantages of an indefinite
deferment of tax, and possible avoidance of tax if the stock is held until the
purchaser's death.
363
Preventing Attribution of Corporate Income to the Stockholder-Employce
Capital gains through the accumulation of corporate income are aborted if
the income is attributed to the principal stockholders in their individual ca-
pacities. This danger is minor for the owner of an enterprise employing sub-
stantial capital as well as his personal services, but it may become real as the
importance of capital diminishes in relation to that of services. In the case
of a one-man advertising or brokerage business, for example, the only apparent
factual difference between the corporation and a sole proprietorship is the
"Inc." on the door.
Tax law abounds with concepts which might be invoked by the Commissioner
to tax corporate income as belonging directly to the stockholder-employee 3a"
Unfortunately, these concepts have little predictive value. A few cases permit
the Commissioner to disregard the corporate entity, but they afford only vague
tests as to when he may properly do so.365 The Code authorizes him to re-
allocate gross income and deductions where necessary "to prevent evasion of
taxes or clearly to reflect the income" of related taxpayers, but it gives little indi-
Realized under Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel, 1954 U. So. CALF. TAx IN ST. 481, 542
(1954).
363. Query whether the compensation element would be ordinary income upon a sale
of the stock by the taxpayer's executor under INT. REV. CODE or 1939, § 126(a) (3) ; IN'r.
Ray. CODE OF 1954, § 691 (a) (3). Presumably any amount taxed as compensation would be
added to the executor's stepped-up basis under INT. REv. CODE or 1939, § 113 (a) (5) ; IN-r.
REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1014, and thus cause a concurrent capital loss.
364. The Commissioner may have relied upon INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 102 to limit the
avoidance of graduated rates, but he is less likely to do so in the future because of the soften-
ing of the penalty tax on improperly accumulated surplus by INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 531-
537. See text at notes 383-93 infra.
365. "The Government may look at actualities and upon determination that the form
employed for doing business or carrying out the challenged tax event is unreal or a sham
may sustain or disregard the effect of the fiction as best serves the purpose of the tax
statute." Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 477 (1940). The corporate entity was disregarded
in Commissioner v. Smith, 136 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1943) ; Paymer v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d
334 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Advance Machinery Exchange, Inc., 8 T.C.M. 84 (1949), aff'd, 196
F.2d 1006 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 835 (1952). But see Moline Properties, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943): "So long as that purpose is the equivalent of business
activity or is followed by the carrying on of business by the corporation, the corporation
remains a separate taxable entity." See Cleary, The Corporate Entity In Tax Cases, 1 TAX
L. REv. 3 (1945).
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cation when the rendition of services by a stockholder-employee would involve
"evasion" or an unclear reflection of income.300 Judicial rules permit the Com-
missioner to disregard: a transaction whereby compensation is prevented "from
vesting even for a second in the man who earned it" (Lucas v. Earl 3) ; a
transaction lacking a business purpose (Gregory v. Helvering 26s); and a
transaction between a wholly-owned corporation and its owner which produces
no change in economic position (Higgins v. Smith 300). These concepts differ
in emphasis, but each merely restates the question: Is income earned by the
corporation or its sole owner?
Tentative and partial answers to this question may be inferred from the few
decisions taxing corporate income to a controlling stockholder. In Commissioner
v. Laughton,37 0 the British movie actor had entered into a five-year employment
contract with his wholly-owned corporation at a salary very much less than
the corporation received for the "loan" of his services. The Ninth Circuit held
that the presence of "business purposes"3 7' did not preclude disregarding the
corporate entity under the rule of Higgins v. Smith. It remanded the case to
determine as a fact whether the arrangement was in effect a single transaction
in which Laughton indirectly received the amount paid for his services.372 On
remand Laughton consented to the assessment of deficiencies against him.3"
The same result was reached in Clinton Davidson 3 4 concerning a life insurance
agent who contracted to turn over commissions on subsequently written policies
to his wholly-owned Estate Planning Corporation in return for a salary, which
in fact he never received. Under New York law the corporation could not be
licensed as an insurance agent,3 7 r but it did serve several business purposes,
including the employment of a staff and extensive advertising of the "Estate
366. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 45; INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 482. As used in § 45, the
word "evasion" has been construed to mean profit-shifting rather than fraud. Asiatic Petrol-
eum Co. v. Commissioner, 79 F2d 234 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 645 (1935).
367. 281 U.S. 111, 114-5 (1930). See note 99 supra.
368. 293 U.S. 465 (1935), affirming, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934). See Michaelson,
"Business Purpose" md Tax-Free Reorganication, 61 YAI. LJ. 14 (1952).
369. 308 U.S. 473 (1940) (jury properly instructed to find whether sale to taxpayer's
wholly-owned corporation was transfer from his individual hand to his corporate hand, so
that it was no transfer at all).
370. 113 F.2d 103 (9th Cir. 1940).
371. The Board of Tax Appeals had found two non-tax purposes: to accumulate funds
for the production of superior films by the corporation; to entrust the conservation of
Laughton's earnings to a board of directors consisting of independent businessmen. Charles
Laughton, 40 B.T.A. 101 (1939). The B.T.A. decision was in accord with its earlier ruling
in Fontaine Fox, 37 B.T.A. 271 (1938).
372. Commissioner v. Laughton, 113 F.2d 103, 104 (9th Cir. 1940). Although the tax-
able years involved were prior to the effective date of the 1937 amendment to the personal
holding company statute, notes 8-12 mpra, neither the Board nor the Ninth Circuit believed
that the statutory remedy precluded a "common law" solution.
373. See Bittker & Redlich, Corporate Liquidations and the Income Tax, 5 T,%x L
REv. 437, 444 (1950).
374. 43 B.T.A. 576 (1941).
375. N.Y. INs. LAW § 91.
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Planning" name. The Board of Tax Appeals held that the commissions had
been earned by the taxpayer in his individual capacity, but permitted him to
deduct all expenses paid by the corporation.
The Laughton and Davidson decisions may mean only that a controlling
stockholder-employee is taxed on corporate income when the services could not
be performed by another person or when the corporation could not legally per-
form the services itself. Or these cases may mean that he is taxed whenever he
does not receive compensation from the corporation comparable to that which
he formerly received from third parties. But even if these cases are viewed as
reallocations of gross income between related taxpayers to restate their incomes
on an arm's-length basis,37 6 their rationale is not easily applied to most one-man
corporations. In the ordinary case the Commissioner would find it far more
difficult than in Laughton and Davidson to establish the fact-and dollar value
-- of uncompensated services,3 7 7 e.g., where the corporation has non-clerical
employees or substantial capital.3 7 8 Moreover, a distinction might be made be-
tween compensation for personal services and entrepreneurial profit, so that
the latter is taxed to the corporation even though partially attributable to the
services of the owner-employee.379
An employee-stockholder will rarely be taxed on what purports to be cor-
porate income, if he is careful that the income does purport to be that of the
corporation. But if he contracts in his individual capacity rather than as the
corporation's representative, he may be taxed on the resultant income on the
theory that it has merely been assigned to the corporation and not earned
by it.38O Similarly, the corporation must not appear dormant by failure to
hold meetings, keep minutes, and maintain separate corporate financial records
and bank accounts.
81
376. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, §§ 39.45-1 (a) (6), (b) (1) (1953). See Bittker & Redlich,
supra note 373, at 447 suggesting that the corporate entity should not insulate underpaid
stockholder-employees from tax on corporate income: "The reason they serve without com-
pensation is to Teduce their taxes, and this reason may condemn the scheme."
377. On this issue the contentions of both Commissioner and taxpayer would be dia-
metrically opposite to their usual contentions in cases involving the deductibility of "reason-
able" compensation under INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 23(a) (1) (A) ; INT. REv. CODE oF 1954,
§ 162(a) (1).
378. An allocation of this type is required wbere services are performed by the donor
of an interest in a family partnership. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 191; INT. REV. CoDE OF
1954, § 704 (e) (2). See discussion in Weiss v. Johnson, 206 F.2d 350 (2d Cir. 1953).
379. In the Davidson case the taxpayer entered into a new contract with the Estate
Planning Corporation whereby he retained subsequent commissions and paid the corporation
ten percent thereof plus its expenses. Davidson was permitted to deduct, and the corporation
was taxed upon, the profit element attributable to the estate planning services as distinct
from the routine insurance agency services.
380. Brown v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 337 (2d Cir. 1940) (stockholder taxed on com-
pensation for services performed as individual despite assignment to wholly-owned corpora-
tion). Cf. Thompson v. United States, 110 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1940).
381. See, e.g., Paymer v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1945); Advance Ma-
chinery Exchange, Inc., 8 T.C.M. 84 (1949), aff'd, 196 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir.), ccrt. dcnied,
344 U.S. 835 (1952).
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Minimizing Corporate Taxes
Accumulation of income within a corporation followed by sale or redemption
of the stock is advantageous primarily if the sum of corporate taxes and capital
gains tax is less than the graduated personal income tax that would be incurred
if the business were conducted as a sole proprietorship or partnership. Corporate
taxes include the rarely applicable surtax on personal holding companies,3s2 the
surtax on corporations improperly accumulating surplus, the recent excess
profits tax, and the regular corporate income tax.
Surtax on Improperly Accumulated Surplus
The penalty surtax on corporations improperly accumulating surplus 'sa has
been a major obstacle to the use of corporations to convert the fruits of personal
effort into capital gain. Although accumulation is permitted for "the reasonable
needs of the business," 38 4 these needs are usually small in the case of a personal
service enterprise. Such a corporation may, nevertheless, be able to show a
"reasonable need" to expand its activities into related fields requiring consider-
able capital,38 5 to purchase a building to house its activities, to hedge against con-
tingent liabilities and anticipated economic adversities,38 0 and possibly to insure
the lives of key men.
3 8 7
Prior to the 1954 Code, if the owner of a small business were in the upper
brackets, tax rate arithmetic sometimes recommended use of the corporate form
even though the penalty tax might be incurred. The penalty tax was
27Y2 percent on the first $100,000388 of undistributed corporate income
after certain adjustments, particularly the subtraction of the regular cor-
porate income tax. The latter tax was 30 percent on the first $25,000 and 52 per-
cent on the balance.38 9 Even if the combination of these two taxes and the even-
382. Discussed in text at notes 5-12 supra. See General Management Corporation v.
Commissioner, 135 F.2d 882 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 757 (1943) (surtax imposed).
Rev. Rul. 54-34, 1954 INT. REv. Bu.- No. 4, at 7 (1954).
383. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 102; Iwr. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 531-537.
384. Ixv. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 102(c); I x. Rsv. CODE OF 1954, §§533(a), 537.
385. Fisher and Fisher, Inc., 32 B.T.A. 211 (1935) (§ 102 inapplicable to a corporation
formed by cartoonist to furnish drawings to cartoon syndicate because corporation con-
templated acquiring its own distribution facilities, purchasing interest in a newspaper, and
producing cartoon films). But cf. Reynard Corp., 37 B.T.A. 552 (1938) (§ 102 applied to
corporation organized by cartoonist for similar purposes). See also Fontaine Fox, 37 B.T.A.
271 (1938).
386. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 537 expressly provides that the "reasonable needs of the
business" include "reasonably anticipated needs." For a typical pre-1954 case see Belaire
Management Corp., 21. T.C. 881 (1954) (§ 102 applicable despite taxpayer's contentions con-
cerning various contingencies).
387. Cf. Emeloid Co. v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 230 (3d Cir. 1951) (indebtedness in-
curred to insure life of key man held to be "incurred for business reasons" and includible
in "borrowed invested capital" for excess profits tax purposes).
388. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 102(a) ; l x. Rnv. CODE OF 1954, § 531. The rate is
38% percent on amounts over $100,000.
389. IT. REv. CoDEOF 1939, §§ 13(b) (2), 15(b); Ixv. REV. CODEOP 1954, §§ l1(b) (1),
11 (c). The 30 percent normal tax is now scheduled to drop to 25 percent effective April 1,
1955. Id. § 11 (b) (2).
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tual capital gains tax was more than the owner would pay as a sole proprietor or
partner, the Commissioner's apparent readiness to settle for less than the full
penalty tax often made incorporation a good gamble.
This gamble is made much more attractive by the 1954 Code. The new statute
permits the taxpayer to shift the burden of proving unreasonableness to the Com-
missioner.8 90 It taxes only that part of the current accumulation found to be
in excess of the reasonable needs of the business.89 ' And it permits a corpora-
tion accumulate up to $60,000 irrespective of its needs 92M-an important ad-
vantage for most personal service corporations. The 1954 Code does seek to
curb multiplication of the $60,000 credit by the formation of several corpora-
tions out of an existing corporation, but it allows a credit to each new corporation
which is a continuation of an unincorporated business or receives only "money"
from an existing corporation.
393
Excess Profits Tax
Unlike the unpredictable incidence of the accumulated earnings tax, the
excess profits tax automatically applied to all corporations for the years 1940
through 1945 and from July 1, 1950 to the end of 1953. Both the World War
II and the Korean versions of the tax exempted "personal service corpora-
tions," if the stockholders included in their personal income pro rata shares
of undistributed corporate profits. 394 Obviously this election cancelled out
the principal tax advantage of doing business as a corporation. If no election
was made, the corporation was subject to a 30 percent tax on its income, after
certain adjustments and after subtracting a credit representing normal earn-
ings.39 5 The "invested capital" methods of computing this credit were of
little help to personal service corporations with small capital"o' Even the credit
390. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 534. The new procedure is described in SEN. Rri,. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 315 (1954).
391. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 535(a), (c) (1), (2). If any part of the accumulation
was found unreasonable, the 1939 Code taxed the entire accumulation. The benefit of the
new rule is denied to a "mere holding or investment company." Id. §§ 535 (c) (1), (3).
392. Id. § 535 (c) (2). The $60,000 minimum credit is reduced (possibly to zero) by
the accumulated profits at the close of the preceding taxable year.
393. Id. § 1551. A new personal service corporation might be held to have acquired
"property" in the form of the good will of an old corporation.
This section is almost identical with INT. PEV. CODE OF 1939, § 15(c) which disallowed
both the $25,000 minimum excess profits credit and the $25,000 surtax exemption to a cor-
poration acquiring property from another unless the corporation could "establish by the
clear preponderance of the evidence that the securing of such exemption or credit was not
a major purpose" of the acquisition.
394. The Korean law, INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 449, was identical with the World War
II law, INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 725, which in turn was based upon Revenue Act of 1918,
§ 200, 40 STAT. 1058 (1918), and Revenue Act of 1921, § 500(5), 42 STAT. 2281 (1921). See
Gutldn, Section 725: Personal Service Corporations, 3 TAx L. REV. 89 (1947).
395. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, §§430(a) (1), 433(a). This and all succeeding excess
profits tax references are to the Korean statute.
396. Id. §§ 437, 453.
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based on modified average earnings during four "base period" years T and
the various "relief" provisions 308 did not make it profitable for new or grow-
ing personal service enterprises to operate as corporations, unless their income
was less than the $25,000 minimum credit 399 or their activities could be divided
among several corporations each with an income under $25,000. Section 15(c),
enacted in 1951 to disallow multiple credits, could probably have been avoided
by most personal service businesses.
400
Corporate Income Tax
Any one of the special corporate taxes may be the decisive factor in a par-
ticular case, but in almost every case the regular corporate income tax must be
added to the capital gains tax in weighing the feasibility of incorporation. During
recent years individual rates have fallen from their World War II peak, large-
ly through the introduction of marital income-splitting, while the corporate
normal tax rate has risen to 30 percent with a corporate surtax of 22 percent. 0 1
Accordingly, successful use of the corporate form to obtain capital gains is
largely dependent upon the reduction or elimination of the corporate income
tax.
Multiple Corporations. To avoid the 22 percent surtax on income in excess
of $25,000, a taxpayer may divide his business into several corporations. -0 2 In
doing so he runs the risk that the Commissioner will be able to reallocate the
income to one corporation or to the stockholders as individuals. 40 3 Generally,
this risk is negligible if each corporation maintains separate financial records
and bank accounts and deals with the others at arms-length terms, and if the
division of business functions among the several corporations can be justified
on non-tax grounds. For example, a commission agency might safely employ
separate corporations for different lines of products, classes of customers, geo-
graphical areas, or for the segregation of commission activities from trading
activities.
404
397. Id. § 435.
398. Alternate credits, e.g., id. § 445, were ordinarily useless to personal service corpora-
tions because based on net assets. Similarly, the 18 percent ceiling rate, id. § 430(a) (2) (C),
based on income without any credit, was beneficial only if income were at least 2% times
the available credit, e.g., a small corporation with only the $25,000 minimum credit derived
no benefit from the 18 percent rate unless its income exceeded $62,500. As to the lower alter-
nate rates for "new corporations," id. § 430(e), see Miller, Excess Profits Tax Consequenecs
of Acquiring Partnership or Proprietorship Assets, N.Y.U. lTH INST. oN' FED. Tax. 973,
990-3 (1953).
399. INT. Rav. CODE OF 1939, § 431.
400. See note 393 supra and corresponding text
401. See note 389 supra.
402. But if obtaining the surtax exemption is a major purpose of the transaction, the
exemption may be denied. IxT. Ray. CODE OF 1939, § 15(c) ; INT. RE%. CODE OF 1954, § 1551.
See note 393 supra.
403. See text at notes 365-9mtpra.
404. See Cooper, Section 45,4 TAx L. REv. 131 (1949). Other possible non-tax grounds
for division would include the segregation of hazardous activities, the reduction of state
franchise taxes, and the facilitation of employee stock ownership.
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Loss Corporations. While multiple corporations reduce the corporate tax,
use of a "loss" corporation may eliminate it completely. The taxpayer pur-
chases at a low price the stock of an old corporation with few assets but with
a history of substantial operating losses which can be carried forward to offset
corporate profits for up to five years.405 He next transfers operating assets to
the corporation through a sale, a contribution to capital, or a merger of another
corporation into the loss corporation. He then conducts his business within
the old corporate shell. Frequently, both the nature of the business and the
name of the old corporation are changed, so that all that remains is a legal
fiction-and potential tax savings from the loss carry-overs. Although most
"loss" corporation devices seem to come within both letter and spirit of the
old Section 129,406 the Commissioner has yet to win a single case under that
section largely because of inability to prove that tax avoidance was the "princi-
pal purpose" of the acquisition. 40 7 And the Tax Court has intimated that, re-
gardless of the taxpayer's purpose, the "section would seem to prohibit the
use of a deduction, credit, or allowance only by the acquiring person or corpora-
tion and not their use by the corporation whose control was acquired."408
To meet this "serious tax-avoidance problem,' 40 9 Section 269 of the 1954
Code augments the old Section 129 with a mild presumption that tax avoid-
ance is the "principal purpose" of the acquisition if the consideration paid for
stock of the old corporation substantially exceeds the sum of the tax basis of
its assets and any other tax benefits made available by the acquisition. 410 And
the new Section 382 disallows the carry-over of operating losses if fifty percent
or more of a corporation's stock 411 changes ownership 412 during a two-year
405. In addition to operating loss carry-overs under INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 122;
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 172, the acquiring corporation may be entitled to a capital loss
carry-over under INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 117(e) ; INT. REv. CODE or 1954, § 1212 and un-
used excess profits credit carry-overs under INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 432.
406. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 129; INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 269. Deductions, credits
and allowances are prohibited where control of a corporation has been acquired, or property
has been acquired by one corporation from another with a substituted basis, for the "prin-
cipal purpose" of avoiding income or excess profits tax. See Tarleau, Acqufsilion of Loss
Companies, 31 TAXES 1050 (1.953).
407. However, in Alpha Tank & Sheet Metal Mfg. Co. v. United States, 116 F. Supp.
721 (Ct. Cl. 1953) both § 129 and § 45 were cited as authority for a decision in the Com-
missioner's favor.
408. Alprosa Watch Corporation, 11 T.C. 240, 245 (1948). See also A. B. & Container
Corporation, 14 T.C. 842 (1950).
409. SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1954).
410. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §269(c). The House Bill would have required the tax-
payer to overcome this presumption "by a clear .preponderance of the evidence," but a Senate
amendment makes a substantially excessive price merely "prima facie evidence" of a purpose
to avoid tax-as it probably was treated under prior law. This nullifying amendment was
said to be necessary to afford the taxpayer "the opportunity of proving that tax avoidance
was not the principal purpose." SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1954).
411. For this purpose, "stock" is defined as "all shares except nonvoting stock which
is limited and preferred as to dividends." INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 382(c).
412. Id. § 382. A person is deemed to own stock held by relatives and by corporations,
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period as the result of stock purchases 413 or redemptions 4 14 and the corpora-
tion materially changes its trade or business. 415
Yet, by another provision, the 1954 Code produces new opportunities to
deduct other people's losses. The Supreme Court has held that when a corpora-
tion with operating losses transfers substantially all its assets to another cor-
poration in a tax-free reorganization, the transferee is not entitled to offset
subsequent profits by carrying forward the losses of the transferor.410 By over-
ruling this decision,417 the new statute makes it possible for the purchasers of
a loss corporation to enjoy its loss carry-overs without having to keep it
alive or to transfer their profitable activities to it. As an alleged safeguard against
abuse, the carry-overs are cut down pro rata if the stockholders of the loss
corporation receive less than twenty percent of the stock of the transferee cor-
poration for their old stock.4 18 Thus if carryovers are large enough to permit
the shareholders of a loss corporation to demand twenty percent of the pur-
chaser's stock in payment, the carry-overs may be used in full by the purchaser,
barring the still remote possiblity that the Commissioner can prove that tax
avoidance was the "principal purpose" of the transaction.
41
0
Collapsible Corporations: Distribution before Realization. The collapsible
corporation, 420 a device indigenous to the personal service area, also seeks com-
plete elimination of the corporate income tax. The accomplishment of two
partnerships, and trusts to the extent of his interest therein. Id §§ 382(a) (1) (B) (i), (ii),
382 (a) (3).
413. Under id. §382(a) (4), an increase in stock ownership is treated as a "purchase"
only if the basis of the stock is determined "solely" by reference to its cost to the holder and
if the stock has been acquired from someone whose ownership of the stock would not be
attributed to the holder under the constructive ownership rules.
414. Except redemptions under § 303 to pay death taxes. Id. § 382(a) (1) (B) (ii).
415. SEh. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 285 (1954), states that a change in busi-
ness is material "if, as a result of [the change in ownership of stock] the corporation shifts
from one type of business to another,... changes its location, or otherwise fails to carry on
substantially the same trade or business as was conducted before such an increase in stock
ownership." (Emphasis added.) The "result" requirement does not appear in the statute.
Any action taken by a new management could be said to "result" from the change in owner-
ship, but this might not be true where the action was in response to external economic factors.
The Conference Report states: "If the corporation continued to carry on substantially the
same trade or business, the limitation would not be applicable even though the corporation
also added a new trade or business." H.R. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1954).
416. New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435 (1934).
417. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 381 (a), (c) (1).
418. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 382(b) (1), (2). The 20 percent limitation does not
apply if both corporations are owned substantially by the same persons in the same propor-
tion. Id. § 382(b) (3).
419. According to SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 285 (1954), § 269 may apply
if § 382 does not apply but can never apply if § 382 does apply. This suggests that where
there is a substantial risk that § 269 will deny the entire carry-over, the stockholders of the
loss corporation may be given a small percentage of the stock of the reorganized corporation
insuring the allowance of five times that percentage of the carry-over.
420. For a brief description of the collapsible corporation device and the 1950 amend-
ment see text at notes 59-67 mipra.
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objectives is required: First, the stockholders must be taxed only at capital gain
rates upon the income generated by the corporation's productive activities.
Second, the corporation must be insulated from any tax on this income by its
distribution to the stockholders of the property produced by the corporation
or of claims to income from that property. If these objectives are not attained,
the collapsible corporation may result in heavier taxation than the more typical
corporation which realizes, and is taxed on, the income from its activities be-
fore liquidation or sale of its stock.
(1) Tax Treatment of Stockholders. The heart of the collapsible corpora-
tion scheme is the avoidance of corporate tax; yet the statutory attack of Section
117(m) 42 1 is not directed at the corporation but at the stockholder by denying
him capital gains. And this attack can seldom be launched. The corporation
must be used "principally" to produce or purchase "property" "with a view
to" liquidation 422 before the corporation realizes a "substantial" part of the
income to be "derived" from such property. The definition of a collapsible
corporation involves many uncertainties which have yet to be considered by the
courts.423 For instance, there is confusion about whether the statute applies
to a "multiple shot" corporation which has realized and paid tax on "substan-
tial" income from some activities but not on potential income from others at
the time of the sale, liquidation or distribution. 424 The Regulations seek to
apply the statutory tests to each activity separately, 425 but the courts may take
the less sophisticated view that the corporation has not been used "principally"
with a view to tax avoidance.
Even if their corporation fits the definition of a "collapsible corporation," the
stockholders may escape taxation at ordinary rates under one of several
statutory or administrative "limitations. '420 The statute is applicable only if
more than seventy percent of the stockholder's recognized gain is attributable
to the property produced by the corporation with the proscribed intent. 42 7
This ambiguous test may possibly permit the stockholders to circumvent the
statute by contributing enough low-basis assets to the corporation to produce
421. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 117(m) ; INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 341(b).
422. Or other corporate distribution, or a sale of the stock. ibid.
423. See MacLean, Collapsible Corporations-The Statute and Regulations, 67 HAlm.
L. Ray. 55, 74 (1953) : "In unusual cases, a question might be raised whether certain items
having value, such as good will, unpaid claims for services, and contract rights, would come
within the section. Probably the term 'property' should be held to apply to such items."
424. See Walker, Investing in Motion Picture Enterprises, 1954 U. So. CALIF. TAX
INST. 399, 406 et seq. (1954).
425. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.117(m)-1 (e), Examples 2 and 5 (1953). See MacLean,
supra note 423, at 70-4.
426. The first of these limitations, rendering the statute inapplicable to under ten per-
cent stockholders (five percent under the 1954 Code) would seldom be of much help to the
typical personal service venture. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 117(m) (3) (A) ; INT. REV. CoDE
OF 1954, § 341.
427. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 117(m) (3) (B) ; INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §341(d) (2).
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thirty percent of their subsequent gain.4
s Or the three-year limitation
might conceivably permit avoidance by a sale of the stock for a down payment
not greater than the stockholder's cost basis with the balance payable under an
unsecured contract after the three years.4 30 Or, since the statute apparently
applies only to "recognized" gains, 431 the stock can apparently be disposed of
in a non-taxable reorganization,43 2 followed at a discreet interval by a sale of
the stock received in the reorganization.
4 33
The courts have yet to decide whether a stockholder who does not come
within the collapsible corporation statute may nevertheless be taxed at gradu-
ated rates under "common law" theories.4 34 The Commissioner unsuccessfully
attempted to invoke some of these in a pre-117(m) case, Herbert v. Riddell.
4 35
428. See MacLean, sn pra note 423, at 78-80. Perhaps this would be successful only
where the assets contributed are actually used (or potentially useful) in the corporation's
productive activities. Query as to the applicability of § 129 of the 1939 Code (§ 269 of the
1954 Code) ?
429. INT. REv. CoDE oF 1939, § 117(m) (3) (C) ; INT. REv. ConE oF 1954, §341(d) (3):
"[T]his subsection shall not apply to gain realized after the expiration of three years fol-
lowing the completion of such manufacture, construction, production, or purchase."
430. The theory would be that the unpaid balance is not part of the "amount realized"
and hence not part of the "gain realized" by a cash-basis seller in the year of sale. INT. REV.
CODE OF 1939, § 111; INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1001. Nina J. Ennis, 17 T.C. 465 (1951) ;
Harold IV. Johnston, 14 T.C. 560 (1950). Cf. Levin & Mitosky, Tax Sating Practices
of Artists and Entertainers, 31 TAxEs 21, 30 (1953). But see MacLean, supra note 423,
at 81-2.
431. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.117(m)-i,(C) (1) (1953).
432. For example, the owners of a single-venture movie corporation could exchange
their stock or the completed movie for stock in a large established movie producer. IN.
REv. CODE OF 1939, §8 112(b) (3), (4), and (g) (1) (B), (C) ; IxT. Rm CODE OF 1954,
§§ 354(a) (1), 368(a) (1) (B), (C). This scheme probably would not work if the acquiring
corporation were controlled by the stockholders of the collapsible corporation or were not
large enough to avoid becoming itself a collapsible corporation. Iz;r. Rv. CODE oF 1939,
§§ 117(m) (2) (A), (B) (ii); INT. R-v. CODE OF 1954, §§ 341(b) (1), (2) (B).
433. A less satisfactory means of avoiding the collapsible corporation statute was
through non-recognition of gain in an elective one-month liquidation. INT. REv. CODE oF
1939, § 112(b) (7). The Commissioner ruled § 117(m) inapplicable to that portion of a tax-
payer's liquidation gain which was not "recognized" under § 112(b) (7). RIA FED. TAx.
CoRINAToR, 1 E-1,731c (1953). Because of the usual low basis under § 113(a) (18) of
assets thus acquired, the stockholders avoided graduated rates only if the assets qualified as
capital assets in their hands and were disposed of in a later sale or exchange. Cf. Osenbach
v. Commissioner, 198 F2d 235 (4th Cir. 1952). INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 333 (a) denies
the one-month liquidation election to stockholders of collapsible corporations.
434. SEN. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1950), states that § 117(m) applies
"only to the extent that the use of the [collapsible corporation] device is interpreted as
giving rise to gain, which gain is considered (but for the provisions of the subsection) as
long-term capital gain." See Bittker & Redlich, Corporate Liquidations and tre Income
Tax, 5 TAx L. REv. 437, 437-48 (1950) ; De Wind, Collapsible Corporations under the
Rvenue Act of 1950, 1951 U. So. CALiF. TAx INsT. 583, 591-2 (1951). Cf. S. Nicholas
Jacobs, 21 T.C. 165 (1953) (sale of stock of temporary corporation treated as sale of under-
lying assets held primarily for sale to customers).
435. 103 F. Supp. 369 (D.C. Cal. 1.952). Cf. Frank E. Gilman, 14 T.C. 833 (1950), acq.,
1950-2 Cum. Bum. 2.
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There a playwright-producer obtained capital gains upon the dissolution of
his fifty percent-owned corporation immediately after the completion of a single
motion picture produced with borrowed funds at the Columbia studios. The
Commissioner argued that the income received from the subsequent distribu-
tion of the film should be taxed as ordinary income either to the stockholder,
on the theory that the corporate entity should be disregarded, or to the corpora-
tion, on the theory that it should have reported the income notwithstanding
its dissolution. The court found that the corporation had served genuine non-
tax purposes: it actually produced the film, borrowed on its own credit, and
insured the taxpayer's control over the film's artistic aspects.430 The court
also accepted at face value testimony that the corporation was intended to
produce more than one film and that its dissolution was not contemplated until
a ten percent stockholder became unwilling to risk his profit in future pro-
ductions. 437 The peculiar facts found in Herbert, especially the stockholders'
motives for organizing the corporation and for dissolving it, would insulate the
stockholders from the collapsible corporation statute if the case had arisen
after 1949.438 More important, these findings afforded little opportunity to
test the "common law" theories for imposing ordinary rates on the stockholder:
the case leaves unanswered the consequences of findings that a corporation was
"born to die" or that its stockholder-employees received inadequate compensa-
tion.
439
The Herbert case is significant, however, in permitting the stockholder to
obtain capital gains on his pre-incorporation services in writing the play, as
distinguished from his post-incorporation services in producing the film. As a
professional playwright, Herbert would have been taxed at graduated rates if
he had sold the play to an established studio either for cash or for a minority
stock interest.440 The creation of a corporation enabled him to make a tax-
free exchange of a non-capital asset (the play) for a capital asset (the stock).441
His capital gain of $547,000 upon liquidation largely represented the fruition
of his efforts as playwright.442 Because motives such as Herbert's could pre-
vent application of the collapsible corporation statute, capital gains on pre-
436. However, there was testimony that obtaining capital gains was discussed prior to
incorporation. Herbert . Riddell, 103 F. Supp. 369, 377 (D.C. Cal. 1952).
437. Id. at 382: "The picture had been released only a short time and very little money
was coming in. To buy him out would have involved a large sum of money, which was not
available." It would seem that the taxpayer or the corporation could easily have borrowed
money to buy him out; the corporation's credit had initially been sufficient to borrow
$400,000, and the completed film was valued at $973,886.25.
438. I.e., because the corporation had not been used "principally ... with a view to"
obtaining capital gains by the stockholders.
439. The $37,500 paid to Herbert by the corporation was not found to be inadequate
compensation for his services as script-writer and adviser.
440. Goldsmith v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1944) ; Fields v. Commissioner,
189 F.2d 950 (2d Cir. 1951).
441. INT. RFv. CODE OF 1939, § 112(b) (5) ; INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §351 (a).
442. To a lesser degree his gain also represented the return on his cash investment,
apparently $25,000.
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incorporation services still seem possible unless the Commissioner is able,
promptly,443 to assess ordinary income tax in the year of incorporation on the
theory that the receipt of stock is in payment for the prior services.
444
The 1954 Code preserves the old collapsible corporation statute in Section
341 with only three significant alterations.44 5 The first is the addition of a
presumption that a corporation is "collapsible" if its "section 341 assets" have
appreciated at least twenty percent over their adjusted basis and represent
at least fifty percent of the fair market value of total corporate assets.440
Section 341 assets are assets held for less than three years, consisting of stock
in trade and similar property, certain real and depreciable property,4 47 and
most "unrealized receivables or fees. '448 This presumption may be both too
narrow in scope 449 and too uncertain in effect 450 to accomplish its stated pur-
pose of strengthening the section's effectiveness.
4
r'
The second change affecting collapsibles does not appear in Section 341 but
in Section 337 which deals with the Court Holding Company problem. 8 ;2 Sec-
tion 337 provides for non-recognition of corporate gain on the sale of assets
443. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.112(b) (5)-3 (1953) requiring prompt disclosure of the
character of property received by a controlled corporation in exchange for its stock, is
frequently disregarded. See also note 289 mupra.
444. Section 112(b) of the 1939 Code has been held not to prevent taxation of stock
received for personal services. Fifth Avenue Bank of New York, 31 B.T.A. 945 (1934).
An argument could be made that the nonrecognition provisions should also be inapplicable
to stock received for property embodying prior personal services. Query whether the new
last sentence of Section 351(a) of the 1954 Code taxing stock issued for services applies
where a sole stockholder receives stock of a new corporation in exchange for property
created by his personal efforts?
445. The Senate rejected the sweeping changes made by H.R. 8300 (House Bill). See
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 38, A100-A11S (1954) ; Sm. Rm. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 48, 260 (1954).
446. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 341 (c) (1.). For this purpose total assets exclude cash,
stocks of other corporations, obligations which qualify as capital assets, and certain govern-
mental non-interest-bearing obligations. Id. § 341(c) (2). For a clue to the valuation of
"section 341 assets," see H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A114 (1954).
447. Excluded from this category is "property which is or has been used in connection
with the manufacture, construction, production, or sale" of stock in trade and similar prop-
erty. Id. § 341 (b) (3) (D).
448. This phrase is defined to "mean" any rights to ordinary income from "goods de-
livered or to be delivered" and "services rendered or to be rendered" to the extent that such
rights were not previously includible in income. Id. § 341 (b) (4). This definition is identical
with that in § 751(c) relating to partnerships except for the unexplained substitution of
"means" for "includes."
449. The definition of "unrealized receivables or fees" may not include rights to future
rental, royalty, and similar payments which are often distributed by temporary corporations
at the time of liquidation. See note 248 supra.
450. Section 341(c) fails to specify how the new presumption is intended to augment
the familiar presumption in favor of the Commissioner's determinations under Tax Court
Rule 32.
45L SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 260 (1954). See also .&. RE!'. No. 2543,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1954).
452. See text at note 464 infra.
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(except stock in trade) within twelve months after the adoption of a plan of
complete liquidation. And it eliminates even the tax on ordinary income from
the sale of stock in trade if substantially all is sold "to one person in one trans-
action. '45 3 The benefits of Section 337 are specifically denied to a "collapsible
corporation as defined in Section 341 (b), ' 454 but Section 337 may itself pre-
vent a corporation from being "collapsible" under Section 341 (b). A taxpayer
could apparently take advantage of Section 337 by (a) forming a single-
venture corporation to construct a building or produce a motion picture, (b)
causing the corporation to adopt a plan of complete liquidation, and (c) then
causing it to "realize" its profit by a sale of all its assets, including the com-
pleted building or film, "to one person in one transaction" within twelve
months. Since the corporation has "realized" a "substantial part of the taxable
income to be derived" from the building or film, it would not literally be "col-
lapsible" under Section 341(b). This would mean capital gains for the stock-
holders and non-recognition of the corporation's gain under Section 337. Thus
the profit from the building or film would be taxed as ordinary income to no
one. In view of Congress' clear intent to deny the benefit of Section 337 to
collapsible corporations, the courts may balk at this use of Section 337 to
frustrate the purpose of Section 341.
4 5
5
The third 1954 amendment affecting collapsible corporations is found in
Section 312(b). This new provision requires that distributions in kind of
appreciated "inventory assets" 456 be accompanied by a special adjustment of
the corporate "earnings and profits" account to reflect the excess of the current
value of such assets over their basis to the corporation. 45 7 This adjustment is
453. INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 337(b) (2).
454. Id. §337(c) (1) (A). This cross-reference could be interpreted to mean that
"collapsible corporation" status is to be determined without the presumption created by
§ 341 (c) which, by its terms, is applicable only "for the purpose of" § 341. Thus a corpora-
tion might not be "collapsible" under § 337 even though "collapsible" under § 341, with the
result that the corporate tax would be eliminated but the stockholders would be taxed at
ordinary rates. Similarly, the cross-reference may mean that "collapsible corporation"
status under § 337 is to be determined without regard to the limitations in § 341 (d) which,
by their terms, apply only "[i]n the case of gain realized by a shareholder . . ." with the re-
sult that the corporate tax might be imposed when the shareholder would not be taxed at
ordinary rates.
455. See text at notes 59-61 .npra.
456. Despite apparent similarity, the definition of "inventory assets" in § 312(b) (2)
differs in several respects from that of "section 341 assets" in §§ 341 (b) (3), (4) (relating
to collapsible corporations) discussed in notes 447 and 448 supra, and that of "unrealized
receivables" and "inventory items" in §§ 751 (c), (d) (relating to partnership interests) dis-
cussed in text at notes 247-9 .rpra.
457. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 312(b) requires that earnings and profits be (A) in-
creased by the excess of the fair market value of the inventory assets distributed over their
adjusted basis, and (B) decreased by the lesser of their fair market value or the earnings and
profits as increased under (A). Section 312(b) represents an exception to the general rule
of § 312(a) requiring that earnings and profits be decreased merely by the adjusted basis
of assets distributed in kind.
The general rule under the 1954 Code is that a distribution of money and/or property
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intended to insure "that the shareholder will always pay a [dividend] tax on
the [current] value of the inventory." 45 It thus prevents him from receiving
the "inventory assets" as a return of capital or as capital gain, even though the
distribution is made before the corporation has realized any income from the
distributed assets or after the corporation has distributed all "earnings and
profits" from its other activities.459 Because Section 312(b) is effective only
where the stockholders receive assets in a simple distribution in kind,c 0 but
not where the corporation is dissolved or its stock is sold, it is significant less
for what it accomplishes than for being the first legislative attempt to deal
with collapsible corporations without reliance upon the unsatisfactory 1950
statute.4 61
(2) Tax Treatment of Corporation. The collapsible corporation stat-
ute employs a test of "substantial" realization of income by the corporation, but
it does not provide criteria for determining how much income has been realized
by the corporation. Successful use of the collapsible corporation scheme pre-
sumes that the corporation will not be taxed on the income received by the
stockholder after the corporation has distributed the property produced by
it or claims to income from that property. This assumption is based largely
on the General Utilities 462 principle that a corporation does not realize income
on the distribution in kind of capital assets which have appreciated in value.463
During the past decade, however, the courts have begun to distinguish the
General Utilities rule when the assets distributed consist of claims to unrealized
income produced by the corporation's activities. This development has several
roots. One is the Court Holding Co. case,40 4 which taxed a corporation when
its stockholders closed a sale of real property distributed in kind to them
after the corporation had completed negotiations with the purchaser. Another
is a series of decisions sustaining the Commissioner's power under the old
Section 41 465 to attribute income to dissolved corporations which had used
is taxable to stockholders as a dividend only to the extent that the amount of the money
and/or the fair market value of the property distributed is deemed to be out of corporate
earnings and profits. INT. Rzv. CODE OF 1954, §§301(b), (c), 312(a), 316(a).
458. H... REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1954).
459. Where § 117(m) was inapplicable under the 1939 Code, the entire amount of the
distribution could theoretically be a dividend if the corporation had but a single dollar of
earnings and profits, while no part of the distribution would be taxable at ordinary rates if
earnings and profits were zero. This rule was applied to capital as well s to inventory assets.
Commissioner v. Hirshon Trust, 213 F.2d 523 (2d Cir. 1954) ; Commissioner v. Estate of
Godley, 213 F.2d 529 (3d Cir. 1954).
460. The amount of earnings and profits does not affect the taxability of liquidating
distributions.
461. H.P.. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1954).
462. General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935).
463. The regulations extend this rule to distributions in liquidation and apparently to
distributions of non-capital assets. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22(a)-20 (1953).
464. Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331. (1945).
465. INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1939, § 41 provided that where the method of accounting em-
ployed by the taxpayer "does not clearly reflect the income, the computation shall be made
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the "completed contract" method of accounting.4 0 Still another source may
be the Supreme Court cases taxing assignors on assigned income.407
No rule of thumb exists as yet for determining whether a corporation will be
taxed on income generated by its activities if its claims to this income are
distributed to stockholders and collected by them. At least two possibilities are
suggested by the cases to date. The first is that the income is taxable to the
corporation, even though on the cash-basis, if it would have accrued to a
corporation on the accrual basis. Thus in Floyd v. Scofield,408 a cash-basis oil
brokerage corporation was taxed on commissions received by its stockholder
around October 20th for services performed by the corporation during the
month of September notwithstanding its dissolution on October 2nd.409 A
second possibility is that the corporation will be taxed when it has done every-
thing necessary to generate the income in an economic sense, even though
at the time of the distribution the income would not be accruable under the
principles of accrual-basis accounting. This "economic" test is directed chiefly
toward operating income; but it can be supported by Court Holding Co. inas-
much as the sales profit there would not have accrued before the distribution
because the purchaser was not then liable for the price under the Florida
statute of frauds. Further authority for this test is found in several decisions
taxing accrual-basis corporations on income which had not accrued before
distributions in kind to stockholders. 470 However, this rule has been said to
in accordance with such method as in the opinion of the Commissioner does clearly reflect
the income." INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 446(b) restates the rule with minor changes in
phraseology.
466. Jud Plumbing and Heating, Inc. v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 127 (1945), aff'd, 153
F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1946) (corporation held taxable upon percentage of the total profit on
jobs that were incomplete at time of dissolution) ; Standard Paving Co. v. Commissioner,
13 T.C. 425 (1949), aff'd, 190 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1951) (dissolved subsidiary held taxable
on percentage of profit on jobs unfinished at time of "tax-free reorganization"). Cf. Guy
M. Shelley, 2 T.C. 62 (1943).
467. E.g., Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930) ; Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
Cf. United States v. Joliet and Chicago Ry., 315 U.S. 44 (1942). But see Campbell v. Pro-
thro, 54-1 U.S. TAx CAs. f 9155 (5th Cir. 1954).
468. 193 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1952).
469. See also First-Nat. Bank of St Elmo, Ill. v. United States, 194 F.2d 389 (7th Cir.
1952) (cash-basis bank taxed on proceeds of sale of mineral rights notwithstanding prior
dividend in kind of bank's claim); Atlas Steamship Co., 18 B.T.A. 654 (1930) (cash-basis
corporation taxed on proceeds of insurance on lost vessel received by stockholders notwith-
standing prior dividend in kind of corporation's claim against insurance company). But Cf.
United States v. Horschel, 205 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1953) (cash-basis corporation held not
taxable upon proceeds of post-liquidation sales of apples). The Horschel case is reconcilable
on the ground that the income was neither accruable nor "earned" in an economic sense by
the corporation prior to its liquidation.
470. Commissioner v. First State Bank of Stratford, 168 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1948),
reversing, 8 T.C. 831 (1.947), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 867 (corporation taxed on collection of
notes previously charged off as worthless notwithstanding distribution of notes to stock-
holders) ; United States v. Lynch, 192 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 934
(1952) (corporation taxed on ordinary income from sale of inventory of apples distributed
in kind to stockholders and subsequently sold by corporation as their "agent") ; Samuel
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apply only where the distribution is by a continuing corporation rather than
one in liquidation.471
The courts have given no clear indication whether they will adopt an
"accrual" test, an "economic" test, or possibly some third test. Herbert v.
Riddell47 2 rejected the "economic" test by holding that the corporation vas
not taxable on income from the film distribution contract transferred to the
stockholders in liquidation. 73 This income would not have been taxable to
the corporation under the "accrual" test because it was not accruable at the
time of the liquidation, even though it required no future activity by the cor-
poration or its stockholders and could be estimated in amount very closely.474
(3) Distribution of Contingent Claims. Adoption of an "accrual" test
would facilitate corporate tax avoidance in personal service situations other than
collapsible movie corporations. The possibilities are illustrated by Susan J.
Carter.47 5 There a sole stockholder dissolved a corporation which for many years
had acted as an oil broker. Its corporate income consisted primarily of commis-
sions for sales of oil arranged by the stockholder's husband as president. The
commissions were expressly contingent upon delivery of the oil by the seller and
receipt by him of the sales price. Before dissolution the corporation had per-
formed services under certain brokerage contracts but had not reported the
commissions because it was on the cash-basis. Subsequently over $43,000 of
such commissions were received by the stockholder. The Commissioner suc-
cessfully invoked an accrual theory, asserting that the corporation was taxable
on $8,000 of these commissions attributable to sales of oil delivered and paid
for before it dissolved. But both Tax Court and Second Circuit upheld the tax-
payer's contention that the remaining $35,000 was taxable to her only as
capital gain. They reasoned that since the claims were admitted to have no
fair market value for computing capital gain at the time of the liquidation, the
Donner, 12 T.C.M. 1335 (1953) (corporation held taxable on ordinary income from sales
made after its complete liquidation under sales agency contract previously negotiated by
corporation) ; Rudco Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 746 (Ct. CL 1949) (cor-
poration taxed on proceeds from sale of oil and gas'notwithstanding temporary assignment
of lease to stockholders). See SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 247 (1954) : "your
committee does not intend to change existing law with respect to attribution of income of
shareholders to their corporation as exemplified for example in the case of Commissioner v.
First State Bank of Stratford."
471. United States v. Horschel, 205 F2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1953); Commissioner v
Henry Hess Co., 210 F.2d 553, 558 (9th Cir. 1954) (accrual-basis corporation held not tax-
able on profit which was neither determinable nor received until after its dissolution).
472. See text at notes 435-44 supra.
473. The Commissioner apparently relied upon U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.3797-2 (1953)
to support an economic test: "If the conduct of the affairs of a corporation continues after
... the termination of its existence, it becomes an association."
474. "Competent evidence" valued the film at $973,866.25 as of the time of the distribu-
tion. Herbert v. Riddell, 103 F. Supp. 369, 382 (D.C. Cal. 1952).
475. 9 T.C. 364 (1947), iwn-acq., 1948-1 Csnx. BuL.. 4, aff'd, 170 F.2d 911 (2d Cir.
1948).
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liquidation was an "open transaction" so that the commissions subsequently
collected by her were treated as received in exchange for the stock.
470
The Carter case is to be contrasted with the liquidation of a cash-basis cor-
poration holding unpaid claims for oil brokerage commissions not contingent
upon delivery. This apparently was the situation in Floyd v. Scofield.477 There
the claims could be "accrued" by the corporation and would have fair market
value in the hands of the stockholders. Accordingly the commissions, less a re-
serve for doubtful accounts, would be includible in corporate income for the year
ending with the dissolution. Presumably, an equal amount would be included in
computing the stockholder's capital gain upon the liquidation, with the result that
the amounts later collected would be tax-free to the stockholder up to this
amount 478 and ordinary income to the extent that they exceeded it.470 This treat-
ment of the commissions on the corporate and stockholder levels would be self-
consistent: the entire amount of the commissions would be taxed once as
ordinary income, either to the corporation or to the stockholder.
Viewed against this background, the Carter result makes little sense. Solely
because the commissions in Carter were subject to a contingency at the time of
dissolution, they escaped tax as ordinary income, both at the corporate level
and at the stockholder level. If the contingency prevents the commissions from
being taxed to the corporation, it would not seem illogical to omit the contin-
gent claims in computing the stockholder's capital gain at the liquidation and
to tax the collection of the claims as ordinary income from personal services.
Until and unless the "economic" test is adopted 480 or the Carter treatment of
the stockholder overruled, 48 ' the way is clear for the conversion of personal
476. This interpretation was based upon Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931), hold-
ing that where stock was sold for future payments based upon coal to be obtained from a
mine, the seller of the stock did not realize capital gain until the payments exceeded the cost
of the stock. Logan involved no corporate tax avoidance because the income from the coal
operations was presumably subject to corporate tax before payment to the seller.
477. See text at note 468 supra.
478. INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954, § 334(a) codifies the rule that fair market value of property
distributed in a corporate liquidation is the distributee's basis.
479. Lewin v. Westover, 53-2 U.S. TAX CAs. 9619 (D.C. Cal. 1953) (income from film
distribution contract held ordinary income to stockholders to the extent that it exceeded esti-
mate used in computing capital gain upon liquidation). See also Osenbach v. Commissioner,
198 F.2d 235 (4th Cir. 1952).
480. It is not clear whether the Commissioner would attempt to tax the corporation on
the entire commissions if the Carter case were to arise again. See Rev. Rul. 255, 1953 INT.
Ray. BULL. No. 24, at 2 (1953) (accrual-basis corporation in dissolution taxable on com-
missions for completed brokerage services although (a) commissions did not become payable
until after shipment of goods by seller and (b) taxpayer's consistent practice was to accrue
commissions only after shipment). The ruling fails to state whether the claims for commis-
sions were contingent upon actual shipment.
481. This is unlikely because of Arrowsmith v. Commissioner. See note 358 supra. The
Court's viewing together all the 1937-1944 liquidation events in order to determine the
nature of the 1944 loss seems to support the Carter "open transaction" concept. But it can
be argued that the Arrowsmith principle should cause the commissions to retain their
character as ordinary income even though received by the stockholders rather than the cor-
poration.
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service income into capital gain without payment of corporate tax by liquidat-
ing corporations with contingent claims to income.482
Disposing of the Stock
With few exceptions the sale of all or a part of the taxpayer's stock is a
legally certain way to capital gains on the appreciation in its value attributable
to his efforts. Practically, however, the stockholder may encounter difficulty
finding a purchaser willing to pay a satisfactory price for the stock, especially
if it is a minority common stock interest in a closely-held corporation.4 3 And
this difficulty is intensified in the case of the typical personal service enterprise
in which corporate earning power is largely dependent upon the activities of
the original stockholders, although its stock may have some value to an out-
sider by reason of accumulated earnings or good will. A second major diffi-
culty with a sale of common stock is that the seller loses at least part of his
stake in the future of the enterprise. Taken together, these factors tend to
reduce the size of the capital gain and to prevent its repetition.
Redemption 484 of the stock by the corporation eliminates both dilution of
interest and the search for a purchaser, but it raises a new question, whether
part of the amount received may be taxed at graduated rates either as compen-
sation or as a dividend. The employee who sells his stock to the corpora-
tion usually runs only a mild risk of receiving taxable compensation. The
Commissioner may find it difficult to establish an intent to compensate even
where he can prove the redemption price to be in excess of reasonable value
of the stock.485 In the absence of this excess value his difficulties are still
greater. Thus in the typical case the sale is pre-arranged in the employment
contract, which sets a price-frequently by a formula based on book value-at
which the employer must buy and the employee must sell upon terminating his
employment. Although the few decisions to date sanction capital gains treat-
482. The Commissioner may also (a) contend that Carter is inapplicable where any
services remain to be performed after the liquidation and (b) contest the fact that the claims
are completely devoid of fair market value, unlike the Carter case where he apparently
agreed to this crucial fact. Although film distribution contracts have been held to have fair
market value, Lewin v. Westover, 53-2 U.S. TAx CAs. 19619 (S.D. Cal. 1953), the courts
are unlikely to find fair market value where the claim is subject to a contingency similar to
that in Burnet v. Logan, supra note 476. See, e.g., Westover v. Smith, 173 F2d 90 (9th Cir.
1949).
483. Cf. Estate of Charles NV. Heppenstall, 8 T.C.M. 136 (1949) (minority interest in
closely-held corporation valued at less than book value for gift tax purposes because holder
could not compel liquidation).
484. The trend of recent decisions is to classify a sale of stock to the issuing corporations
as a "redemption" which may be subject to dividend taxation under IT,"r. REv. CoE oF 1939,
§ 115 (g) (1), even though the corporation does not retire the acquired shares but holds them
as treasury stock. See authorities collected by Murphy, Hou to Handle Treasury Stoc;
Distinction between Treasury Stock and Unissued Stock: Is There Any Justification for
This? N.Y.U. 10TH INST. ON FED. TAx. 1161 (1952). This interpretation is made statutory
by INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 317(b).
485. See te.xt at note 311 supra.
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ment of the employee under agreements of this general type, 480 the entire gain
might be compensation where the employee's rights are so limited that he can
be regarded as never having owned stock at all.
The dividend risk is minimal for the stockholder, such as the typical non-
proprietor, who surrenders his entire stock interest in the corporation; but a
proprietary stockholder is ordinarily unwilling to sacrifice all or a substantial
part of his interest in the control and future growth of the business,48 7 or to
liquidate the corporation and operate it in unincorporated form.488 If the pro-
prietor surrenders a part of his stock without terminating or substantially re-
ducing his proportionate interest in the corporation, the redemption payment
will probably be taxed to him as a dividend. 489 Accordingly, the major objec-
tive of controlling stockholders has been to find methods to pocket the
appreciation in value of their corporation with neither a loss of their proportion-
ate interest in the enterprise nor a dividend tax-to have their cake and eat it
too.
To date Congress, the courts, and the Commissioner have blocked some
but not all of these methods. If the stockholder attempts to withdraw
corporate earnings at capital gains rates by a complete liquidation preceded 410
486. See, e.g., Estate of Raymond T. Marshall, 20 T.C. 979 (1953) (capital gain allowed
to retiring employee who sold stock for price measured by dividends of next ten years). Cf.
Patent Button Co. v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 479 (2d Cir. 1953), affirming, 11 T.C.M. 262
(1952) (employer corporation denied compensation deduction for amounts paid to former
employee upon exercise of option to resell stock at current book value which he had pur-
chased at 80 percent of book value). See also Willard D. Avery, Tax Court Docket No.
49397 (1953) (additional compensation alleged to arise upon compulsory resale at book value
by retiring employee of stock purchased at book value; corporate employer attempted to de-
duct part of the purchase price).
487. Where the owners of the corporation are willing both to relinquish its control and
to accept stock of a corporate purchaser in full or part payment for their old stock, the ex-
change can be set up as a "reorganization" (see note 432 supra), thus deferring or eliminat-
ing all or part of the capital gains tax, depending upon whether "boot" is also received and
whether the new stock is retained by the seller until his death. For the definition of "non-
proprietor" see note 291 supra.
488. When the enterprise is continued in unincorporated form, the stockholder's capital
gain tax upon the liquidation may be substantially increased by the good will acquired by
him. See Schwartz, Good Will in the Tax Law: A Correlation, 8 TAx L. REV. 96, 98 (1952).
489. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 115(g) (1) ; INT. Ray. COD OF 1954, § 302(b) (1), (2),
(3). Pro rata redemptions have occasionally been held not to be "essentially equivalent to
a dividend" where the redemption served some legitimate non-tax purpose: (1) segregation
of risky activities, John L. Sullivan, 17 T.C. 1420 (1952), aff'd, 210 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1954) ;
L. M. Lockhart, 8 T.C. 436 (1947) ; (2) facilitation of employee stock purchases, Commis-
sioner v. Snite, 177 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1949) ; (3) improvement of corporate credit stand-
ing, Isaac C. Eberly, 10 T.C.M. 1.157 (1951); (4) reflection of contraction in volume of
business, Clarence R. O'Brien, 10 T.C.M. 1122 (1951).
The 1954 Code effects two principal changes: § 302(c) adds constructive ownership
rules, and § 302(b) (5) provides that in determining whether a redemption is "essentially
equivalent to a dividend," no weight shall be given to the fact that the Tedemption is not sub-
stantially disproportionate. See also the new definition of "partial liquidation" in § 346.
490. Lewis v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1949), discussed by Wittenstein,
Boot Distributions and Section 112(c)(2); A Re-examination, 8 TAx L. REv. 63 (1952).
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or followed 491 by the transfer of some of the assets to another
controlled corporation, the two steps may be viewed together as
a "reorganization ' 492  coupled with a dividend.40 3  And if he seeks
to effect a tax-free division of the corporation into two or more
corporations, one of which is then sold or liquidated, the courts are likely to
view the successive steps as a single transaction, not within the spirit of the
non-recognition provisions, and levy a dividend tax 494 whether the divisiun
takes the form of a "split-up," 495 "split-off,"190 or "spin-off."-49 T This risk is
increased by Section 355 of the 1954 Code. The new section expressly hinges
the tax-free status of all types of corporate divisions 4 8 on two conditions
See also Ernest F. Becher, 22 T.C. No. 112 (1954) ; William M. Lidden, 22 T.C. No. 150
(1954).
491. Survaunt v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1947). See Bittker & Redlich,
Corporate Liquidations and the Income Tax, 5 TAx L. REv. 437, 453-5 (1950). But see
United States v. Arcade Company, 203 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1953) ; Charles R. Mathis, Jr.,
19 T.C. 1123 (1953).
492. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 112(g) (1) (D); IN-r. REV. CODE OF 1954, §363(a) (1)-
(D).
493. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 112(c) (2) and/or § 115(g) (1), U.S. Treas. Reg. 118,
§ 39.112(g)-i (b) (1953); INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 302(b) (1) and/or § 356(a) (2). Sec-
tion 357 of H.R. 8300 (House Bill) provided that an individual should be deemed to receive
a taxable "boot" distribution if he failed to prove that tax avoidance was not one of the
"principal purposes" of a tax-free transfer to a 50 percent-owned corporation of more than 50
percent of the assets received by him during the past 5 years in the complete or partial liqui-
dation of another corporation. This provision was eliminated by the Senate. See H.R. Ru.
No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1954) (the Conference Report) : "[T]he possibility of tax
avoidance in this area is not sufficiently serious to require a special statutory provision. It
is believed that this possibility can appropriately be disposed of by judicial decision or by
regulation within the framework of the other provisions of the bill."
494. See Danzig, Distribution of Corporate Operations with a Vicw to Sale of Part of
the Business, N.Y.U. 11TH INsT. ON FED. TAx. 891 (1953) ; Michaelson, "Business Pur-
pose" and Tax-Free Reorganication, 61 YALE L.J. 14 (1952).
495. An exchange of all assets of the old corporation for the stock of two or more new
corporations, followed by dissolution of the old corporation and distribution to its share-
holders of the stock of the new corporations was tax-free undLr INT. REV. CuI .,F 1939,
§§ 112(b) (3), (g) (1) (D). See Johnson, Split-Offs and Split-Ups, N.Y.U. llTH INsT.
ON FED. TAx. 285 (1953).
496. An exchange of part of the assets of the old corporation for the stock of one or
more new corporations, followed by distribution of the stock of the new corporation(s) to
the shareholders of the old corporation in exchange for a part of the old corporation's stock
was tax-free under the Ix. REv. CODE OF 1939, §§ 112(b) (3), (g) (1) (D). Chester E.
Spangler, 18 T.C. 976 (1952), acq., 1953-1 Cum. BuLL 6; Rev. Rul. 289, 1953 I.T. Rnv.
BuLT. No. 26, at 10.
497. A "spin-off" was similar to a "split-off" except for (a) the retention by the share-
holders of all of their stock in the old corporation and (b) additional statutory requirements
intended to prevent tax-avoidance. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, §§ 112(b) (11), (g) (1) (D).
See Rapp, Spin-Offs, N.Y.U. 11TH Ixsr. ON FED. TAx. 343 (1953). Cf. Rev. Rul. 54-139,
1954 INT. REv. BULL No 16, at 8 ("spin-off" tax-free where sole stockholder has no inten-
tion of selling or otherwise disposing of any stock of either corporation or liquidating either
corporation).
498. See SEN. REs. NTO. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 266 (1954).
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derived from, but broader than, those set forth in the 1951 "spin-off" amend-
ment.409 First, a distribution by corporation A of the stock of its 80 percent
controlled 500 corporation B will be tax-free only if A's stockholders can prove
that "the transaction was not used principally as a device for the distribution
of the earnings and profits of the distributing corporation or the controlled
corporation or both." 501 Secondly, each corporation must engage in "the active
conduct of a trade or business" immediately after the distribution . 0 2 This
prevents a corporation from segregating liquid assets purchased with earnings
in a separate corporation and then distributing its stock tax-free. Section 355
also hinders a corporation from using its earnings to form or buy tip a second
business in order to make a tax-free distribution of stock in that business.
The distribution is taxable if, during the five preceding years, the new busi-
ness was acquired for consideration consisting in any part of cash or property
other than stock or securities of the acquiring or a related corporation.603
However, it still seems possible to siphon off earnings through a divisive re-
organization if the corporation buys and holds a secondary business for at
least five years before the distribution.
50 4
Sales to Sister Corporations
Multiple corporations facilitate capital gain withdrawals, especially if an en-
terprise can be divided among several "sister" corporations initially, or if a
going corporation can be so divided without incurring a dividend tax. Ordin-
arily, the sale or dissolution of even an inessential branch of the business, e.g.,
one store in a retail chain, has at least one disadvantage: the branch is lost to
the owners or must be operated in unincorporated form. And a personal ser-
vice enterprise typically has no expendable functions. However, no part of the
499. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 112(b) (11), added by Revenue Act of 1951, § 317(a),
65 STAT. 452 (1951).
500. NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 368(c).
501. Id. §355(a) (1) (B). Cf. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, §39.112(b) (l1)-2(d), Examples
(1953). Section 355 may be more lenient than the old section 112(b) (11) because of the
addition of a provision that a sale of stock or securities in one or more of such corporations,
unless negotiated before distribution, "shall not be construed to mean that the transaction
was used principally as such a device."
502. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 355(b) (1) (A). An exception is provided for certain
holding companies. Id. § 355 (b) (1) (B).
503. Id. §§ 355(b) (2) (B), (C), (D). See also id. § 368(a) (1) (C) and (b) (acqui-
sition of assets in exchange for stock of corporation in control of the acquiring corporation)
discussed in SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 263, 273, 275 (1954).
504. By a happy coincidence, the 80 percent stock ownership required by § 355 may
allow the parent to accumulate surplus for the reasonable needs of the new subsidiary. See
SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1954) : "where the taxpayer has 80 percent or
more of the voting stock of another corporation, the taxpayer should be viewed as though It
engaged directly in the business of such other corporation." Since no provision to this effect
appears in the statute itself, it is not clear how much weight will be accorded to this Con-
gressional dictum. For a typical pre-1954 Code decision see Latchis Theatres of Keene, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 54-2 U.S. TAx CAs. 1[ 9544 (lst Cir. 1954).
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business need be sacrificed or operated in unincorporated form when it is sold
to a sister corporation.
Before the 1954 Code a stockholder, X, controlling several corporations
could withdraw earnings as capital gains by selling part of his stock in corpora-
tion A to corporation B, and part of his B stock to A1. r,0 These cross-sales are
largely blocked by the new Section 304. Now, if A purchases stock of B from
X, a person in control 5" of both corporations, the full payment by A is treated
as a distribution in redemption of A's own stock, 07 but the character of this
distribution is made to depend upon the extent of any change in X's propor-
tionate ownership of B.508 Because X is deemed to continue to own his B stock
constructively through A,50 9 the transaction does not result in a termination
or substantial reduction of his interest in B.' 0 Consequently, the entire distri-
bution 511 will usually be taxed to X as a dividendY '
While the 1954 Code limits dividend tax avoidance through intercompany
sales of stock, it opens new avoidance possibilities through intercompany sales
of assets. Section 337, the Court Holding Co. provision, eliminates corporate
tax on sales of assets made within one year after the adoption of a plan of
complete liquidation, including the sale of non-capital assets if sold to "one
person in one transaction."5 13 This section might allow the controlling stock-
holder to withdraw earnings of both corporations as capital gain by causing
505. Emma Cramer, 20 T.C. 679 (1953) (capital gains allowed upon sale of stock in
three corporations to a fourth, all of which were owned in nearly the same proportions by
selling stockholders). In Commissioner v. 'Wanamaker, 178 F.2d 10 (3d Cir. 1949), § 115
(g) (1) of the 1939 Code was construed to be inapplicable to the purchase of stock of its
parent by a subsidiary corporation because the subsidiary did not redeem or cancel "its"
stock. Section 115(g) (2) was enacted in 1950 to overrule the WVanamn!ier case but the
Senate refused to extend § 115(g) to purchases of stock by "sister" corporations. Smr.. REP.
No. 2 375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1950).
506. IxT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 304(c) (1). For this purpose "control" is defined as the
ownership of stock possessing 50 percent of the voting power or 50 percent of the total
value of all classes of stock. A person is deemed to control a subsidiary of a controlled cor-
poration.
507. Id. § 304(a) (1). The amount, if any, taxable as a dividend is limited by the earn-
ings and profits of corporation A rather than corporation B. Id. § 304(b) (2) (A).
508. Id. § 304(b) (1).
509. For the purpose of determining whether a redemption is exempt from dividend
tax as a "substantially disproportionate distribution" under id. § 302(b) (2), a person is
deemed to own stock held by related taxpayers including his proportionate interest in stock
held by certain corporations. Id. §§ 302(c) (2), 318(a). For the purposes of § 304, a tax-
payer is also deemed to own stock held by an intermediate corporation even though he does
not own, either directly or constructively, a 50 percent interest in the intermediate corpora-
tion. Id. §304(b) (1).
510. Id. §§ 302(b) (2), (3).
511. X's basis for his B stock is not subtracted from the amount received from A but
is added to his basis for his A stock as if he had made a contribution of capital to A. Id.
§ 304(a) (1), last sentence.
512. Unless he could make a factual showing that the distribution was not "essentially
equivalent to a dividend." Id. § 302(b) (1). See note 489 supra.
513. See text at notes 452-5 supra.
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corporation B to adopt a plan of complete liquidation, sell its operating assets
and good will to corporation A, and then distribute to him the sales proceeds
and its other liquid assets.5 14
Sales of Preferred Stock Dividends
A sale of non-voting, non-participating preferred stock was another pre-1954
device used by proprietary stockholders to obtain capital gains without impair-
ment of their control or interest in future corporate growth. The theory of this
device was to issue preferred shares to the common stockholders as a tax-free
stock dividend 515 or recapitalization. 516 A fractional part of each stockholder's
basis for his common stock would then become his basis for the preferred
shares,5 17 so that the sale of the preferred at or near its market value would
result in capital gain. Later the circle could be closed by redeeming the pre-
ferred from its purchaser.
Prior to the 1954 Code, the Commissioner took the position that if, at the
time of a preferred stock dividend or recapitalization, there was a plan to sell
the preferred, the preferred shares should not be received tax-free or their sale
should give rise to ordinary income.5 1 8 In C. P. Chamberlin,"10 the Tax Court
accepted at least the first of these theories and taxed as a dividend a distribu-
tion of preferred stock which had been tailored to the specifications of the
purchaser, even to the extent of mandatory annual retirements commencing
sixteen months after the issuance. The Tax Court was reversed by the Sixth
Circuit and certiorari was denied.5 2 0 Even if other circuits accept the Com-
missioner's theories as to pre-1954 transactions, it is doubtful that they will
employ them in less obvious cases, e.g., where there is a substantial interval
between the issuance of the preferred and the making of arrangements for its
514. The controlling stockholder would receive B's earnings and any earnings of A
received by B as part of the sales price of B's assets. But query whether the liquidation
of B is "complete" under Section 337?
515. See, e.g., Strassburger v. Commissioner, 318 U.S. 604 (1943) (dividend of pre-
ferred shares on common ruled tax-free where only common was outstanding).
516. Under INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, §§ 112(b) (3), (g) (1) (E), or IrNT. REv. CODr oF
1954, §§ 354 and 368(a) (1) (E), the surrender of old common in exchange for new common
and preferred would be tax-free to the stockholders, assuming the presence of "business
purpose" for the transaction. See Platt, Preferred Stock Dividends and Recapitalkzations
after the Bazley and Adams Cases, N.Y.U. 7TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 561 (1949).
517. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, §§ 113(a) (6), (19) ; INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 307, 358,
518. His theories were that the preconceived sale changed the stockholders' proportion-
ate interests in the corporation, so that the preferred stock dividend was not within the
rationale of Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920) ; Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371
(1943) ; Strassburger v. Commissioner, 318 U.S. 604 (1943) ; and Helvering v. Sprouse,
318 U.S. 604 (1943), and that the transaction was in substance a sale of the preferred by
the corporation followed by a cash dividend of the sales proceeds. See Darrell, Recent
Developments in Non-taxable Reorganizations and Stock Dividends, 61 HARv. L. REv. 958
(1948) ; DeWind, Preferred Stock "Bail-Outs" and the Income Tax, 62 HARV. L. RiV.
1.126 (1949).
519. 18T.C. 164 (1952).
520. Chamberlin v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
918 (1954).
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sale or redemption. This state of the law presented several practical obstacles
to the use of the preferred stock "bail out" by a personal service corporation.
Outsiders would be likely to invest in a corporation dependent on the activities
of a few individuals only in reliance upon rapid redemption provisions. These
provisions would increase the tax risk of the common stockholders. Near
relatives or business associates might be willing to gamble on the permanence
of the corporation's personnel, but a redemption of preferred stock sold to
them might be taxed as a dividend.1-21
After a bad start in the House Bill,522 the 1954 Code has drastically curtailed
the capital gains benefits of preferred stock. Section 306 provides that if pre-
ferred shares are distributed as a stock dividend r or in a tax-free reorganiza-
tion, the entire proceeds of their subsequent sale will be treated as gain from
sale of a non-capital asset to the extent that a cash distribution equal to the
fair market value of the stock at the time of the stock distribution would have
been taxed as a dividend at that time.524 Section 306 is inapplicable where the
521. Pre-1954 law was unsettled as to redemptions from persons so closely related to
the common stockholders as to "be equivalent to one economic unit." farie AV. F. Nugent-
Head Trust, 17 T.C. 817 (1951), acq., 1952-1 Cum. Buu.. 3. See the Treasury's proposal
(subsequently withdrawn) to amend Reg. 111, § 29.115(g)-1 (a) (2) (1943), P-H 1951 FED.
TAx Smrv. 1 76,019. See also Leopold Adler, 30 B.T.A. 897 (1934), aff'd on other grounds,
77 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1935); William Grimditch, 37 B.T.A. 402 (1938) (redemptions of
stock acquired by gift or inheritance).
522. H.R. 8300 (House Bill) would have imposed upon the corporation a "transfer
tax' of 85 percent of any amounts distributed in redemption of "non-participating" stock
within ten years from its issuance, with certain exceptions. Because the transfer tax did not
apply to redemptions of either "participating stock" (as defined in § 312(b) of the Bill) or
"securities" (as defined in § 312(a)), the Bill would have permitted "bail outs" effected by
redeemable non-voting common stock or securities subordinated to claims of trade creditors.
And it would have been possible for the common stockholders to issue themselves preferred
stock redeemable after ten years, hold it for eight or nine years, and then sell it to outsiders
from whom it would be redeemed in the eleventh year. Also the transfer tax could apparent-
ly have been avoided by having the redemption qualify as a dividend to a purchaser of the
preferred such as a tax-exempt charitable institution, an insurance company, or any cor-
poration enjoying a low bracket for intercompany dividends. The overall effect of the House
Bill would probably have been to encourage the "bail-outs" it purported to "eliminate." See
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1954).
523. Stock dividends may now be received free of tax whether or not the distribution
alters the recipient's proportionate interest in the corporation. INT. REv. Con oF 1954,
§ 305(a). See SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1954).
524. IN. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 306(a) (1) (A). The selling stockholders will not be
entitled to the new dividend credit under id. § 34. However, the credit will be available
under the corollary rule that if the preferred shares are subsequently redeemed by the cor-
poration, the redemption proceeds will generally be treated as a dividend to the ezxtent of
corporate earnings at the time of the redemption. Id. § 306(a) (2). SEr. RE_.. No. 1622,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 242 (1954). The statute anticipates and taxes a variety of possible
schemes to avoid these rules. See, e.g., SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 242 (1954)
(pledges of distributed stock) ; id. at 244-5 (exchange of distributed stock for common stock
of controlled corporation which is sold to outsiders) ; id. at 245 (issuance of low value stoc:
with limited earnings assigned to it, followed by change in terms to render it more .aluable).
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preferred shares are sold by the estate or legatee of the stockholder who re-
ceived them as a stock dividend or in a reorganization, but this will be small
consolation if the stock of a personal service corporation becomes unmarketable
upon the death of one of its principal stockholders." 5
CONCLUSION
The many instances of capital gains taxation of the fruits of personal efforts
are accidental by-products of unrelated technicalities in the tax law. No inten-
tion has been expressed by Congress or the courts to extend the capital gains
tax to personal service income as such. Congress has merely approved some
instances of this extension as "incentives" 520 and relief from "unduly harsh"
taxation 527 while condemning others as "loopholes. '5 25  Similarly, the courts
have repeatedly reached contradictory conclusions in parallel cases, 20 largely
because of economically insignificant technicalities used to define a "sale or
exchange" of "property." Together Congress and the courts have produced
a jumble of ad hoc solutions to specific problems, apparently giving little
thought to the relation of personal service income to the general scope and
purpose of the capital gains tax.
A possible explanation for the hodgepodge is that scope and purposes have
dimmed with the passing years since the introduction of the capital gains tax
in 1921. It is only necessary to contrast recent capital gains opinions with
those of the 'twenties and 'thirties to document the proposition that much less
weight is now given to considerations of policy. 2 0 The few and cryptic official
statements of capital gains philosophy and an unceasing and bewildering series
of amendments to the statutory provisions "I may have made the rationale
of the capital gains tax so tenuous and uncertain that the courts--and perhaps
Congressmen--can no longer use it as a guide.
If this were the full explanation for the law's many inconsistencies, the remedy
would be a return to the original concept of the 1921 Act. In their age of
innocence, capital gains were thought to be gains from capital investments such
525. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 306(c) (1) (C), 1014. See SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 245 (1954). The absence of a § 306 tax would leave preferred with the ad-
vantage that it could be redeemed tax-free and with no loss of voting power by the estate to
pay death taxes and administration expenses. INT. Rrv. CODE OF 1954, § 303.
526.- SEN. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 59-60 (1950) (employee stock options).
527. SEN. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1951) (lump-sum payment in lieu of
contingent deferred compensation).
528. SEN. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1950) (capital gains for amateur
writers).
529. See, e.g., text at notes 104-1.10 and 129-34 (McFall and Corbyn), 182-7 and 188-
200 (O'Rear and Wyler), 216-20 and 221-4 (Helvering v. Smith and Swiren), 345-6 and
347-51 (Gwinner and Kuchman), 370-3, 371 (Laughton and Fox), 477-9 and 475-6 (Sco-
field and Carter) supra.
530. Compare Jones v. Corbyn, 186 F.2d 450, 452 (10th Cir. 1950), with Burnet v.
Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 106 (1932).
531. See Wells, Legislative History of Treatment of Capital Gains undcr the Federal
Income Tax, 1913-1948,2 NAT. TAx J. 12 (1949).
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as "farms, mineral properties, and other capital assets."' m2 A return to 1921
would require repeal of the amendments permitting capital gains on personal
effort, such as Section 165(b) 533 and Section 130A,5 34 and the overruling of
recent court decisions such as Corbyn,535 Wylcr,mo Swircn,r 7 Lehinan M and
Herbert.539 However, even such a sweeping reversal would not solve the
problem. It would affect only the most spectacular personal effort cases, and
would not touch the capital gains treatment of sales of sole proprietorships,
of partnership interests, and of stock in closely-held corporations, in all of which
personal efforts are thoroughly intermixed with other elements, particularly
the owners' financial investment. Capital gains have become clearly available
to sales of partnerships and sole proprietorships only during the past decade,
but they have been obtained by owners of closely-held corporations ever since
the 1921 Act. An attempt to restore the capital gains law to its lost purity
would be abortive because the law was never really pure.
A more important objection to an attempted withdrawal of the capital gains
tax from personal service income is the serious practical difficulty which would
be encountered in isolating the personal effort element upon the sale of an
interest in a business.5 40 Unless this problem can be solved satisfactorily, there
is little point in prohibiting capital gains in the relatively unimportant situa-
tions where repealing a section or overruling a case could accomplish the pro-
hibition. Capital gains would still be available in some personal service cases
solely by reason of formal distinctions without economic differences.
The root of the problem is that the capital gains concept itself is clear and
consistent neither in practice nor in principle.r' 1 The anomalies encountered in
personal effort situations are merely symptoms of this underlying confusion.
Any attempt to bring about fair or consistent tax treatment of the fruits of
personal effort is likely to be futile in the absence of a thoroughgoing reapprais-
al of the proper tax treatment of capital gains in a progressive income tax
system.
532. See notes 24 and 48supra.
533. Now § 402(a) of the 1954 Code. See text at notes 13-17 supra.
534. Now § 421,of the 1954 Code. See text at notes 18-31 and 313-18 supra.
535. See text at notes 129-34 supra.
536. See text at notes 188-200 supra.
537. See text at notes 221-4 and 244-63 supra.
538. See text at notes 353-60 supra.
539. See text at notes 435-44 supra.
540. See text at notes 181 and 378 mpra.
541. See Miller, The 'Capital Asset Concept: A Critique of Capital Gains Taxation,
Part II, 59 YAE L.J. 1057 (1950).
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